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  1. Propositions and Attitudes.Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.) - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The concept of a proposition is important in several areas of philosophy and central to the philosophy of language. This collection of readings investigates many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions and the ways they have been regarded through the years. Reflecting both the history of the topic and the range of contemporary views, the book includes articles from Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, the Russell-Frege Correspondence, Alonzo Church, David Kaplan, John Perry, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Mark Richard, Scott (...)
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  • On Sinn and Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1997 - In Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.), The Frege reader. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-172.
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  • Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
    This is the 1991 (2nd) edition of the 1986 book (MIT Press), considered to be the classic defense of Millianism. The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob (...)
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  • Pierre and the Fundamental Assumption.Joseph Owens - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):250-273.
    Kripke's Pierre puzzle undermines some of the central epistemic intuitions that underlie traditional defences of the Fregean assumption that sentences'S believes that Fa ‘and'S believes that Fb’ can differ in truth value, even though a = b. Millian theorists have seized on this and employed the puzzle to reject the Fregean assumption itself. I argue that Millians are correct in rejecting traditional defences of the Fregean assumption, but they are wrong in rejecting the Fregean assumption itself. To this end, I (...)
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  • Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
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  • A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
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  • Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Jan Wolenski - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (4):439-440.
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