Results for 'Gottlob Frege'

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  1. Gottlob Frege: Ist Wahrheit definierbar?David Löwenstein - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Didaktik der Philosophie Und Ethik 4:73-79.
    This paper presents a passage on truth from "Der Gedanke" and comments on its content and use in the classroom.
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  2. Gottlob Frege: On Sense and Reference (Reading, Translation into Arabic and Comment).Salah Osman - 2016 - Contexts, Language and Interdisciplinary Studies, Natural Sciences Publishing Cor., USA 1 (1):277 - 298.
    كان «فريجه» – على حد تعبير «دامت» – من أوائل من أدركوا أن نظرية المعنى، أو فلسفة اللغة، هي جزءٌ اساسي من الفلسفة ترتكز عليه كافة الأجزاء الاخرى؛ فإلى جانب دراساته التأسيسية الرائدة في الرياضيات والمنطق، كان يُؤسس ايضًا لفلسفة اللغة ببعض المقالات التي فاقت في تاثيرها وشهرتها تاثير وشهرة معظم أعماله الرياضية الأخرى، دون إقلال من شان هذه الأخيرة وريادتها. وهذه الدراسة بمثابة قراءة تحليلية – نقدية لمقاله الأكثر أهمية في هذا الصدد «في المعنى والإشارة»، مشفوعة بترجمة إلى العربية (...)
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  3.  41
    La Lógica de Gottlob Frege: 1879-1903.Joan Bertran-San Millán - 2016 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona
    In this dissertation I offer a global and detailed reconstruction of the logic developed by Gottlob Frege throughout his career. Even though Frege's logic suffered profound modifications from his initial formulation in Begriffsschrift to its revised version in Grundgesetze, the significant differences between these two works have been rarely taken at face value. I not only argue that these differences exist, but I also explain how they should be understood in the light of the evolution of (...)'s thought. First, I suggest a new reconstruction of Begriffsschrift's logic, which amounts to a completely novel reading of its formal system—one that contradicts the core of modern historical studies. In particular, I defend that this logic is not—as it has been repeatedly said—a second-order logic and provide the following reasons. (1) The language is not properly a formal language. (2) In Begriffsschrift there is only one sort of quantification: quantification over arguments. (3) Begriffsschrift's logic does not have a semantics in the modern sense. Second, I offer an explanation of the reasons that drive the evolution of Frege's logic. The transition from Begriffsschrift to Grundgesetze has been seldom addressed and never fully explained. According to my historical analysis, the switch from Frege's position concerning logic in Begriffsschrift to his later conception—finally established in Grundgesetze—can be articulated through the adoption of the distinction between concept and object as the basic element of the formal system. This leads to a formalisation of the notion of concept, which in the end drives to Grundgesetze's notion of function. Finally, I put forward a global analysis of Grundgesetze's logic. In this work, Frege develops a formal system that resembles in many relevant ways a second-order one. I suggest a reconstruction of this formal system that allows us to compare it with Begriffsschrift's. In particular, I formulate precisely every rule of inference proposed by Frege and especially focus on the rules of substitution. Moreover, I reflect on several meta-logical results that can be drawn from this reconstruction. (shrink)
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  4.  79
    Book Review: Gottlob Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic. [REVIEW]Kevin Klement - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (1):175-180.
    Review of Basic Laws of Arithmetic, ed. and trans. by P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (Oxford 2013).
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  5. Représentation, Coloration Et Éclairage Dans la Philosophie du Langage de Gottlob Frege.Klaus Speidel - 2006 - In Jocely Benoist (ed.), Propositions Et États de Choses. Vrin.
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  6. Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Vierteljahrsschrift Für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (2):192-205.
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  7. Frege, Gottlob (1848-1925).Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Philosophers.
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  8. Frege, Hankel, and Formalism in the Foundations.Richard Lawrence - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11).
    Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program “could be called formal” but is “completely different” from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege’s relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege’s foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel’s. This undercuts (...)
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  9. What Frege Meant When He Said: Kant is Right About Geometry.Teri Merrick - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (1):44-75.
    This paper argues that Frege's notoriously long commitment to Kant's thesis that Euclidean geometry is synthetic _a priori_ is best explained by realizing that Frege uses ‘intuition’ in two senses. Frege sometimes adopts the usage presented in Hermann Helmholtz's sign theory of perception. However, when using ‘intuition’ to denote the source of geometric knowledge, he is appealing to Hermann Cohen's use of Kantian terminology. We will see that Cohen reinterpreted Kantian notions, stripping them of any psychological connotation. (...)
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  10. Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can (...)
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  11. Frege's Influence on Wittgenstein: Reversing Metaphysics Via the Context Principle.Erich Reck - manuscript
    Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein (the later Wittgenstein) are often seen as polar opposites with respect to their fundamental philosophical outlooks: Frege as a paradigmatic "realist", Wittgenstein as a paradigmatic "anti-realist". This opposition is supposed to find its clearest expression with respect to mathematics: Frege is seen as the "arch-platonist", Wittgenstein as some sort of "radical anti-platonist". Furthermore, seeing them as such fits nicely with a widely shared view about their relation: the later Wittgenstein is supposed (...)
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  12. Frege, Kant e le Vorstellungen.Gabriele Tomasi & Alberto Vanzo - 2006 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 61 (supplement):227-238.
    Gottlob Frege criticized Kant's use of the term "representation" in a footnote in the Foundations of Arithmetics. According to Frege, Kant used the term "representation" for mental images, which are private and incommunicable, and also for objects and concepts. Kant thereby gave "a strongly subjectivistic and idealistic coloring" to his thought. The paper argues that Kant avoided the kind of subjectivism and idealism which Frege hints in his remark. For Kant, having "Vorstellungen" requires the capacity of (...)
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  13.  54
    Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.
    In ‘What’s Puzzling Gottlob Frege?’ Michael Thau and Ben Caplan argue that, contrary to the common wisdom, Frege never abandoned his early view that, as he puts it in Begriffsschrift, a statement of identity ‘expresses the circumstance that two names have the same content’ and thus asserts the existence of a relation between names rather than a relation between objects. The arguments at the beginning of ‘On Sense and Reference’ do, they agree, raise a problem for that (...)
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  14. Why Did Frege Reject the Theory of Types?Wim Vanrie - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):517-536.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege (...)
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  15. Aesthetic Gestures: Elements of a Philosophy of Art in Frege and Wittgenstein.Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Newton da Costa (eds.), Wittgensteinian (adj.) Looking at the World from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Berlin: Springer. pp. 506-18.
    Gottlob Frege’s conception of works of art has received scant notice in the literature. This is a pity since, as this paper undertakes to reveal, his innovative philosophy of language motivated a theoretically and historically consequential, yet unaccountably marginalized Wittgenstinian line of inquiry in the domain of aesthetics. The element of Frege’s approach that most clearly inspired this development is the idea that only complete sentences articulate thoughts and that what sentences in works of drama and literary (...)
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  16. Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls Und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik Zu Einem Transzendentalen Kern der Logik.David Löwenstein - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):514-531.
    Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at (...)
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  17. Situating Frege’s Look Into Language.Pierre Adler - 2008 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 8 (1):157-224.
    A presentation and discussion of Gottlob Frege's understanding of language, both natural and artificial, with close attention to his texts.
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  18. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem (...)
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  19.  58
    Logical Categories, Signs, and Elucidation in Frege.Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Ghent
    Frege's conception of the logical categories has vexed commentators for decades. In this dissertation, I argue that it revolves around two forms of internality. The first is the internality of its use in the expression of judgment to the sign. A proper understanding of that internality reveals how Frege's philosophical logic cannot be fit into the framework given by the contemporary syntax/semantics distinction. The second is the internality that obtains between the way in which Begriffsschrift signs stratify into (...)
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  20.  33
    Review of New Essays on Frege, Edited by G. Bengtsson, A. Pichler, and S. Säätelä. [REVIEW]Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 9:247-253.
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  21. Significado e Cognição. O Legado de Frege.João Branquinho - 2016 - In Léo Peruzzo Júnior E. Bortolo Valle (ed.), Filosofia da Linguagem. Curitiba, PR, Brasil: pp. 9 - 52.
    Queremos neste ensaio caracterizar de modo introdutório o essencial do legado de Gottlob Frege para a Filosofia da Linguagem contemporânea, identificando e caracterizando os traços distintivos mais genéricos de uma teoria do significado (ou conteúdo semântico) inspirada nas suas ideias seminais e contrastando-a com outras concepções actuais influentes acerca do significado, em especial as posições sobre o conteúdo singular (conteúdo expresso por nomes próprios e outros termos singulares) remotamente inspiradas em ideias de John Stuart Mill.
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  22. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which (...)
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  23.  27
    On Dummett's Interpretation and Criticisms of Frege's View of Meaning. (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2010 - Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 4 (37): 41-49.
    نگاهی به تفسیر و انتقادات دامت از آموزه‌های فرگه پیرامون مباحث معناشناختی .
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  24. Review of Perception: Essays After Frege, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW]James Genone - forthcoming - Mind.
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  25. Peirce entre Frege e Boole: sobre a busca de diálogos possíveis com Wittgenstein.Rafael Duarte Oliveira Venancio - 2012 - Estudos Semioticos (USP) 8 (2):99-108.
    O presente artigo busca debater a posição de Charles Sanders Peirce e dos primeiros estudantes peirceanos de Lógica (Christine Ladd e O. H. Mitchell nos Studies in Logic, 1883) dentro do debate inspirador da visão da linguagem dentro da Filosofia Analítica, conhecido como “Lingua Universalis contra Calculus Ratiocinator”, cujos primórdios podem ser traçados desde a filosofia de Gottfried Leibniz. Para isso, comparamos esse campo do pensamento peirceano com o debate crucial entre a conceitografia de Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879) (...)
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  26. Objects, Concepts, Unity.Ulrich Reichard - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Gruyter. pp. 213-224.
    The paradox of the concept horse has often been taken to be devastating for Frege’s ontological distinction between objects and concepts. I argue that if we consider how the concept-object distinction is supposed to account for the unity of linguistic meaning, it transpires that the paradox is in fact not paradoxical.
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  27.  4
    Logical Concepts Vs. Logical Operations.Tabea Rohr - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11):56 - 74.
    In what follows, the difference between Frege’s and Schröder’s understanding of logical connectives will be investigated. It will be argued that Frege thought of logical connectives as concepts, whereas Schröder thought of them as operations. For Frege, logical connectives can themselves be connected. There is no substantial difference between the connectives and the concepts they connect. Frege’s distinction between concepts and objects is central to this conception, because it allows a method of concept formation which enables (...)
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  28. The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise.Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2 (1):81-105.
    Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein‘s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution – the joint program was abandoned. Section 2 of this paper outlines the key points of that program, identifying what Russell and Wittgenstein each contributed to it. The third section determines precisely those features of their collaborative work that Frege criticized. Finally, building upon the evidence developed in (...)
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  29. Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False.Jessica Pepp - 2018 - In Eliot Michaelson Andreas Stokke (ed.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying. This is the conflict of saying what you think is false. The chapter shows how stubbornly saying what you think is false resists analysis. In traditional analyses of lying, saying what you think is false is analyzed in terms of saying something and believing that it is false. But standard cases of unconscious or divided belief challenge these analyses. Classic puzzles about belief from Gottlob (...) and Saul Kripke show that suggested amendments involving assent instead of belief do not fare better. I argue that attempts to save these analyses by appeal to guises or Fregean modes of presentation will also run into trouble. I then consider alternative approaches to untruthfulness that focus on (a) expectations for one’s act of saying/asserting and (b) the intentions involved in one’s act of saying/asserting. Here I introduce two new kinds of case, which I call “truth serum” and “liar serum” cases. Consideration of these cases reveals structural problems with intention- and expectation-based approaches as well. Taken together, the string of cases presented suggests that saying what you think is false, or being untruthful, is no less difficult and interesting a subject for analysis than lying itself. Tackling the question of what it is to say what you think is false illuminates ways in which the study of lying is intertwined with fundamental issues in the nature of intentional action. (shrink)
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  30. Wholistic Reference, Truth-Values, Universes of Discourse, and Formal Ontology: Tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...)
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  31. Force, Content and Logic.Michael Schmitz - 2019 - In Gabriele M. Mras, Paul Weingartner & Bernhard Ritter (eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Contributions of the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 221-223.
    The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently (...)
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  32. Force, Content and the Varieties of Unity (Old Version).Michael Schmitz - manuscript
    [This is an old version which is superseded by the published version. I keep it here for the record, as it has been cited.] A strict dichotomy between the force / mode of speech acts and intentional states and their propositional content has been a central feature of analytical philosophy of language and mind since the time of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks (2015, 2016) and Francois (...)
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  33.  16
    "Cała matematyka to właściwie geometria". Poglądy Gottloba Fregego na podstawy matematyki po upadku logicyzmu.Krystian Bogucki - 2019 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 44:1 - 20.
    Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of (...)
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  34. Objects of Thought.Ian Rumfitt - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meaning and Other Things: Essays on the Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In his book The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer advances a subtle defence of what he calls the ‘face-value’ analysis of attributions of belief and reports of speech. Under this analysis, ‘Harold believes that there is life on Venus’ expresses a relation between Harold and a certain abstract object, the proposition that there is life on Venus. The present essay first proposes an improvement to Schiffer’s ‘pleonastic’ theory of propositions. It then challenges the face-value analysis. There will be such things (...)
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  35. Categories of First-Order Quantifiers.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2018 - In Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska & Ángel Garrido (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present. Basel, Switzerland: pp. 575-597.
    One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1storder quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations. The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko, referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle is introduced for categorial (...)
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  36. Fregean de Re Thoughts.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2014 - Cognitio-Estudos 11 (1):1-12.
    This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back to Russellian (...)
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  37. Categories of First -Order Quantifiers.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2018 - Lvov-Warsaw School. Past and Present.
    One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1st order quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations.The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko, referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle is introduced for categorial (...)
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  38. An Analysis of Two Accounts on the Sense of Singular Terms.Alan Schwerin - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (3):221-231.
    This paper is a critical investigation of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's views on the sense or meaning of singular terms. In his famous "On denoting" Russell erects his case on objections that he raises against Frege. I suggest that Russell's criticisms of Frege are seriously misguided, due in large measure to the uneven applications of his terminology when addressing Frege's views.
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  39. What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):741-759.
    It is fairly widely accepted that Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan, and others showed in the 1960s–1980s that proper names, in particular uses by speakers, can refer to things free of anything like the epistemic requirements posited by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. This paper separates two aspects of the Frege–Russell view of name reference: the metaphysical thesis that names in particular uses refer to things in virtue of speakers thinking of those things and the epistemic thesis that (...)
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  40. Zelfpredicatie: Middeleeuwse en hedendaagse perspectieven.Jan Heylen & Can Laurens Löwe - 2017 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 79 (2):239-258.
    The focus of the article is the self-predication principle, according to which the/a such-and-such is such-and-such. We consider contemporary approaches (Frege, Russell, Meinong) to the self-predication principle, as well as fourteenth-century approaches (Burley, Ockham, Buridan). In crucial ways, the Ockham-Buridan view prefigures Russell’s view, and Burley’s view shows a striking resemblance to Meinong’s view. In short the Russell-Ockham-Buridan view holds: no existence, no truth. The Burley-Meinong view holds, in short: intelligibility suffices for truth. Both views approach self-predication in a (...)
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  41. Sense and Linguistic Meaning: A Solution to the Kirkpe-Burge Conflict.Carlo Penco - 2013 - Paradigmi 23 (3).
    In this paper I apply a well known tension between cognitive and semantic aspects in Frege’s notion of sense to his treatment of indexicals. I first discusses Burge’s attack against the identification of sense and meaning, and Kripke’s answer supporting such identification. After showing different problems for both interpreters, the author claims that the tension in Frege’s conception of sense (semantic and cognitive) accounts for some shortcomings of both views, and that considering the tension helps in understanding apparently (...)
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  42.  7
    Lógica: Una introducción sistemática e histórica.Agustina Borzi & Camillo Fiore - forthcoming - In Claudia Mársico & Rodrigo Illarraga (eds.), Un introductorio recorrido filosófico al pensamiento científico: historia, epistemología, lógica y sociedad. Buenos Aires: Teseo Press.
    En este capítulo ofrecemos una introducción sistemática e histórica a la lógica, disciplina que contribuyó en gran medida a la producción del conocimiento en general y a la formación del pensamiento científico en particular. La primera sección contiene la introducción sistemática: primero, presentamos las distintas disciplinas que forman parte de la lógica en el sentido amplio del término; luego, identificamos a la lógica en sentido canónico o estricto como el estudio la validez; por último, explicamos en qué sentido la validez (...)
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  43. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.
    This essay is a critical examination of how Edmund Husserl, in his appropriation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality into his phenomenology, deals with the very issues that shaped Brentano’s theory of intentionality. These issues concern the proper criterion for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena and the right explanation for the independence of the intentionality of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of their objects. Husserl disagrees with Brentano’s views that intentionality is the distinguishing feature of all mental phenomena (...)
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  44. A Forma Lógica de Afirmações de Existência.João Branquinho - 1998 - Disputatio 5 (s1):05-33.
    Há alguns anos atrás, algumas pessoas acreditavam que a tese de que a existência não é um predicado, uma tese defendida por autoridades como Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell, era um dos traços distintivos da chamada filosofia analítica. Que uma tal crença é afinal falsa pode ser tomado como mais um sinal da vitalidade e do anti-dogmatismo que caracterizam em geral a tradição analítica; e o mesmo se aplica a quaisquer outras crenças do género, que comprometam esta tradição (...)
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  45. Predict the Behavior: Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Action.Leonardo Caffo - 2011 - Dialettica and Filosofia (2011):1-8.
    The folk Psychology frames propositional attitudes as fundamental theoretical entities for the construction of a model designed to predict the behavior of a subject. A trivial, such as grasping a pen and writing reveals - something complex - about the behavior. When I take a pen and start writing I do, trivially, because I believe that a certain object in front of me is a pen and who performs a specific function that is, in fact, that of writing. When I (...)
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  46. Carl Stumpf in Prague (1879-1884). The Institutionalisation of Brentano's Philosophical Program in Prague.Denis Fisette - forthcoming - Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung (2018).
    This study is about Carl Stumpf's achievements during his stay in Prague (1879-1884). It can be considered a piece of sociology of knowledge that is meant to uncover the institutional mechanisms used by Brentano from Vienna in order to implement his philosophical program in Prague. I claim that Stumpf and Marty have been instrumental in Brentano's plans and strategies to consolidate his hold on philosophy and its institutions in Austria. There are also several aspects of Stumpf's and Marty's scientific activities (...)
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  47. Logic in Early Modern Thought.Katarina Peixoto & Edgar da Rocha Marques - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences,.
    Logical reflection in early modern philosophy (EMP) is marked by the instability of the period, although it is more lasting (the Port-Royal Logic was nevertheless used as a handbook in philosophy courses until the end of the nineteenth century). It started in the sixteenth century and ended in the nineteenth century, a period of 300 years during which there were deep transformations in the conceptions of authority and scientific method. For the history of twentieth-century philosophy, it was the period of (...)
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  48. Wyrażenia okazjonalne jako wyrażenia funkcyjne.Volha Kukushkina - 2008 - Diametros 17:1-29.
    I’m going to present a new idea about how to find the right place for the indexical and demonstrative expressions in Gottlob Frege’s semantics. My main thesis is: that it is possible to find such interpretation of Frege’s view on indexicals and demonstratives which is entirely “fregean” and is not vulnerable to the counterexamples given by Kaplan and Perry. According to the interpretation I propose, these expressions are functional and they denote first-level functions defined on objects. These (...)
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  49.  94
    Thoughts About Russell's Thoughts. [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1998 - Times Higher Education.
    This collection of essays by acclaimed philosophers explores Bertrand Russell's influence on one of the dominant philosophical approaches of this century. Michael Dummett argues that analytical philosophy began with Gottlob Frege's analysis of numbers. Frege had begun by inquiring about the nature of number, but found it more fruitful to ask instead about the meanings of sentences containing number words. Russell was to exploit this method systematically. I reflect on the essays of Charles R. Pigden, David Lewis (...)
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  50. Un acercamiento preliminar a la semántica fregeana.Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate - 2013 - INVENIO 31:23-31.
    El artículo no pretende ser estudio detallado de la semántica de Gottlob Frege, más bien, se caracteriza por ser un acercamiento a la distinción entre signo (Zeichen), representaciones (Vortellungen), sentido (Sinn) y referencia (Bedeutung) expuesta por el autor. La argumentación fregeana discute la manera desde la cual se puede referir, a través de signos, y como, de éstos, emerge un mundo (tercer mundo), de sentido, que puede estar o no ligado a una referencia. El presente estudio recurre a (...)
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