Results for 'Gottlob Frege'

653 found
Order:
  1. Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Vierteljahrsschrift Für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (2):192-205.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   117 citations  
  2.  81
    Der Gedanke.Eine logische Untersuchung / Misao. Jedno logičko istraživanje (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Gottlob Frege - 1987 - Dijalog 1 (1-2):33-49.
    Frege's essay "Der Gedanke.Eine logische Untersuchung" was first published in the Beitrage zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus for 1918-1919 and is one of three related logical studies published as a complete work by Gunther Patzig entitled Logische Untersuchungen in Gottingen, 1966 .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Gottlob Frege’s völkisch Political Theology.Stephen D’Arcy - 2022 - Politics, Religion, and Ideology 23 (2).
    Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) has been called ‘the undisputed father of analytic philosophy’ and ‘the most important logician since Aristotle.’ Even if his impact on philosophy were to extend no further than his decisive influence on leading early twentieth-century thinkers of the stature of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap, that alone would assure him a notable place in the history of modern philosophy. Nevertheless, there are other areas of Frege’s intellectual activity that have largely escaped the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Gottlob Frege: On Sense and Reference (Reading, Translation into Arabic and Comment).Salah Osman - 2016 - Contexts, Language and Interdisciplinary Studies, Natural Sciences Publishing Cor., USA 1 (1):277 - 298.
    كان «فريجه» – على حد تعبير «دامت» – من أوائل من أدركوا أن نظرية المعنى، أو فلسفة اللغة، هي جزءٌ اساسي من الفلسفة ترتكز عليه كافة الأجزاء الاخرى؛ فإلى جانب دراساته التأسيسية الرائدة في الرياضيات والمنطق، كان يُؤسس ايضًا لفلسفة اللغة ببعض المقالات التي فاقت في تاثيرها وشهرتها تاثير وشهرة معظم أعماله الرياضية الأخرى، دون إقلال من شان هذه الأخيرة وريادتها. وهذه الدراسة بمثابة قراءة تحليلية – نقدية لمقاله الأكثر أهمية في هذا الصدد «في المعنى والإشارة»، مشفوعة بترجمة إلى العربية (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Gottlob Frege and Gongsun Long in Dialogue.Nevia Dolcini & Carlo Penco - 2023 - Asian Studies 11 (1):267-295.
    This work addresses the critical discussion featured in the contemporary literature about two well-known paradoxes belonging to different philosophical traditions, namely Frege’s puzzling claim that “the concept horse is not a concept” and Gongsun Long’s “white horse is not horse”. We first present the source of Frege’s paradox and its different interpretations, which span from plain rejection to critical analysis, to conclude with a more general view of the role of philosophy as a fight against the misunderstandings that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Gottlob Frege.Kevin Klement - 2010 - In Dean Moyar (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 858-886.
    A summary of the philosophical career and intellectual contributions of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), including his invention of first- and second-order quantified logic, his logicist understanding of arithmetic and numbers, the theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) of language, the third-realm metaphysics of “thoughts”, his arguments against rival views, and other topics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Gottlob Frege: Ist Wahrheit definierbar?David Löwenstein - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Didaktik der Philosophie Und Ethik 4:73-79.
    This paper presents a passage on truth from "Der Gedanke" and comments on its content and use in the classroom.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. La Lógica de Gottlob Frege: 1879-1903.Joan Bertran-San Millán - 2016 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona
    In this dissertation I offer a global and detailed reconstruction of the logic developed by Gottlob Frege throughout his career. Even though Frege's logic suffered profound modifications from his initial formulation in Begriffsschrift to its revised version in Grundgesetze, the significant differences between these two works have been rarely taken at face value. I not only argue that these differences exist, but I also explain how they should be understood in the light of the evolution of (...)'s thought. First, I suggest a new reconstruction of Begriffsschrift's logic, which amounts to a completely novel reading of its formal system—one that contradicts the core of modern historical studies. In particular, I defend that this logic is not—as it has been repeatedly said—a second-order logic and provide the following reasons. (1) The language is not properly a formal language. (2) In Begriffsschrift there is only one sort of quantification: quantification over arguments. (3) Begriffsschrift's logic does not have a semantics in the modern sense. Second, I offer an explanation of the reasons that drive the evolution of Frege's logic. The transition from Begriffsschrift to Grundgesetze has been seldom addressed and never fully explained. According to my historical analysis, the switch from Frege's position concerning logic in Begriffsschrift to his later conception—finally established in Grundgesetze—can be articulated through the adoption of the distinction between concept and object as the basic element of the formal system. This leads to a formalisation of the notion of concept, which in the end drives to Grundgesetze's notion of function. Finally, I put forward a global analysis of Grundgesetze's logic. In this work, Frege develops a formal system that resembles in many relevant ways a second-order one. I suggest a reconstruction of this formal system that allows us to compare it with Begriffsschrift's. In particular, I formulate precisely every rule of inference proposed by Frege and especially focus on the rules of substitution. Moreover, I reflect on several meta-logical results that can be drawn from this reconstruction. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Conceptos clave de la filosofía de Gottlob Frege: Una introducción.Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias - 2022 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 8.
    El presente artículo tiene como principal objetivo introducir al lector algunos de los conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía de Gottlob Frege. Estos son: el binomio sentido/referencia, el valor veritativo de oraciones con elementos no referenciales, la distinción entre pensar, juzgar y aseverar, su concepción de los indéxicos y los demostrativos, así como su defensa de la existencia de un tercer reino. En algunos de ellos se mostrarán algunas problemáticas asociadas que han sido destacados por pensadores de renombre. Tal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Listy Gottloba Fregego. Uwagi o polskim wydaniu [rec. Gottlob Frege: Korespondencja naukowa]. [REVIEW]Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Folia Philosophica 48:1-24. Translated by Andrzej Painta, Marta Ples-Bęben, Mateusz Jurczyński & Lidia Obojska.
    The present article reviews the Polish-language edition of Gottlob Frege’s scientific correspondence. In the article, I discuss the material hitherto unpublished in Polish in relation to the remainder of Frege’s works. First of all, I inquire into the role and nature of definitions. Then, I consider Frege’s recognition criteria for sameness of thoughts. In the article’s third part, I study letters devoted to the principle of semantic compositionality, while in the fourth part I discuss Frege’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Book Review: Gottlob Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic. [REVIEW]Kevin C. Klement - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (1):175-180.
    Review of Basic Laws of Arithmetic, ed. and trans. by P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (Oxford 2013).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Représentation, Coloration et Éclairage dans la philosophie du langage de Gottlob Frege.Klaus Speidel - 2006 - In Jocely Benoist (ed.), Propositions Et États de Choses. Vrin.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Frege, Gottlob (1848-1925).Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Philosophers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Can Frege pose Frege's puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Frege, Hankel, and Formalism in the Foundations.Richard Lawrence - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11).
    Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program “could be called formal” but is “completely different” from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege’s relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege’s foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel’s. This undercuts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference.Kevin C. Klement - 2001 - New York: Routledge.
    This book aims to develop certain aspects of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning, especially those relevant to intensional logic. It offers a new interpretation of the nature of senses, and attempts to devise a logical calculus for the theory of sense and reference that captures as closely as possible the views of the historical Frege. (The approach is contrasted with the less historically-minded Logic of Sense and Denotation of Alonzo Church.) Comparisons of Frege’s theory with those (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  17. What Frege Meant When He Said: Kant is Right about Geometry.Teri Merrick - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (1):44-75.
    This paper argues that Frege's notoriously long commitment to Kant's thesis that Euclidean geometry is synthetic _a priori_ is best explained by realizing that Frege uses ‘intuition’ in two senses. Frege sometimes adopts the usage presented in Hermann Helmholtz's sign theory of perception. However, when using ‘intuition’ to denote the source of geometric knowledge, he is appealing to Hermann Cohen's use of Kantian terminology. We will see that Cohen reinterpreted Kantian notions, stripping them of any psychological connotation. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  18. Frege, Kant e le Vorstellungen.Gabriele Tomasi & Alberto Vanzo - 2006 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 61 (supplement):227-238.
    Gottlob Frege criticized Kant's use of the term "representation" in a footnote in the Foundations of Arithmetics. According to Frege, Kant used the term "representation" for mental images, which are private and incommunicable, and also for objects and concepts. Kant thereby gave "a strongly subjectivistic and idealistic coloring" to his thought. The paper argues that Kant avoided the kind of subjectivism and idealism which Frege hints in his remark. For Kant, having "Vorstellungen" requires the capacity of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Frege's influence on Wittgenstein: Reversing metaphysics via the context principle.Erich Reck - 2005 - In Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. I. London: Routledge. pp. 241-289.
    Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein (the later Wittgenstein) are often seen as polar opposites with respect to their fundamental philosophical outlooks: Frege as a paradigmatic "realist", Wittgenstein as a paradigmatic "anti-realist". This opposition is supposed to find its clearest expression with respect to mathematics: Frege is seen as the "arch-platonist", Wittgenstein as some sort of "radical anti-platonist". Furthermore, seeing them as such fits nicely with a widely shared view about their relation: the later Wittgenstein is supposed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  20. Situating Frege’s Look into Language.Pierre Adler - 2008 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 8 (1):157-224.
    A presentation and discussion of Gottlob Frege's understanding of language, both natural and artificial, with close attention to his texts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Frege, Thomae, and Formalism: Shifting Perspectives.Richard Lawrence - 2023 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 11 (2):1-23.
    Mathematical formalism is the the view that numbers are "signs" and that arithmetic is like a game played with such signs. Frege's colleague Thomae defended formalism using an analogy with chess, and Frege's critique of this analogy has had a major influence on discussions in analytic philosophy about signs, rules, meaning, and mathematics. Here I offer a new interpretation of formalism as defended by Thomae and his predecessors, paying close attention to the mathematical details and historical context. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Higher-Order Metaphysics in Frege and Russell.Kevin C. Klement - forthcoming - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the metaphysical views about higher-order logic held by two individuals responsible for introducing it to philosophy: Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Frege understood a function at first as the remainder of the content of a proposition when one component was taken out or seen as replaceable by others, and later as a mapping between objects. His logic employed second-order quantifiers ranging over such functions, and he saw a deep division in nature between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Why did Frege reject the theory of types?Wim Vanrie - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):517-536.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Aesthetic Gestures: Elements of a Philosophy of Art in Frege and Wittgenstein.Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Newton da Costa (eds.), Wittgensteinian (adj.) Looking at the World from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Berlin: Springer. pp. 506-18.
    Gottlob Frege’s conception of works of art has received scant notice in the literature. This is a pity since, as this paper undertakes to reveal, his innovative philosophy of language motivated a theoretically and historically consequential, yet unaccountably marginalized Wittgenstinian line of inquiry in the domain of aesthetics. The element of Frege’s approach that most clearly inspired this development is the idea that only complete sentences articulate thoughts and that what sentences in works of drama and literary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik zu einem transzendentalen Kern der Logik.David Löwenstein - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):514-531.
    Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  1
    Frege, Poincaré, Carnap, Kripke: cuatro réplicas a un dogma kantiano.Emilio Méndez Pinto - 2021 - Estudios: Filosofía, Historia, Letras 19 (138):147-166.
    I present the replies that Gottlob Frege, Henri Poincaré, Rudolf Carnap, and Saul Kripke made to the assumption that apriority and necessity are interchangeable synonyms, an assumption that I take, together with the assumptions that there is a split between analytic truths and synthetic truths and that there is a dichotomy between our conceptual schemes and empirical content, as a Kantian dogma.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Logical categories, signs, and elucidation in Frege.Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Ghent
    Frege's conception of the logical categories has vexed commentators for decades. In this dissertation, I argue that it revolves around two forms of internality. The first is the internality of its use in the expression of judgment to the sign. A proper understanding of that internality reveals how Frege's philosophical logic cannot be fit into the framework given by the contemporary syntax/semantics distinction. The second is the internality that obtains between the way in which Begriffsschrift signs stratify into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Peirce entre Frege e Boole: sobre a busca de diálogos possíveis com Wittgenstein.Rafael Duarte Oliveira Venancio - 2012 - Estudos Semioticos (USP) 8 (2):99-108.
    O presente artigo busca debater a posição de Charles Sanders Peirce e dos primeiros estudantes peirceanos de Lógica (Christine Ladd e O. H. Mitchell nos Studies in Logic, 1883) dentro do debate inspirador da visão da linguagem dentro da Filosofia Analítica, conhecido como “Lingua Universalis contra Calculus Ratiocinator”, cujos primórdios podem ser traçados desde a filosofia de Gottfried Leibniz. Para isso, comparamos esse campo do pensamento peirceano com o debate crucial entre a conceitografia de Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. On Dummett's Interpretation and Criticisms of Frege's View of Meaning. (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2010 - Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 4 (37): 41-49.
    نگاهی به تفسیر و انتقادات دامت از آموزه‌های فرگه پیرامون مباحث معناشناختی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  77
    El espejar y el retratar en la semántica de Frege.Lourdes Valdivia Dounce - 2015 - Signos Filosóficos 17 (34):78-97.
    Gottlob Frege sostuvo que las palabras-concepto sólo se refieren a conceptos no a objetos y que los términos singulares se refieren sólo a objetos no a conceptos. Estas tesis dan lugar a la paradoja del concepto, de acuerdo con la cual ‘el concepto F’ no se refiere a ningún concepto. Mark Textor sostiene que su principio del espejar explica el origen del problema. Sin embargo, argumento que su artículo no explica todas las consecuencias de las tesis de (...) y mi supuesto semántico ontológico puede verse como una consecuencia del principio del espejar de Textor. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Um estudo do estatuto das leis lógicas a partir de Frege.Samuel Cibils - 2013 - Porto Alegre: LUME - the Digital Repository of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
    Philosophy undergraduate course completion work published in 2015. This work examines Frege's concept of logical law and its relationship to other normative and descriptive approaches in the history of philosophy, as well as epistemological conceptions of the a priori aspects of mathematical knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Significado e Cognição. O Legado de Frege.João Branquinho - 2016 - In Léo Peruzzo Júnior E. Bortolo Valle (ed.), Filosofia da Linguagem. Curitiba, PR, Brasil: pp. 9 - 52.
    Queremos neste ensaio caracterizar de modo introdutório o essencial do legado de Gottlob Frege para a Filosofia da Linguagem contemporânea, identificando e caracterizando os traços distintivos mais genéricos de uma teoria do significado (ou conteúdo semântico) inspirada nas suas ideias seminais e contrastando-a com outras concepções actuais influentes acerca do significado, em especial as posições sobre o conteúdo singular (conteúdo expresso por nomes próprios e outros termos singulares) remotamente inspiradas em ideias de John Stuart Mill.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Review of New Essays on Frege, edited by G. Bengtsson, A. Pichler, and S. Säätelä. [REVIEW]Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 9:247-253.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Review of Perception: Essays After Frege, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW]James Genone - forthcoming - Mind.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.Nathan Bice - 2019 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. New Logic and the Seeds of Analytic Philosophy.Kevin C. Klement - 2019 - In John Shand (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth‐Century Philosophy. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 454–479.
    Analytic philosophy has been perhaps the most successful philosophical movement of the twentieth century. While there is no one doctrine that defines it, one of the most salient features of analytic philosophy is its reliance on contemporary logic, the logic that had its origin in the works of George Boole and Gottlob Frege and others in the mid‐to‐late nineteenth century. Boolean algebra, the heart of Boole's contributions to logic, has also come to represent a cornerstone of modern computing. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Fregean Side-Thoughts.Thorsten Sander - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):455-471.
    This paper offers a detailed reconstruction of Frege’s theory of side-thoughts and its relation to other parts of his pragmatics, most notably to the notion of colouring, to the notion of presupposition, and to his implicit notion of multi-propositionality. I also highlight some important differences between the subsemantic categories employed by Frege and those used in contemporary pragmatics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40. Towards a Fregean psycholinguistics.Thorsten Sander - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    This paper is partly exegetical, partly systematic. I argue that Frege's account of what he called “colouring” contains some important insights on how communication is related to mental states such as mental images or emotions. I also show that the Fregean perspective is supported by current research in psycholinguistics and that a full understanding of some linguistic phenomena that scholars have accounted for in terms of either semantics or pragmatics need involve psycholinguistic elements.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Objects, Concepts, Unity.Ulrich Reichard - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Gruyter. pp. 213-224.
    The paradox of the concept horse has often been taken to be devastating for Frege’s ontological distinction between objects and concepts. I argue that if we consider how the concept-object distinction is supposed to account for the unity of linguistic meaning, it transpires that the paradox is in fact not paradoxical.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise.Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2 (1):81-105.
    Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein‘s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution – the joint program was abandoned. Section 2 of this paper outlines the key points of that program, identifying what Russell and Wittgenstein each contributed to it. The third section determines precisely those features of their collaborative work that Frege criticized. Finally, building upon the evidence developed in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  43. "Cała matematyka to właściwie geometria". Poglądy Gottloba Fregego na podstawy matematyki po upadku logicyzmu.Krystian Bogucki - 2019 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 44:1 - 20.
    Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Logical Concepts vs. Logical Operations.Tabea Rohr - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11):56 - 74.
    In what follows, the difference between Frege’s and Schröder’s understanding of logical connectives will be investigated. It will be argued that Frege thought of logical connectives as concepts, whereas Schröder thought of them as operations. For Frege, logical connectives can themselves be connected. There is no substantial difference between the connectives and the concepts they connect. Frege’s distinction between concepts and objects is central to this conception, because it allows a method of concept formation which enables (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. The Decomposition of Thought.Nathan Bice - manuscript
    This paper defends an interpretation of Gottlob Frege’s views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in multiple, distinct ways. These multiple decompositions will often have distinct logical forms. I also argue against Michael Dummett and others that Frege was committed to the sense of a predicate being a function from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Wholistic reference, truth-values, universes of discourse, and formal ontology: tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. The senses of functions in the logic of sense and denotation.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):153-188.
    This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be "sense-functions," functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or "deviant" sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating any two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False.Jessica Pepp - 2018 - In Eliot Michaelson Andreas Stokke (ed.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying. This is the conflict of saying what you think is false. The chapter shows how stubbornly saying what you think is false resists analysis. In traditional analyses of lying, saying what you think is false is analyzed in terms of saying something and believing that it is false. But standard cases of unconscious or divided belief challenge these analyses. Classic puzzles about belief from Gottlob (...) and Saul Kripke show that suggested amendments involving assent instead of belief do not fare better. I argue that attempts to save these analyses by appeal to guises or Fregean modes of presentation will also run into trouble. I then consider alternative approaches to untruthfulness that focus on (a) expectations for one’s act of saying/asserting and (b) the intentions involved in one’s act of saying/asserting. Here I introduce two new kinds of case, which I call “truth serum” and “liar serum” cases. Consideration of these cases reveals structural problems with intention- and expectation-based approaches as well. Taken together, the string of cases presented suggests that saying what you think is false, or being untruthful, is no less difficult and interesting a subject for analysis than lying itself. Tackling the question of what it is to say what you think is false illuminates ways in which the study of lying is intertwined with fundamental issues in the nature of intentional action. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  49. Force, content and the varieties of unity (old version).Michael Schmitz - manuscript
    [This is an old version which is superseded by the published version. I keep it here for the record, as it has been cited.] A strict dichotomy between the force / mode of speech acts and intentional states and their propositional content has been a central feature of analytical philosophy of language and mind since the time of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks (2015, 2016) and Francois (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Force, content and logic.Michael Schmitz - 2019 - In Gabriele M. Mras, Paul Weingartner & Bernhard Ritter (eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Contributions of the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 221-223.
    The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 653