For much of its history, philosophy was not merely a theoretical discipline but a way of life, an "art of living." This practical aspect of philosophy has been much less dominant in modernity than it was in ancient Greece and Rome, when philosophers of all stripes kept returning to Socrates as a model for living. The idea of philosophy as an art of living has survived in the works of such major modern authors as Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Each of (...) these writers has used philosophical discussion as a means of establishing what a person is and how a worthwhile life is to be lived. In this wide-ranging, brilliantly written account, Alexander Nehamas provides an incisive reevaluation of Socrates' place in the Western philosophical tradition and shows the importance of Socrates for Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Why does each of these philosophers—each fundamentally concerned with his own originality—return to Socrates as a model? The answer lies in the irony that characterizes the Socrates we know from the Platonic dialogues. Socratic irony creates a mask that prevents a view of what lies behind. How Socrates led the life he did, what enabled or inspired him, is never made evident. No tenets are proposed. Socrates remains a silent and ambiguous character, forcing readers to come to their own conclusions about the art of life. This, Nehamas shows, is what allowed Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault to return to Socrates as a model without thereby compelling them to imitate him. This highly readable, erudite study argues for the importance of the tradition within Western philosophy that is best described as "the art of living" and casts Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Foucault as the three major modern representatives of this tradition. Full of original ideas and challenging associations, this work will offer new ways of thinking about the philosophers Nehamas discusses and about the discipline of philosophy itself. (shrink)

This article addresses the increasingly widespread view that Bourdieu's sociological analysis is flawed by excessive determinism and thus is anti-rationalist in its socio-political implications. Against this contention, it argues that works such as Distinction should be viewed as critiques of an absolutist universalism rather than of universalism as such. Moreover, Bourdieu's logic of practice, it is claimed, caters not only for a degree of autonomy at the level of the individual, but also identifies two key intellectual fields as pivotal cultural (...) accumulators of autonomous or critical thought: the artistic field and the scientific field. In this context, it is particularly important that one of his very late works, Science of Science and Reflexivity, gives such a vital role to the free `corporation' of scientists as judges of scientific reputations. His concept of artistic autonomy is further explored by illustrations from casestudies in historical sociology, by writers who have been decisively influenced by his sociology of literature. The article ends with an application of his ideas to contemporary newspaper obituaries of cultural producers. This illuminates in particular an underlying issue in his sociology: current dangers to artistic autonomy. (shrink)

The article focuses on the fact that the consequence of Bourdieu’s death is that we now have to respond specifically to the texts that he produced between 1958 and 2002, rather than to the impact of writing and political action in combination, which was his goal during his life. The article raises general questions about the status of social texts in relation to the practices of philosophy and social scientific enquiry to which Bourdieu must have returned in preparing his final (...) course of lectures, published in 2001 as Science de la science et réflexivité. It then offers three case studies of this relationship in action in Bourdieu’s early work, considering his textual and scientific practices. It discusses aspects of the contemporary philosophical debate about the referentiality of texts at the time of this early work and thus indicates that this was a question of continuous importance in Bourdieu’s work. The article next reflects on the significance of Bourdieu’s thinking in this respect for the ways in which we should now respond to his texts and deploy his concepts empirically. It takes three examples of different ways in which Bourdieu’s texts have become pretexts for further research practice. These are characterized as ‘academic exploitation’, ‘nominal appropriation’ and ‘informed divergence’. The conclusion is that Bourdieu’s work demands a reflexive response, which requires that respondents should analyse rigorously their own situations and the grounds for transferring received concepts, and that this entails detailed attention to both Bourdieu’s texts and the contexts of their production, rather than a superficial exploitation or appropriation of his ‘consecrated’ texts. (shrink)

Portrait de Pierre Bourdieu en forme d'hommage.

De la sortie des Héritiers (1964) à la Misère du monde (1993), Pierre Bourdieu a occupé une place importante dans la vie intellectuelle : objet de nombreuses critiques puis de larges célébrations, sans changer le moins du monde une théorie très vite échafaudée, il n'a cessé de faire de la polémique une arme " scientifique ", et de critiquer ses critiques. Profitant de l'audience élargie que lui a conférée la Misère du monde, le "savant" s'est transformé en " militant scientifiques (...) ", plus avide d'interventions sur les estrades politiques que de réflexion. Travaillant depuis vingt ans sur la place des intellectuels aux extrêmes de l'espace politique et sur leur rôle dans des combats souvent antidémocratiques, je me suis arrêtée sur l'œuvre complète de Bourdieu - léninisme pessimiste rehaussé par un lourd apparat scientifique -, puis sur le rôle du doctrinaire, peu soucieux d'expliquer ceux dont il s'improvise le porte-drapeau et voulant s'imposer comme " intellectuel total ". (shrink)

Scholarly activity presupposes a certain distance from the concerns of everyday life, which has both liberating and crippling effects. Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology hopes to undo these crippling effects by making the scholar aware of the limits of his/her ‘liberation’. Through his emphasis on the practical content of social life, Bourdieu provides a powerful alternative to theoretical critiques of contemporary society advanced by sociologists such as Adorno. At the same time, read against the background of Adorno’s ‘critical theory’, this reflexive move (...) itself appears as a limitation. Due to its emphasis on the conditions of sociological knowledge, reflexive sociology tends to subordinate ‘theory’ to ‘epistemology’ and, therefore, hinders the sociologist from imagining a different society. Read together, Bourdieu’s and Adorno’s works provide important insights about two potential dangers that remain on the path of the sociologist. Adorno’s critique of ‘scientism’ implies that adhering to an epistemological principle may not be enough to escape the ‘ fallacious’ representations of social reality, while Bourdieu’s critique of ‘theoreticism’ implies that one cannot grasp social reality without ‘touching’ it. (shrink)