This chapter challenges the conventional narrative that dignity is not an important or pervasive feature of the law of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It begins by locating human dignity in the case law on Article 3 and Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in order to explore the meaning that human dignity has been given by judges. Whilst accepting that no singular definition has been constructed around a theoretical premise, this chapter argues that dignity is related to (...) the idea of the equal worth of each human being who is due respect as an integrated, multidimensional whole. It then proceeds to map the uses of human dignity in the law of Great Britain and Northern Ireland across a wide range of legal fields and in relation to adjudication, legislation, and regulation. In doing so, this chapter provides the most detailed and systematic account of the uses of human dignity in the law of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It argues that both the wide reach of dignity and the key role it plays in many hard cases make it a core value of the law of the United Kingdom. (shrink)

This paper develops a phenomenological analysis of the disturbances of self-experience in dementia. After considering the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the notions of self and person in current research on dementia, we develop a phenomenological theory of the structure of self-experience in the first section. Within this complex structure, we distinguish between the basic level of pre-reflective self-awareness, the episodic sense of self, and the narrative constitution of the self. In the second section, we focus on dementia and argue (...) that, despite the impairment of narrative self-understanding, more basic moments of self-experience are preserved. In accordance with the theory developed in the first part, we argue that, at least until the final stages of the illness, these self-experience in dementia goes beyond the pure minimal self, and rather entail forms of self-reference and an episodic sense of self. (shrink)

This essay aims to correct a prevalent misconception about Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, which understands it to support a conception of human understanding as finite as Heidegger did, but in a more “conceptuallyconservative” way. The result is that Ricoeur’s work is viewed as incapable of addressing the most pressingproblems in contemporary Continental metaphysics. In response, it is argued that Ricoeur is in fact the firstto develop an infinite hermeneutics, which departs significantly from Heideggerian finitude. This positionis demonstrated by tracing the itinerary (...) from Heidegger’s account of aletheia to Ricoeur’s account ofattestation. The conclusion, then, not only clears Ricoeur of the stated charges, but also presents a moreviable path for the future of hermeneutics. (shrink)

Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.

Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.

This article situates The Course of Recognition in the context of Ricœurian philosophy and contemporary debates on mutual recognition. This article reconstructs the debate between Ricœur and mainstream recognition scholars, as well as with the other figures, such as Boltanski, Thévenot and Hénaff, who had a direct influence in the way Ricœur fleshed out his alternative conception of recognition. By connecting recognition with Ricœur’s notions of ideology and utopia, we are able to uncover a major blind spot in the standard (...) model of recognition,and to undo ideological and reified forms of recognition. Honneth and Ricœur both aim at societies whose members are duly recognized, but they do so in radically different manners. Whereas Honneth’s model must be politicized in order to become relevant to social change, Ricœur evisages social change in a pure ethics of recognition. (shrink)

This essay examines Paul Ricœur’s views on recognition in his book The Course of Recognition . It highlights those aspects that are in some sense surprising, in relation to his previous publications and the general debates on Hegelian Anerkennung and the politics of recognition. After an overview of Ricœur’s book, the paper examines the meaning of “recognition” in Ricœur’s own proposal, in the dictionaries Ricœur uses, and in the contemporary debates. Then it takes a closer look at the ideas of (...) recognition as identification and as “taking as true.” Then it turns to recognition (attestation) of oneself, in light of the distinction between human constants (and the question “What am I?”), and human variables (and the question “Who Am I?”). The last section concerns the dialectics of struggles for recognition and states of peace, and the internal relationship between the contents of a normative demand and what counts as satisfying the demand. . (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur's early appreciation of hermeneutics introduced a dynamic interaction between a reader and a text. Employing both explanation and understanding, aided by the catalyst of Kantian creative imagination, Ricoeur revitalized hermeneutics from being simply a method of interpreting the literal meaning of a text. Such an openness to the text, as a form of otherness, initiated new insights into human ways of being and acting. In time, however, Ricoeur became disheartened by the unmerited suffering that he witnessed human beings (...) were inflicting on other beings. He qualified his hermeneutic foundations so as to introduce compassion and justice as modes of action towards rejected and mistreated others. (shrink)

Although Paul Ricœur never wrote a book on acting and suffering, the essay focuses on Ricœur’s engagement with this topic. It was one of Ricœur’s abiding interests that consistently appeared over the years in a number of his works. Given his compassionate affirmation of life in this world, he was vitally concerned about human beings’ inhumanity, in the form of inflicting unmerited suffering on their fellow beings. His distress on this issue was clearly evident. This essay is an overview of (...) Ricœur’s endeavors to try and alleviate such injustice by a commitment to an ethically grounded approach that aimed at “the good life with and for others, in just institutions.”. (shrink)

In the last decades of his life, Ricoeur was dismayed by the undiminishing amount of violence that humans inflicted on one another. He felt impelled to address this unjustified suffering. He moved from theoretical philosophical discussions to develop an ethical project directed toward a just society. I trace Ricoeur’s development, starting from Fallible Man and Freedom and Nature, by way of The Symbolism of Evil, Oneself as Another, and The Course of Recognition, as he delineates his project. In this journey, (...) Ricoeur emerges from the strict Protestant training of his youth to a more pluralist and inclusive ideal. During his elaboration of the ethical, as well as political and social conditions where human beings can flourish, Ricoeur does not appeal directly to religious terminology. Nonetheless, his work remains imbued with a deep love of humankind and wisdom, the roots of which remain entangled in his Christian background. (shrink)

The standard reply to the critique that narrative theories of the self are either chauvinistic or trivial is to “go implicit”. Implicit narratives, it is argued, are necessary for diachronically structured self-experience, but do not require that such narratives should be wholly articulable life stories. In this paper I argue that the standard approach, which puts forward a phenomenological conception of implicit narratives, is ultimately unable to get out of the clutches of the dilemma. In its place, I offer an (...) alternative approach that does avoid the dilemma, by construing implicit narrativity as an enabling condition for experiences, rather than as something that is itself present in experience. According to this constitutive account, the coherence and intelligibility of our experiences is due to the fact that they are anchored in a larger, diachronic context. This context, I argue, takes a fundamentally embodied and narrative dimension. (shrink)

Baedeker -- Independence. Truth in morals -- External skepticism -- Morals and causes -- Internal skepticism -- Interpretation. Moral responsibility -- Interpretation in general -- Conceptual interpretation -- Ethics. Dignity -- Free will and responsibility -- Morality. From dignity to morality -- Aid -- Harm -- Obligations -- Politics. Political rights and concepts -- Equality -- Liberty -- Democracy -- Law -- Epilogue. Dignity indivisible.

David Luban argues in this lecture that the moral foundation of the lawyer's profession lies in the defense of human dignity-and the chief moral danger facing the profession arises when lawyers assault human dignity rather than defend it. The concept of human dignity has a rich philosophical tradition, with some philosophers identifying human dignity as a metaphysical property of individuals-a property such as having a soul, or possessing autonomy. Luban argues instead that human dignity is a relational property of "the (...) dignifier" and "the dignified," emphasizing that assaulting human dignity humiliates the victim. Lawyers honor the human dignity of others by protecting them against humiliations, and defile that dignity by subjecting them to humiliations. The lecture develops these ideas through four traditional issues in legal ethics: the right of criminal defendants to an advocate, the duty of confidentiality, paternalism of attorneys toward their clients, and pro bono service. (shrink)

U ovom radu analizirano je shvaćanje ljudskog dostojanstva njemačkog pravnog teoretičara Güntera Düriga. Dürigovo tumačenje je desetljećima imalo snažan utjecaj na njemačku pravnu teoriju i ustavnu praksu, a ni s pojavom konkurentskog tumačenja u okviru »Maunz-Düriga« početkom novog milenija Dürigova rješenja nisu pala u zaborav. U radu su razvijene bitne točke, važne filozofske pretpostavke i implikacije Dürigovog tumačenja dostojanstva. Istovremeno je problematizirano njegovo shvaćanje smisla i statusa ljudskog dostojanstva u pravu, odnosa dostojanstva i ljudskih prava, nositelja dostojanstva, odnosa časti, ugleda (...) i dostojanstva, njegova ideja personalne etike, »objekt-formule«, kao i odnosa dostojanstva i slobode.This paper analyses the understanding of human dignity as conceived by Günter Dürig, German legal theorist. For decades his interpretation has had a strong influence on the German legal theory and constitutional practice, and even with the emergence of a rival interpretation in the framework of “Maunz-Dürig” by the beginning of the new millennium, Dürig’s solutions have not been forgotten. The paper develops key points, important philosophical presuppositions and implications of Dürig’s interpretation of dignity. At the same time, his understanding of the meaning and status of human dignity in law is problematized, together with the relationship of dignity and human rights, subjects of dignity, the relationship between honour, reputation and dignity, his idea of personal ethics, “object-formulas”, as well as the relationship between dignity and freedom. (shrink)