The description for this book, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation, will be forthcoming.

In _Leviathan_, Thomas Hobbes's landmark work on political philosophy, James Martel argues that although Hobbes pays lip service to the superior interpretive authority of the sovereign, he consistently subverts this authority throughout the book by returning it to the reader. Martel demonstrates that Hobbes's radical method of reading not only undermines his own authority in the text, but, by extension, the authority of the sovereign as well. To make his point, Martel looks closely at Hobbes's understanding of religious and rhetorical (...) representation. In _Leviathan_, idolatry is not just a matter of worshipping images but also a consequence of bad reading. Hobbes speaks of the "error of separated essences," in which a sign takes precedence over the idea or object it represents, and warns that when the sign is given such agency, it becomes a disembodied fantasy leading to a "kingdom of darkness." To combat such idolatry, Hobbes offers a method of reading in which one resists the rhetorical manipulation of figures and tropes and recognizes the codes and structures of language for what they are-the only way to convey a fundamental inability to ever know "the thing itself." Making the leap to politics, Martel suggests that following Hobbes's argument, the sovereign can also be seen as idolatrous—a separated essence—a figure who supplants the people it purportedly represents, and that learning to be better readers enables us to challenge, if not defeat, the authority of the sovereign. (shrink)

This is the first major work in English to explore at length the meaning, context, aims, and vital importance of Thomas Hobbes's concepts of the law of nature..

In this important new book, Quentin Skinner shows us, with rare precision and eloquence, a world with which we are undoubtedly far less familiar than he, that of humanist rhetoric, and uses his deep knowledge of it to illuminate the recesses of a thinker with whom we feel we are all too familiar. In so doing he opens our eyes to different ways of thinking about early modern political philosophy and provides us with a Hobbes quite different from the one (...) we thought we knew, and the context in which to understand him. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes assigned indispensable, peace-directed roles to conscience in his moral and political philosophy. This paper first locates Hobbes's definition of conscience in its historical context by highlighting commonalities with scholastic and seventeenth-century doctrines. Second, it shows that Hobbes imposed numerous stringent obligations on conscience in the natural condition. Third, it analyses Hobbes's account of conscience as 'shared knowledge' in Chapter 7 of Leviathan and considers the possible targets for his polemics. Finally, it lays out the chief responsibilities of conscience (...) in society, clarifies the relationship between 'private' and 'public' conscience, and identifies major tensions in Hobbes's theory. (shrink)

It has often been argued that, notwithstanding his commitment to the authoritarian state, Thomas Hobbes is a champion of the "minimal" version of liberty of conscience: namely, the freedom of citizens to think whatever they like as long as they obey the law. Such an interpretation renders Hobbes's philosophy more palatable to contemporary society. Yet the claim is incorrect. Alongside his notion of "private" conscience, namely, Hobbes develops a conception of conscience as a public phenomenon. In the following, it is (...) argued that this inconsistency serves the purpose of deception: it holds out the possibility of dissent while making it impossible to utilise. Arguably, moreover, this is the proper hermeneutical approach to take to Hobbes's inconsistencies in general. Indeed, said inconsistencies ought to alert contemporary normative theorists to the instability of the "minimal" version of liberty of conscience attributed to Hobbes: Hobbes himself, namely, shows that it is insufficient. (shrink)

The paper argues that Leviathan can be interpreted as employing a constructionist approach in several important respects. It takes issue with commentators who think that, if for Hobbes man is not naturally social, then man must be naturally unsocial or naturally purely individual. First, Hobbes's key conceptions of the role of artifice and nature-artifice relations are identified, and uncontroversially constructionist elements outlined, most notably Hobbes's conceptualisation of the covenant. The significance of crucial distinctions in Leviathan, between the civil and the (...) social, between science and philosophy, between mankind's nature and the human condition, is developed. A constructionist reading of the argument of Leviathan is then advanced. The interpretation focuses on the contribution of nature-artifice relations, and of Hobbes's notion of civil philosophy, in understanding the critical issues of the state of nature and individual subjectivity. This reconstruction of the meaning of the text highlights the necessarily social character of human life in Leviathan, expressed in the way that the social' gives meaning to the 'natural', as well as because for Hobbes we live in a mind-affected world of perception and ideas. Leviathan can be interpreted as, in particular, a political social construction, because both social and individual identity logically require the social order and arrangements that only a strong government can supply. The social world, in Leviathan, cannot exist prior to the generation of a political framework, in civil society, the commonwealth, and law. (shrink)

At least from Bentham's time, the dominant interpretive approaches to Hobbes's Leviathan have tended to soften and blur the despotic message of that book. Writers of otherwise very different persuasions and pursuing very different intellectual agendas have sought to soften the way Hobbes's political theory has been understood. In the effort to insulate and preserve obviously valuable aspects of that theory, the elements of tyranny so significant to the text of Leviathan have been ignored, distorted, obscured and denied. The upshot (...) has been to portray Hobbes as no more than a harmless proto-liberal. (shrink)

"The well-known moral and political doctrines of Leviathan have tended to overshadow Hobbes's speculations in other fields. In this book doctrines familiar from the treatises on 'Policy', as well as less familiar empirical and metaphysical theories, are given balanced consideration against the background of his philosophy of science."--Bookjacket.

The precise relationship between Hobbes's political philosophy and his late history of the English Civil War remains something of a puzzle. Given his well known doubts about the epistemological status of history, Behemoth or the Long Parliament is often treated as little more than a procrustean effort at forcing complex historical events into the bed of abstract theory that he had developed earlier. On this view, even Noam Flinker, who offers one of the few studies devoted to a close reading (...) of Behemoth, argues that Hobbes intended the work to be self repudiating, and that the dialogue form and the apparent confusions of one of the participants were meant to point readers to �the less rhetorical logic of the Leviathan�. Others, more impressed by Hobbes�s pragmatic intentions than his methodological pretensions, note that a primary motive for his political arguments was a horror at first of the prospect and then of the reality of civil war. They thus emphasize the significance of Behemoth for Hobbes and his interpreters. Robert Kraynak, for example, argues that it �is a work of primary importance� in completing the �history of civilization which is the logical beginning point of Hobbes's thought�, and that a complete understanding of his political theory is impossible without his analysis of the way in which �doctrinal politics and disputative science� had created political chaos in England. This interpretation correctly emphasizes the role of ideas, as opposed to economic interests, in his explanation of civil conflict. It also rightly notes didactic continuities between Behemoth and his earlier work. However, I argue below that it overestimates the extent to which Hobbes treats the general idea of opinion as an eliminable product of �artificial� historical relations rather than as a permanent feature of human psychology and action. Thus, it discounts the extent to which his understanding of the relationship between opinion and civil war was a product of his philosophy rather than of a 'history of civilization'. (shrink)