'Lysogeny is the hereditary power to produce bacteriophage'. This definition, coined by André Lwoff in 1953, seems simple enough. However, it summarizes a very complex history, which began with the discovery of bacteriophages. How was the novel relationship between a virus and a bacterial cell conceived? In what way did this relationship renew the question of the nature of viruses? How did it generate a theory of hereditary factors? It was soon shown that bacteria can produce a lysogenic agent without (...) exogenic phages. That was in 1925 with the discovery of lysogeny. In an attempt to throw light on the history of lysogeny, I have traced the work of Eugène Wollman from 1919 to 1943, and have examined the work of J. Bordet, O. Bail and F.M. Burnet. The second part of this paper is devoted to the experiments that led to the elucidation of lysogeny. Of particular importance was the shaping of the concept of 'prophage'. Lysogeny was studied anew and clarified at the Institut Pasteur in Paris under the guidance of André Lwoff. How was genetic determinism of lysogeny brought to light? What new models and new concepts then formed the basis of genetic analysis of the relationship between the virus and its bacterial host? These aspects are seen in the light of the work of André Lwoff, François Jacob, Joshua Lederberg and Elie Wollman. (shrink)

In the above pages I have sketched a history of the genesis and comparative evaluation of the repressor model of genetic regulation of enzyme induction. I have not attempted in this article to carry out an analysis of the more scientifically interesting fully developed Jacob-Monod operon theory of genetic regulations but such an analysis of the operon theory would not, I believe, involve any additional logical or epistemological features than have been discussed above. I have argued that the above account (...) of the development of a theory of enzyme induction involved inferential moves and well-characterized desiderata, of both empirical and non-empirical character, in the genesis and evaluation of new hypotheses and theories. I have also contended that the reasoning displayed in the genesis of a theory is in a large measure identical to that utilized in evaluating a theory. Both of these conclusions are at variance with the views of philosophers such as H. Reichenbach, Sir Karl Popper, and C.G. Hempel who have argued that the genesis of new hypotheses is primarily an irrational affair and that only the context of justification is susceptible of rational reconstruction. In the alternative view presented here, scientific discovery and scientific justification represent the application in contexts, which are primarily telically distinguishable, of a fundamentally unitary logic of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

The living world is one of complexity, the result of innumerable interactions among organisms, cells, molecules. In analyzing a problem, the biologist is constrained to focus on a fragment of reality, on a piece of the universe which he arbitrarily isolates to define certain of its parameters.In biology, any study thus begins with the choice of a “system.” On this choice depend the experimenter's freedom to maneuver, the nature of the questions he is free to ask, and even, often, the (...) type of answer he can obtain. (shrink)