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  1. A Slim Book About Narrow Content.[author unknown] - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1115-1119.
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  • Fodor's Modal Argument.Frederick R. Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
    What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of (...)
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  • Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality.Bernard Molyneux - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):255 - 277.
    Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson.
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  • Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1981 - Synthese 49 (2):187-217.
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  • Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
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  • The Subject's Point of View. [REVIEW]Katalin Farkas - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):791-794.
    On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...)
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
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  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Dan Lloyd & Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):289.
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  • Must Psychology Be Individualistic?Frances Egan - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.
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  • Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
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  • Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  • Individuation and Causation in Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 707 (4):303-22.
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
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  • Can Mental Content Explain Behavior?Pierre Jacob - 2002 - In Languages of the Brain.
    I scrutinize the argument for why externally individuated mental content might not be causally efficacious in the explanation of an individual's physical movements. I argue that even though externalististically construed mental content might not explain an individual's physical movements, it might nonetheless explain his or her behavior on a componential view of behavior according to which an individual's physical movement is a component of his or her behavior.
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