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  1. What we cannot learn from analogue experiments.Karen Crowther, Niels S. Linnemann & Christian Wüthrich - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 16):1-26.
    Analogue experiments have attracted interest for their potential to shed light on inaccessible domains. For instance, ‘dumb holes’ in fluids and Bose–Einstein condensates, as analogues of black holes, have been promoted as means of confirming the existence of Hawking radiation in real black holes. We compare analogue experiments with other cases of experiment and simulation in physics. We argue—contra recent claims in the philosophical literature—that analogue experiments are not capable of confirming the existence of particular phenomena in inaccessible target systems. (...)
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  • Confirmation via Analogue Simulation: What Dumb Holes Could Tell Us about Gravity.Radin Dardashti, Karim P. Y. Thébault & Eric Winsberg - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    In this article we argue for the existence of ‘analogue simulation’ as a novel form of scientific inference with the potential to be confirmatory. This notion is distinct from the modes of analogical reasoning detailed in the literature, and draws inspiration from fluid dynamical ‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes. For that case, which is considered in detail, we defend the claim that the phenomena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case that its counterpart is detected (...)
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  • Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction.Keith J. Holyoak & Paul Thagard - 1989 - Cognitive Science 13 (3):295-355.
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  • Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic.J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2016 - Erkenntnis (2):01-19.
    We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combination of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity (as opposed to e.g. shared predicates) within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would (...)
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  • (1 other version)Seven Strictures on Similarity.Nelson Goodman - 2020 - Philosophia Scientiae 24:17-27.
    La ressemblance, je dirais, est sournoise. Et s’il est perfide d’associer la ressemblance à la perfidie, c’est encore mieux. Toujours prête à résoudre des problèmes philosophiques et à proposer ses services, la ressemblance est une hypocrite, une imposture, une arnaque. Si elle a, certes, ses lieux et ses usages, on la trouve plus souvent là où elle ne devrait pas être, s’attribuant des pouvoirs qu’elle ne possède pas. Aucune des restrictions que j’appliquerai ici à l’encontre de la ressembla...
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  • Analogical Predictive Probabilities.Simon M. Huttegger - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):1-37.
    It is well known that Rudolf Carnap’s original system of inductive logic failed to provide an adequate account of analogical reasoning. Since this problem was identified, there has been no shortage of proposals for how to incorporate analogy into inductive inference. Most alternatives to Carnap’s system, unlike his original one, have not been derived from first principles; this makes it to some extent unclear what the epistemic situations are to which they apply. This paper derives a new analogical inductive logic (...)
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  • Structure‐Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy.Dedre Gentner - 1983 - Cognitive Science 7 (2):155-170.
    A theory of analogy must describe how the meaning of an analogy is derived from the meanings of its parts. In the structure‐mapping theory, the interpretation rules are characterized as implicit rules for mapping knowledge about a base domain into a target domain. Two important features of the theory are (a) the rules depend only on syntactic properties of the knowledge representation, and not on the specific content of the domains; and (b) the theoretical framework allows analogies to be distinguished (...)
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