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Imagination

In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012)

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  1. Human creativity: Its cognitive basis, its evolution, and its connections with childhood pretence.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):225-249.
    This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other—namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a smooth and evolutionarily-plausible explanation (...)
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  • Morality, fiction, and possibility.Brian Weatherson - 2004 - Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-27.
    Authors have a lot of leeway with regard to what they can make true in their story. In general, if the author says that p is true in the fiction we’re reading, we believe that p is true in that fiction. And if we’re playing along with the fictional game, we imagine that, along with everything else in the story, p is true. But there are exceptions to these general principles. Many authors, most notably Kendall Walton and Tamar Szabó Gendler, (...)
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  • Desire in imagination.Gregory Currie - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-221.
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  • Why Pretend?Peter Carruthers - 2006 - In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Truth, Fiction and Literature: a Philosophical Perspective.Peter Lamarque & Stein Olsen - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):241-243.
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  • Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
    I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understanding (...)
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  • Melody and metaphorical movement.Rafael De Clercq - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2):156-168.
    In recent issues of this journal, Roger Scruton and Malcolm Budd have debated the question whether hearing a melody in a sequence of sounds necessarily involves an ‘unasserted thought’ about spatial movement. According to Scruton, the answer is ‘yes’; according to Budd, the answer is ‘no’. The conclusion of this paper is that, while Budd may have underestimated the viability of Scruton's thesis in one of its possible interpretations, there is no good reason to assume that the thesis is true. (...)
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  • Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn’t Behave Like Believing.Nichols Shaun - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (4):459-474.
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination‐based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite different psychological (...)
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  • Against simulation: The argument from error.R. Saxe - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.
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  • Imagining objects and imagining experiences.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  • Is young children’s recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds’ understanding of pretend sounds and speech.Ori Friedman, Karen R. Neary, Corinna L. Burnstein & Alan M. Leslie - 2010 - Cognition 115 (2):314-319.
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  • Imagination as motivation.Gregory Currie - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):201-16.
    What kinds of psychological states motivate us? Beliefs and desires are the obvious candidates. But some aspects of our behaviour suggest another idea. I have in mind the view that imagination can sometimes constitute motivation.
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  • The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.
    This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...)
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  • (1 other version)Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications.Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.) - 1995 - Blackwell.
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  • (2 other versions)Reading with Feeling: The Aesthetics of Appreciation.Susan L. Feagin - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):557-558.
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