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  1. Cotard syndrome in anti-NMDAR encephalitis: two patients and insights from molecular imaging.Jesus Ramirez-Bermudez - 2021 - Neurocase 27 (1):64-71.
    Cotard syndrome is a clinical condition defined by the presence of nihilistic delusions. We report two patients with Cotard syndrome in whom anti-NMDAR encephalitis (ANMDARE) was confirmed. Both cases showed features of affective psychosis, developed catatonic syndrome, and worsened after the use of antipsychotics. 18F-FDG PET brain studies showed a bilateral hemispheric pattern of hypometabolism in posterior regions, mainly in the cingulate cortex and in the medial aspects of parietal and occipital lobes. A more severe hypometabolism was observed in the (...)
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  • Addiction and the self.Hanna Pickard - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):737-761.
    Addiction is standardly characterized as a neurobiological disease of compulsion. Against this characterization, I argue that many cases of addiction cannot be explained without recognizing the value of drugs to those who are addicted; and I explore in detail an insufficiently recognized source of value, namely, a sense of self and social identity as an addict. For people who lack a genuine alternative sense of self and social identity, recovery represents an existential threat. Given that an addict identification carries expectations (...)
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  • Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding.Philip Gerrans - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):401-418.
    A flood of new multidisciplinary work on the causes of depersonalization disorder provides a new way to think about the feeling that experiences “belong” to the self. In this paper I argue that this feeling, baptized “mineness” or “subjective presence” : 565–573, 2013) emerges from a multilevel interaction between emotional, affective and cognitive processing. The “self” to which experience is attributed is a predictive model made by the mind to explain the modulation of affect as the organism progresses through the (...)
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  • Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience.Chris Letheby & Philip Gerrans - 2017 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 3:1-11.
    Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...)
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  • From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind.Micah Allen & Karl J. Friston - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2459-2482.
    Predictive processing approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered (...)
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  • I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  • Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights from the Study of Depersonalisation.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
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  • The narrative self.Marya Schechtman - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This article examines the narrative approach to self found in philosophy and related disciplines. The strongest versions of the narrative approach hold that both a person's sense of self and a person's life are narrative in structure, and this is called the hermeneutical narrative theory. This article provides a provisional picture of the content of the narrative approach and considers some important objections that have been raised to the narrative approach. It defends the view that the self constitutes itself in (...)
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  • Large-scale brain networks and psychopathology: a unifying triple network model.Vinod Menon - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):483-506.
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  • Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self.Anil K. Seth - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (11):565-573.
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  • Emotion and the Unreal Self: Depersonalization Disorder and De-Affectualization.Nick Medford - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):139-144.
    Depersonalization disorder (DPD) is a psychiatric condition in which there is a pervasive change in the quality of subjective experience, in the absence of psychosis. The core complaint is a persistent and disturbing feeling that experience of oneself and the world has become empty, lifeless, and not fully real. A greatly reduced emotional responsivity, or “de-affectualization,” is frequently described. This article examines the phenomenology and neurobiology of DPD with a particular emphasis on the emotional aspects. It is argued that the (...)
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  • A Liberal Account of Addiction.Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):1-22.
    Philosophers and psychologists have been attracted to two differing accounts of addictive motivation. In this paper, we investigate these two accounts and challenge their mutual claim that addictions compromise a person’s self-control. First, we identify some incompatibilities between this claim of reduced self-control and the available evidence from various disciplines. A critical assessment of the evidence weakens the empirical argument for reduced autonomy. Second, we identify sources of unwarranted normative bias in the popular theories of addiction that introduce systematic errors (...)
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  • Autonomy and addiction.Neil Levy - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.
    Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.
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  • Mineness first: three challenges to contemporary theories of bodily self-awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - In Frederique De Vignemont & Adrian J. T. Alsmith (eds.), The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 189-216.
    Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the (...)
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  • Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us?Jeanette Kennett & Doug McConnell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):470 - 489.
    ABSTRACT Choice theorists such as George Ainslie and Gene Heyman argue that the drug-seeking behaviour of addicts is best understood in the same terms that explain everyday choices. Everyday choices, they claim, aim to maximise the reward from available incentives. Continuing drug-use is, therefore, what addicts most want given the incentives they are aware of but they will change their behaviour if and when better incentives become available. This model might explain many typical cases of addiction, but there are hard (...)
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  • Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
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  • Learning What to See in a Changing World.Katharina Schmack, Veith Weilnhammer, Jakob Heinzle, Klaas E. Stephan & Philipp Sterzer - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.
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  • Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.Jakub Limanowski & Felix Blankenburg - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • The perception and categorisation of emotional stimuli: A review.Tobias Brosch, Gilles Pourtois & David Sander - 2010 - Cognition and Emotion 24 (3):377-400.
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  • Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account.Pablo Fernandez Velasco & Slawa Loev - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10847-10882.
    This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families (...)
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  • Is Addiction a Brain Disease?Kent C. Berridge - 2016 - Neuroethics 10 (1):29-33.
    Where does normal brain or psychological function end, and pathology begin? The line can be hard to discern, making disease sometimes a tricky word. In addiction, normal ‘wanting’ processes become distorted and excessive, according to the incentive-sensitization theory. Excessive ‘wanting’ results from drug-induced neural sensitization changes in underlying brain mesolimbic systems of incentive. ‘Brain disease’ was never used by the theory, but neural sensitization changes are arguably extreme enough and problematic enough to be called pathological. This implies that ‘brain disease’ (...)
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  • Comment: The Appraising Brain: Towards a Neuro-Cognitive Model of Appraisal Processes in Emotion.Tobias Brosch & David Sander - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (2):163-168.
    Appraisal theories have described elaborate mechanisms underlying the elicitation of emotion at the psychological-cognitive level, but typically do not integrate neuroscientific concepts and findings. At the same time, theoretical developments in appraisal theory have been pretty much ignored by researchers studying the neuroscience of emotion. We feel that a stronger integration of these two literatures would be highly profitable for both sides. Here we outline a blueprint of the “appraising brain.” To this end, we review neuroimaging research investigating the processing (...)
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  • Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account.Philip Gerrans - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Emotional Experience and Awareness of Self: Functional MRI Studies of Depersonalization Disorder.Nick Medford, Mauricio Sierra, Argyris Stringaris, Vincent Giampietro, Michael J. Brammer & Anthony S. David - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Empathy with One's Past.Peter Goldie - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):193-207.
    This paper presents two ideas in connection with the notion of empathic access to one's past, where this notion is understood as consisting of memories of one's past from the inside, plus a fundamental sympathy for those remembered states. The first idea is that having empathic access is a necessary condition for one's personal identity and survival. I give reasons to reject this view, one such reason being that it in effect blocks off the possibility of profound personal progress through (...)
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  • More of myself: Manipulating interoceptive awareness by heightened attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self.Vivien Ainley, Lara Maister, Jana Brokfeld, Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1231-1238.
    Psychology distinguishes between a bodily and a narrative self. Within neuroscience, models of the bodily self are based on exteroceptive sensorimotor processes or on the integration of interoceptive sensations. Recent research has revealed interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing of self-related information, for example that mirror self-observation can improve interoceptive awareness. Using heartbeat perception, we measured the effect on interoceptive awareness of two experimental manipulations, designed to heighten attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self. Participants gazed at a (...)
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  • The instrumental rationality of addiction.Hanna Pickard - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6):320-321.
    The claim that non-addictive drug use is instrumental must be distinguished from the claim that its desired ends are evolutionarily adaptive or easy to comprehend. Use can be instrumental without being adaptive or comprehensible. This clarification, together with additional data, suggests that Müller & Schumann's (M&S's) instrumental framework may explain addictive, as well as non-addictive consumption.
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  • 6 The Self as.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole & Dale L. Johnson (eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 6--103.
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  • How we think of others' emotions.Peter Goldie - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (4):394-423.
    As part of the debate between theory‐theorists and simulation‐theorists in the philosophy of mind, there is the question of how we think about the emotions of other people. It is the aim of this paper to distinguish and clarify some of the ways in which we do this. In particular five notions are discussed: understanding and explaining others’ emotions, emotional contagion, empathy, in‐his‐shoes imagining, and sympathy. I argue that understanding and explanation cannot be achieved by any of the other four (...)
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  • A visceral account of addiction.George Loewenstein - 1999 - In Jon Elster & Ole-Jørgen Skog (eds.), Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction. Cambridge University Press.
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  • Cyber Security: Effects of Penalizing Defenders in Cyber-Security Games via Experimentation and Computational Modeling.Zahid Maqbool, Palvi Aggarwal, V. S. Chandrasekhar Pammi & Varun Dutt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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