the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

Describes the changing sounds of the rain, the slow soft sprinkle, the drip-drop tinkle, the sounding pounding roaring rain, and the fresh wet silent after-time of rain.

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and ...

This article on the early history of phenomenological psychological research in the academic context in America focuses on the four approaches of the following respective psychologists: 1) Donald Snygg, Arthur W. Combs, and Anne C. Richards and Fred Richards; 2) Robert B. MacLeod; 3) Adrian L. van Kaam; and 4) Amedeo P. Giorgi. It begins by first addressing the "context" for this early history namely, the European origin of philosophical phenomenology and the connection of it with the psychology of its (...) times in Europe, and then the American background for the development of a sensibility for phenomenology and an eventual connection of phenomenology with psychology. Each of the four positions was examined in terms of basic approach to the study of human experience and behavior. That is, examination was directed toward whether the respective position was under the aegis of psychology as a human science or as a natural science. Also examined were the research postures and the methodologies of the four positions in terms of their respective degrees of reflecting either the human science or the natural science approach, and in terms of their approximation to a phenomenological psychology. It was found that syncretism characterized the approaches of the first three positions, and that there was either an absence of phenomenological psychological method in the psychologies of those positions or, in the case of MacLeod, an undeveloped and non-worked-out method. Only the work of Amedeo Giorgi presented 1) a human science approach that was radical and not compromised by natural science syncretions, and 2) an articulated phenomenological psychological method based on Husserl's concept of intentionality and on mediation of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical phenomenological method. (shrink)

From FRANZ BRENTANO's manuscripts for his Vienna lectures 1888/89. Photo by his son, Dr. John CM Brentano, Highland Park, Illinois...

This article provides a historical overview of the Existential-Phenomenological tradition in psychiatry and psychotherapy, tracing its development from its origin in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical thought, through its major European psychiatric proponents and schools, to its emergence as an influential approach in North America after World War II. The emphasis is on the implicit themes that provide continuity within this movement as well as on the distinctive contributions of individual thinkers. We conclude with a discussion of the present status (...) and future prospects of this tradition. (shrink)

The relationship between phenomenology and psychology in Husserl's writings has remained a controversial and unsettled issue. This work tracks the evolution of Husserl's understanding of this relation through the historical unfolding of his work, giving primary importance to the role of psychologism in both the determination of the nature of philosophical phenomenology and the requirements for an application of phenomenology to psychological understanding and practice. It is the conclusion of this historical exegesis and analysis of Husserl's work that psychology must (...) take its place within the transcendental framework provided by philosophical phenomenology if both philosophy and psychology are not to be rendered psychologistic. ;As a result, it is suggested that psychology operate through a return to the natural from the transcendental attitude, situating the psychic in the context of transcendental constitution. The context of Nature provided by naturalism is thus replaced by the "world of mind" in its historical and intersubjective constitution, and the concrete practice and understanding of psychology becomes informed by and infused with the social, cultural and historical aspects of the life-world which had been excluded by naturalism. Phenomenologically-informed psychology becomes in this way a "socio-cultural science." ;This work concludes with a discussion of examples of areas of psychological interest in which the contributions of a phenomenologically-informed psychology are elucidated. The significance of a phenomenological approach to psychology which is not psychologistic is demonstrated in the clarification of the distinction between psychological aspects of phenomena and the phenomena themselves which, while of psychological interest, are not themselves psychic in nature. As the life-world is rich and varied in its meanings, psychology must limit itself to a well circumscribed domain of the much larger whole which is our everyday lives, while at the same time remaining cognizant of the overall context of which it is only one part. ;This work thus argues for a more humble yet generous psychology; aware both of its limits and of what it has to offer in the way of exploration of one among several aspects of human existence. (shrink)