This book describes a new method of consulting the public that has been tried successfully around the world. The book combines the theory of democracy with actual practice. Fishkin lays out a theory of "deliberative democracy" and shows with practical examples, how it can be realized.

ABSTRACT George Bishop’s The Illusion of Public Opinion does a superb job of showing how various errors and malfeasances in conducting and interpreting surveys have created illusions about public opinion. It thereby offers a very useful compendium on how to do, and especially how not to do, survey research. Nothing in the book, however, provides persuasive evidence for either of two more troubling “illusion” arguments: that collective public preferences on policy issues do not exist; or that surveys cannot measure them. (...) Instead, Bishop’s examples show that even in obscure, low‐information situations, well‐designed survey questions generally reveal meaningful collective policy preferences that are coherent, well differentiated, and reflective of citizens’ basic interests and values. (shrink)

A major contribution to contemporary social theory. Not only does it provide a compelling critique of some of the main perspectives in 20th century philosophy and social science, but it also presents a systematic synthesis of the many themse which have preoccupied Habermas for thirty years. --Times Literary Supplement.

Using data from a randomized field experiment within a Deliberative Poll, this paper examines deliberation’s effects on both policy attitudes and the extent to which ordinal rankings of policy options approach single-peakedness (a help in avoiding cyclical majorities). The setting was New Haven, Connecticut, and its surrounding towns; the issues were airport expansion and revenue sharing – the former highly salient, the latter not at all. Half the participants deliberated revenue sharing, then the airport; the other half the reverse. This (...) split-half design helps distinguish the effects of the formal on-site deliberations from those of other aspects of the treatment. As expected, the highly salient airport issue saw only a slight effect, while much less salient revenue-sharing issue saw a much larger one. (shrink)

I respond to Fishkin?s critique of my book The State of Democratic Theory. I reiterate my defense of a competitive model of democracy geared to reducing domination, rather than Fishkin?s deliberative model that deploys structured discussion to enlighten mass preferences. In light of the literatures on framing effects and the value of mutually independent judgments, I question whether the procedures Fishkin recommends would produce outcomes that are better informed rather than differently informed. Recognizing that deliberation might sometimes be helpful in (...) reducing domination, I note that sometimes it will not, and I fault Fishkin for his indiscriminate embrace of exceedingly costly deliberative mechanisms that promise dubious benefits? notably his and Bruce Ackerman?s?Deliberation Day? (shrink)

ABSTRACT Contrary to George Bishop's claim, collective deliberation and cue‐taking permit even poorly informed individuals to form opinions that can accurately reflect their values and interests in light of available information. Statistical aggregation of poll results can smooth out offsetting errors and uncertainties and reveal collective preferences that are real, stable, consistent, coherent, differentiated, and responsive to information: preferences that policy makers should pay attention to. Media polls tend to be more useful for this purpose than academic surveys that encourage (...) “don't know” responses and use information‐based filters that bias estimates of collective preferences against lower‐income citizens, minorities, and others who tend to be less well informed. Media polls frequently ask about specific policy issues relevant to policy makers. Even biased poll questions of certain kinds can provide useful information about collective policy preferences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Benjamin Page's thoughtful critique of my book, The Illusion of Public Opinion, strives to reassure readers that all is well—despite the book's extensive documentation of measurement‐error artifacts in numerous public opinion surveys. Page's own careful polling practices are not followed outside of elite academic survey centers. Moreover, even in such well‐run surveys, the respondents are often ignorant of the issues being probed. The fact that nonrandom reasons of some sort must be determining on‐the‐spot survey responses may allow us to (...) call the respondents “rational” in a loose sense. But the responses still don't represent actual opinions about the specific policy issues being probed—let alone well‐informed answers. Finally, while Page argues that measurement errors are most likely random, and should cancel out in the aggregate, the “miracle of aggregation” doesn't occur when the form, wording, and context of questions varies from survey to survey. And even when wording and context are held constant, the respondents' understanding of the same words can vary dramatically or subtly over time, due to new political events and their changing interpretation. (shrink)