"This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.

The Mind of the Universe and Causality : In The Mind of the Universe Mariano Artigas builds a bridge connecting science and theology. One of the connections he establishes between the two areas of knowledge goes through the philosophy of nature, specifically through the study of causality; in fact, in The Mind of the Universe can be found ways to understand and to expose the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of causality that allow, on the one hand, the connection between science and theology (...) and, on the other hand, going deeper into the philosophical understanding of the natural world. (shrink)

The theoretical reliability of determinism. A review from the proposal of Mariano Artigas This article has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the theory of determinism, which claims to be based on the principles of experimental science, cannot be considered as an explanation compatible with such sciences. To do this, we use some ideas of Mariano Artigas on the explanatory power of scientific theories and their reliability from his book The Mind of the Universe. Through this process we (...) seek to achieve the second objective: to show the importance of the work of Artigas to dissolve complex contemporary debates, such as the current discussion about the existence of human freedom. (shrink)

Discusses the incompatibility of the concepts of free will and determinism and argues that moral responsibility needs the doctrine of free will.

This new edition includes a substantial postscript by the author, in which he responds to thirty years of discussion, criticism and further work in the field to ...

This study considers the ranges of the power of self-determination in human action, attending to the « status quaestionis » of the matter as it is contained in statements of Cicero on the Stoic position, his own thoughts on this matter, and the reception and re-reading of the theme in Thomas Aquinas. We thus attend to the Ciceronian exposition in De natura deorum, De divinatione and De fato on the Stoic position regarding the need for causal connection. We also study (...) the criticism added by Cicero to its transmission, and the projections of the problematic in Aquinas’s quaestio De fato, in the Summa Theologiae, and in other parallel passages. (shrink)

The formulation is persuasive. Yet clearly it does assert a necessary connection between any occurrence and its antecedents. In order for a different result to occur, there has to be a corresponding difference in the antecedents. This means that from any determinate set of antecedents, a single determinate result must follow. It is a formula for determinism. Anscombe wants to caution us not to take what it says for granted.

Este trabajo consiste en un estudio de la teoría del dominio, en el que se muestran algunos aspectos de la recepción que la obra de Tomás de Aquino registra de la filosofía de Aristóteles al respecto. Para llevar a cabo el análisis, se ha escogido como punto de partida la interpretación efectuada por Hannah Arendt —recogida luego por Jürgen Habermas—, según la cual ya en el Aquinate habría comenzado a abandonarse una filosofía genuinamente política del dominio en beneficio de una (...) de carácter estrictamente social; inicio, por lo demás, de un proceso que culminaría en el posterior auge en la Edad Moderna de la primacía de lo social y lo privado por encima de lo político y lo público. A fin de determinar la validez de este esquema hermenéutico —no carente, por cierto, de divulgación—, en primer lugar se realiza aquí un examen lingüístico de la enseñanza aristotélica y tomística sobre la realidad del dominio. Al respecto, se observa ante todo un carácter altamente analógico en la familia conceptual del término «dominio», al tiempo que es posible concluir que no existe beligerancia alguna entre lo social y lo político, ni en Aristóteles, ni en Tomás de Aquino. El extravío hermenéutico arendtiano se revela finalmente al considerar la orientación fundamental de la doctrina aristotélica y tomística del dominio, a saber, su servicio a la dimensión ultrapolítica de la actividad más propiamente humana, que es la del noûs. (shrink)

"Both Thomistic scholars and analytic philosophers interested in theories of human action and accountability will find this book a welcome addition to their libraries. Truly a substantive addition to both Thomistic scholarship and the ongoing analytic investigation into human action and responsible agency."—American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly "A first-rate book...Brock's lucid and illuminating analysis offers much of value to both intellectual historians and theologians, as well as philosophers."—Theological Studies"Brock's treatment of Aquinas's account of action exhibits a rare combination of rigor and (...) learning. It is, no doubt, the best we have."—The Thomist. (shrink)

In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to agent causation only in a (...) reducible sense. Written in an engaging style and incorporating recent scholarship, this study is critical reading for scholars and students interested in the topics of motivation, causation, responsibility, and freedom. In broadly covering the important positions of others along with its exposition of the author’s own view, Free Will provides both a significant scholarly contribution and a valuable text for courses in metaphysics and action theory. (shrink)

This article asks how we should understand the maxim liber est causa sui when we encounter it in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The maxim – most easily translated as “the free is the cause of itself” – is taken from the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,and Thomas uses it when he needs to show that something, or someone, is free. The first section of this paper shows that Thomas does not intend us to understand the maxim as indicating self-creation: (...) as he himself often says, Nihil est causa sui. The second part of this paper argues that Thomas intended us to understand something more than agent causality or acting “from oneself” when he cited this maxim. Thomas’s meaning when citing this maxim includes Aristotle’s meaning in writing it, and Aristotle did not primarily mean that the free being caused itself to act. Instead, he meant that the free being acted for the sake of an end that was its own – it acted “for its own sake.” Passages in which Thomas cites the maxim – particularly De veritate 24.1 – must be understood to include two senses of causa sui. When Thomas applies the words causa suito something, he does not simply mean that its actions are from itself or a se; he also intends to signify that its actions are “for its own sake” or propter se. (shrink)

This paper aims to explain how the human Self can be said a cause of his/her free actions, especially when they are voluntary and physical. First it is analyzed the natural causation in the physical world, particularly in self-organized living beings and afterwards in animal intentional behaviour, which is guided by cognition and emotions. An important distinction between downward causation and bottom-up causation is useful to explain the complex causality in self-organized intentional beings. Downward causation, coming from a higher level, (...) has in influence over lower ontological levels. Bottom-up causation operates inversely. It is also drawn a distinction between the “natural Self” (nature enhanced by habits) and the “intentional Self” (a subject endowed with consciousness and the power of controlling operations). This framework is applied to man, whose higher downward causality comes from the person (intellect and free will) and, guiding the sensitive lower layer of his/her nature, reaches in a quite natural way the voluntary control of the body. (shrink)