- Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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The Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Disappearing Agent.Filip Čeč - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 235-253.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.details
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Lehrer and the consequence argument.Danilo Šuster - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):77-86.details
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Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the "Order of Explanation": An Intervention.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):208-240.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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The truth in compatibilism and the truth of libertarianism.Helen Steward - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.details
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More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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The Power to Make Others Worship.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):221 - 237.details
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Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble. [REVIEW]Saul Smilansky - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):211-239.details
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Why free will remains a mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.details
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Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
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Action explanation and the free will debate: How incompatibilist arguments go wrong1.Scott Sehon - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.details
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A Defense of Derk Pereboom’s Containment Policy.Jeremy Scharoun & Neil Campbell - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1291-1307.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Maria Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.details
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The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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The Place of the Trace: Negligence and Responsibility.Samuel Murray - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):39-52.details
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The Three-Case Argument against the Moral Justificatory Significance of Basic Desert.Aleksandr Mishura - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (3):1327-1340.details
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The sweet mystery of compatibilism.Eugene Mills - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61.details
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Alternative possibilities and asymmetry.Erasmus Mayr - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):105-125.details
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Neural holism and free will.Daniel A. Levy - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-228.details
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Neural holism and free will.Donald Levy - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths.Andrew Law - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):110-123.details
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Traction without Tracing: A Solution for Control‐Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility.Matt King - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):463-482.details
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Freedom and the Fixity of the Past.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):179-207.details
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The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination.Ruth Groff - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):179-200.details
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Imperio y causalidad en Tomás de Aquino.María Teresa Enríquez Gómez & Jorge Martín Montoya Camacho - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (1):329-355.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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Powers, Necessity, and Determinism.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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