In this book two of the leading figures in argumentation theory present a view of argumentation as a means of resolving differences of opinion by testing the acceptability of the disputed positions. Their model of a 'critical discussion' serves as a theoretical tool for analysing, evaluating and producing argumentative discourse. They develop a method for the reconstruction of argumentative discourse that takes into account all aspects that are relevant to a critical assessment. They also propose a practical code of behaviour (...) for discussants who want to resolve their differences in a reasonable way. This is a major contribution to the study of argumentation and will be of particular value to professionals and graduate students in speech communication, informal logic, rhetoric, critical thinking, linguistics, and philosophy. (shrink)

The evaluation of arguments and argumentation is best understood epistemologically. Epistemic circularity is not formally defective but it may be epistemologically objectionable. Sorenson's doubts about the syntactic approach to circularity are endorsed with qualifications. One explanation of an argument's goodness is its ability to produce justified belief in its conclusion by means of justified belief in its premises, but matters are not so simple for interpersonal argumentation. Even when an argument's premises and conclusion are justified for a speaker, this justifiedness (...) may not be transmissible to every hearer. Still, an epistemic approaeh is instructive. Arguing in enthymemes can be legitimate, e.g., because enthymemes can help produce justified persuasion in an audience that supplies the missing premises. (shrink)

This volume contains 12 papers addressed to researchers and advanced students in informal logic and related fields, such as argumentation, formal logic, and communications. Among the issues discussed are attempts to rethink the nature of argument and of inference, the role of dialectical context, and the standards for evaluating inferences, and to shed light on the interfaces between informal logic and argumentation theory, rhetoric, formal logic and cognitive psychology.

Many argumentation theorists have adopted the view that argumentation may be approached from three different perspectives: the logical, the dialectical and the rhetorical—which I refer to as the Triumvirate.). According to Wenzel, the conceptual foundation for this Triumvirate is the distinction between argumentation as product, as process and as procedure. In this paper, I want to raise questions about the Triumvirate View and the Tripartite Distinction on which it is based.