Preface Part One Buddhism and Phenomenology Ch.1Buddhism and Phenomenology Ch.2 Husserl and Merleau-Ponty Part Two The Four Basic Buddhist Models in India Introduction Ch.3 Model One: The Five Skandhas Ch.4 Model Two: Pratitya-samutpada Ch.5 Model Three: Tridhatu Ch.6 Model Four: Sila-Samadhi-Prajna Ch.7 Asamjni-samapatti and Nirodha-samapatti Ch.8 Summary of the Four Models Part Three Karma, Meditation, and Epistemology Ch.9 Karma Ch.10 Madhyamikan Issues Ch.11 The Privilaging of Prajna-paramita Part Four Trimsika and Translations Ch.12 Texts and Translations Part Five The Ch’eng Wei-Shih (...) Lun and the Problem of Psychosophical Closure: Yogacara in China Ch.13 Ch.14 Seven Trajectories Ch.15 The Legend of the Transmission of the Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun Ch.16 Alterity: Parinama Ch.17 Why Consciousness in Not Empty Ch.18 On Rupa Ch.19 Externality Ch.20 The Four Conditions Ch.21 Mirror Knowing: Soteric Alterations Ch.22 Language, Avijnapti-Rupa and Vijnapti-Rupa Ch.23 Is What is Ultimately Real Itself Ultimately Real? Conclusions Appendices Bibliography Index. (shrink)

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

The article presents and critically examines the techniques of husserl's phenomenological reduction on the one hand and of yogic meditation on the other, The latter as expounded by patanjali in the 'yoga-Sutras'. By comparing and contrasting these, The author argues that patanjali provides clear and consistent techniques for performing phenomenological reduction. The inconsistency between phenomenological reduction as a technique and the goal of phenomenology as providing the foundations of knowledge is then brought into clear focus. Finally, It is shown that (...) yoga and phenomenology both logically lead to transcendental idealism. (shrink)

IntroductionThis is a comparative study. It is in two parts: ‘nature’ and ‘elementary nature’. ‘Nature ’ as in the Western tradition is identified here with ‘prakṛti’ in sāṅkhya.NatureSāṅkhya is argued to be a post-epoche discourse. ‘Pure consciousness’ is then identified with ‘buddhi’ and what Husserl calls its ‘ground’, with ‘pradhān’. The ‘nature’ of the psychophysical reality is argued to be ‘pure consciousness’ while the ‘nature’ of ‘pure consciousness’ is argued to be its ‘ground’. Phenomenological reduction is interpreted as ‘laya’ of (...) the psychophysical reality into its ‘nature’.‘Elementary nature’‘Stuff’ and ‘form’ in phenomenology and the three ‘guṇa’ in sāṅkhya are interpreted as the ‘elementary natures’. Two criteria, one of ‘non-selfsufficiency’ and the other of ‘comprehensiveness’, for qualifying as ‘elementary nature’, are proposed. The former is shown to disqualify as ‘elementary nature’, what we get by ‘empirical intuition’. What Husserl describes as ‘pure essence’ satisfies, but it is argued to be but a kind, the ‘empirically instantiated’ kind of ‘pure essence’ and is identified with what sāṅkhya calls ‘dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’. ‘Stuff’, is not ‘empirically instantiated’, but ‘empirically un-instantiated’ kind of ‘pure essence’ and is identified with what sāṅkhya calls ‘a-dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa’ kind of ‘sāmānya viṣaya’. It is characterised as non-selfsufficiency of ‘reciprocal’ kind, as against ‘form’, as one of ‘unilateral’ kind. The other criterion, that of ‘comprehensiveness’, is based upon ‘satkāryavāda’. It requires moods and the four Aristotelian causes of mental things to be traceable to the ‘elementary natures’ in the respective discipline. Sāṅkhya satisfies both these criteria but phenomenology is not found to fare as well; particularly, ‘sense-data’, which Husserl proposes as ‘stuff’, fails on the criterion of ‘non-selfsufficiency’. (shrink)