And in this book the distinguished scholar Amartya Sen offers a powerful critique of the theory of social justice that, in its grip on social and political ...

Commodities and Capabilities presents a set of inter-related theses concerning the foundations of welfare economics, and in particular about the assessment of personal well-being and advantage. The argument presented focuses on the capability to function, i.e. what a person can do or can be, questioning in the process the more standard emphasis on opulence or on utility. In fact, a person's motivation behind choice is treated here as a parametric variable which may or may not coincide with the pursuit of (...) self-interest. Given the large number of practical problems arising from the roles and limitations of different concepts of interest and the judgement of advantage and well-being, this scholarly investigation is both of theoretical interest and practical import. (shrink)

This book develops some of the most important themes of Sen's works over the last decade. He argues in a rich and subtle approach that we should be concerned with people's capabilities rather than their resources or welfare.

I argue for a conception of health as a person's ability to achieve or exercise a cluster of basic human activities. These basic activities are in turn specified through free-standing ethical reasoning about what constitutes a minimal conception of a human life with equal human dignity in the modern world. I arrive at this conception of health by closely following and modifying Lennart Nordenfelt's theory of health which presents health as the ability to achieve vital goals. Despite its strengths I (...) transform Nordenfelt's argument in order to overcome three significant drawbacks. Nordenfelt makes vital goals relative to each community or context and significantly reflective of personal preferences. By doing so, Nordenfelt's conception of health faces problems with both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively defined wellbeing. Moreover, Nordenfelt does not ever explicitly specify a set of vital goals. The theory of health advanced here replaces Nordenfelt's (seemingly) empty set of preferences and society-relative vital goals with a human species-wide conception of basic vital goals, or ‘central human capabilities and functionings’. These central human capabilities come out of the capabilities approach (CA) now familiar in political philosophy and economics, and particularly reflect the work of Martha Nussbaum. As a result, the health of an individual should be understood as the ability to achieve a basic cluster of beings and doings—or having the overarching capability, a meta-capability, to achieve a set of central or vital inter-related capabilities and functionings. (shrink)

One would be hard pressed to find a more controversial or nebulous human right than the right to health - a right that stems primarily, although not exclusively, from Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). While activists, non-governmental organizations, and scholars have made significant progress in promoting a human rights approach to health and the field of health and human rights more generally, the question of a philosophical and conceptual foundation - a theory (...) - for the right to health has fallen through the cracks that emerge from an interdisciplinary intersection of medical ethics, international relations, international human rights law, health policy, health law, and public health law. This Article offers a philosophical justification for a right to health. As such it makes a case for the right to health as a meaningful and operational right and discusses the degree to which this right is necessarily justifiable and enforceable as prescribed in international law. The theoretical framework proposed in this Article builds on and integrates Aristotle's political theory, the capability approach, and a social choice paradigm known as incompletely theorized agreements. This Article draws on these perspectives to develop a theory of a right to health and to explicate societal obligations, both state and non-state, for progressive realization of this right. Finally, this Article argues that sustaining the effort to realize a right to health requires individual and societal commitments to what I call public moral norms. In other words, this Article argues for treating the right to health as an ethical demand for equity in health. This ethical demand will likely involve legal instruments for enforcement, but more likely will require individuals, states, and non-state actors to internalize public ethical norms to enhance implementation and compliance with a right to health in international human rights policy and law. (shrink)