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Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.

In Anita Avramides & Matthew Parrott (eds.), Knowing Other Minds. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2019)

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  1. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States.Helen Steward - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.
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  • Perception.Michael Martin - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK.
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  • The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
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  • The scope of perceptual knowledge.Alan Millar - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):73-88.
    Plausibly perceptual knowledge satisfies the following: It is knowledge about things from the way they appear. It can embrace more than the way things appear. It is phenomenologically immediate and thus, in one sense, non-inferential. and place a significant constraint on adequate elucidations of . Knowledge about an object, from the way it looks, which embraces more than the way it looks, should not turn out to be inferential in the relevant sense. The paper shows how this constraint can be (...)
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  • Perception as Unconscious Inference.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - In D. Heyer (ed.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons. pp. 113--143.
    In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of inferences (...)
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  • Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press. Edited by G. Warnock.
    This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.
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  • Content and self-knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.
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  • What is present to the mind?Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press. pp. 197-213.
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  • Content and Self-Knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.
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  • Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
    Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for (...)
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  • Other Minds.J. L. Austin - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Seeing What You Want.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:554-564.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
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  • Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:101-122.
    It is only in fairly recent philosophy that psychological self-knowledge has come to be seen as problematical; once upon a time the hardest philosophical difficulties all seemed to attend our knowledge of others. But as philosophers have canvassed various models of the mental that would make knowledge of other minds less intractable, so it has become unobvious how to accommodate what once seemed evident and straightforward–the wide and seemingly immediate cognitive dominion of minds over themselves.
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.[author unknown] - 1962 - Foundations of Language 3 (3):303-310.
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  • The Emergence of Probability.Ian Hacking - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (198):476-480.
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  • The Possibility of Knowledge * By Quassim Cassam * Oxford University Press, 2007. X + 256 PP. 32.00 CLOTH: Summary.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):307-309.
    An epistemological how-possible question asks how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible. Familiar epistemological how-possible questions include ‘How is knowledge of the external world possible?’, ‘How is knowledge of other minds possible?’ and ‘How is a priori knowledge possible?’ These are the three questions that I tackle in my book. In each case, I explain how and why the question arises and propose a way of answering it. The main negative claim of the book is that transcendental (...)
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  • The Problem of Knowledge.G. P. Henderson - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (30):95-96.
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  • Seeing and Knowing.L. C. Holborow - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):82-83.
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  • Experiences: An Enquiry into Some Ambiguities.J. M. Shorter - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):174-179.
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  • The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Mortality and Tragedy.Stanley Cavell - 1982 - Mind 91 (362):292-295.
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  • Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness and Understanding Other Minds.J. Heal - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):181-184.
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  • The Mind and its Place in Nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Mind 35 (137):72-80.
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  • Other Minds.John O. Wisdom - 1943 - Mind 52:289.
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  • The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau‐Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism about Other Minds.Marie McGinn - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):45-58.
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  • The Emergence of Probability. [REVIEW]Terrence L. Fine - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (1):116.
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  • Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
    A compelling new approach to the problem that has haunted twentieth century philosophy in both its analytical and continental shapes. No other book addresses as thoroughly the parallels between Wittgenstein and leading Continental philosophers such as Levinas, Husserl, and Heidegger.
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  • The Look of Another Mind.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1023-1061.
    According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an (...)
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  • How direct is social perception?John Michael & Leon De Bruin - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:373-375.
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  • Perception: Essays After Frege.Charles Travis - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Charles Travis presents a series of essays on philosophy of perception, inspired by the insights of Gottlob Frege. He engages with a range of contemporary thinkers, and explores key issues including how perception can make the world bear on what we do or think, and what sorts of capacities we draw on in representing something as (being) something.
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  • Oxford Realism.Mark Eli Kalderon & Charles Travis - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 489--517.
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  • Wittgenstein on criteria and the problem of other minds.Edward Witherspoon - 2011 - In Oskari Kuusela & Marie McGinn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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  • Our Knowledge of Other Minds.H. H. Price - 1932 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 32 (1):53 - 78.
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  • On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William McNeill - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
    Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis. I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you (...)
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  • Mill's argument for other minds.Janice Thomas - 2001 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (3):507 – 523.
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  • Perception and other minds.Fred I. Dretske - 1973 - Noûs 7 (1):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  • Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright.John McDowell - 1991 - In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. New York: De Gruyter. pp. 148--69.
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  • What is present to the mind.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.
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