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Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.

In Anita Avramides & Matthew Parrott (eds.), Knowing Other Minds. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2019)

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  1. The possibility of knowledge.Quassim Cassam - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
    I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible? The latter is an example of a how-possible question. I argue that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent and that they need to be dealt with at three different levels, the level of means, of obstacle-removal, and of enabling conditions. At the first of these levels the possibility of knowledge is accounted for by identifying means of knowing, and I argue that the identification of such means also contributes to (...)
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  • The Possibility of Knowledge * By Quassim Cassam * Oxford University Press, 2007. X + 256 PP. 32.00 CLOTH: Summary.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):307-309.
    An epistemological how-possible question asks how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible. Familiar epistemological how-possible questions include ‘How is knowledge of the external world possible?’, ‘How is knowledge of other minds possible?’ and ‘How is a priori knowledge possible?’ These are the three questions that I tackle in my book. In each case, I explain how and why the question arises and propose a way of answering it. The main negative claim of the book is that transcendental (...)
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  • The problem with Reid's direct realism.Todd Buras - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477.
    There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to (...)
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  • The Mind and its Place in Nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Mind 35 (137):72-80.
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  • The Mind and Its Place in Nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Humana Mente 1 (1):104-105.
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  • The Mind and its place in nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 103:145-146.
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  • Content and self-knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.
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  • The Problem of Knowledge.G. P. Henderson - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (30):95-96.
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.[author unknown] - 1962 - Foundations of Language 3 (3):303-310.
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  • An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense.Thomas Reid - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Thomas Reid , the Scottish natural and moral philosopher, was one of the founding members of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society and a significant figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. Reid believed that common sense should form the foundation of all philosophical inquiry. He criticised the sceptical philosophy propagated by his fellow Scot David Hume and the Anglo-Irish bishop George Berkeley, who asserted that the external world did not exist outside the human mind. Reid was also critical of the theory of ideas (...)
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  • Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
    A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea of constitutive determination or ‘ontological ground’; and it is the aim of the present paper to help put the idea on a firmer (...)
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  • Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 1785 - University Park, Pa.: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derek R. Brookes & Knud Haakonssen.
    Thomas Reid was a philosopher who founded the Scottish school of 'common sense'. Much of Reid's work is a critique of his contemporary, David Hume, whose empiricism he rejects. In this work, written after Reid's appointment to a professorship at the university of Glasgow, and published in 1785, he turns his attention to ideas about perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste. He examines the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, arguing that 'when we find philosophers maintaining that there (...)
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  • The Possibility of Knowledge.Quassim Cassam (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of how-possible questions in epistemology. In this highly original book Quassim Cassam explains how such questions arise and how they should be answered.
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  • Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
    A compelling new approach to the problem that has haunted twentieth century philosophy in both its analytical and continental shapes. No other book addresses as thoroughly the parallels between Wittgenstein and leading Continental philosophers such as Levinas, Husserl, and Heidegger.
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  • The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference.Ian Hacking - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
    Historical records show that there was no real concept of probability in Europe before the mid-seventeenth century, although the use of dice and other randomizing objects was commonplace. Ian Hacking presents a philosophical critique of early ideas about probability, induction, and statistical inference and the growth of this new family of ideas in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Hacking invokes a wide intellectual framework involving the growth of science, economics, and the theology of the period. He argues that the (...)
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  • Last writings on the philosophy of psychology.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1982 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman & Ludwig Wittgenstein.
    v. 1. Preliminary studies for part II of the Philosophical investigations -- v. 2. The inner and the outer, 1949-1951.
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  • Self-expression.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on (...)
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  • Perception: Essays After Frege.Charles Travis - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Charles Travis presents a series of essays on philosophy of perception, inspired by the insights of Gottlob Frege. He engages with a range of contemporary thinkers, and explores key issues including how perception can make the world bear on what we do or think, and what sorts of capacities we draw on in representing something as (being) something.
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  • Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Marquette University Press.
    This is the 2011 Aquinas Lecture delivered by John McDowell on February 27, 2011 at Marquette University. A central theme in much of Professor McDowell's work is the harmful effect, in modern philosophy and in the modern reception of pre-modern philosophy, of a conception of nature that reflects an understanding, in itself perfectly correct, of the proper goals of the natural sciences. He has argued that we can free ourselves from the characteristic sorts of philosophical anxiety by recalling the possibility (...)
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  • The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States.Helen Steward - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.
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  • Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
    A compelling new approach to the problem that has haunted twentieth century philosophy in both its analytical and continental shapes. No other book addresses as thoroughly the parallels between Wittgenstein and leading Continental philosophers such as Levinas, Husserl, and Heidegger.
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  • The Problem of Knowledge.A. J. Ayer - 2006 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Ayer Writings in Philosophy : A Palgrave Macmillan Archive Collection. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  • Oxford Realism.Mark Eli Kalderon & Charles Travis - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 489--517.
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • Perception as Unconscious Inference.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons. pp. 113--143.
    In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of inferences (...)
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  • Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...)
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  • Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds.Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard - 2012 - ProtoSociology (47):239-262.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
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  • Other Minds.J. L. Austin - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  • Perception.Michael Martin - 1998 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  • Our Knowledge of Other Minds.H. H. Price - 1932 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 32 (1):53 - 78.
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  • Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.
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  • Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid & A. D. Woozley - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (66):189-190.
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  • The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Mortality and Tragedy.Stanley Cavell - 1982 - Mind 91 (362):292-295.
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  • Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities.J. M. Hinton - 1975 - Mind 84 (335):466-468.
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  • The Emergence of Probability.Ian Hacking - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (198):476-480.
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  • Other Minds.John Wisdom - 1954 - Philosophy 29 (111):365-370.
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  • Wittgenstein on criteria and the problem of other minds.Edward Witherspoon - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
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  • What is the problem of other minds?Colin McGinn - 1984 - Aristotelian Society Proceedings 58:119-37.
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