This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.

This book, one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus, and others are contributing, is an exploration and defense of the notion of modality de re, the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Plantinga develops his argument by means of the notion of possible worlds and ranges over such key problems as the nature of essence, transworld identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence (...) of unactual objects in other possible worlds. He also applies his logical theories to the elucidation of two problems in the philosophy of religion: the problem of evil and the ontological argument. (shrink)

UNCLEAR as it is, the traditional doctrine that the notion "meaning" possesses the extension/intension ambiguity has certain typical consequences. The doctrine that the meaning of a term is a concept carried the implication that mean- ings are mental entities. Frege, however, rebelled against this "psy- chologism." Feeling that meanings are public property-that the same meaning can be "grasped" by more than one person and by persons at different times-he identified concepts (and hence "intensions" or meanings) with abstract entities rather than (...) mental entities. However, "grasping" these abstract entities was still an individual psychological act. None of these philosophers doubted that understanding a word (knowing its intension) was just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (somewhat in the way in which knowing how to factor numbers in one's head is just a mat- ter of being in a certain very complex psychological state). (shrink)

If no property of a system of many particles discriminates among the particles, they are said to be indistinguishable. This indistinguishability is equivalent to the requirement that the many-particle distribution function and all of the dynamic functions for the system be symmetric. The indistinguishability defined in terms of the discrete symmetry of many-particle functions cannot change in the continuous classical statistical limit in which the number density n and the reciprocal temperature β become small. Thus, microscopic particles like electrons must (...) remain indistinguishable in the classical statistical limit although their behavior can be calculated as if they move following the classical laws of motion. In the classical mechanical limit in which quantum cells of volume (2πħ)3 are reduced to points in the phase space, the partition functionTr{exp(−βĤ) for N identical bosons (fermions) approaches (2πħ)−3N(N!) ∫ ... ∫ d3r1 d3p1 ... d3rN d3pN exp(−βH). The two factors, (2πħ)−3N and (N!)−1, which are often added in anad hoc manner in many books on statistical mechanics, are thus derived from the first principles. The criterion of the classical statistical approximation is that the thermal de Broglie wavelength be much shorter than the interparticle distance irrespective of any translation-invariant interparticle interaction. A new derivation of the Maxwell velocity distribution from Boltzmann's principle is given with the assumption of indistinguishable classical particles. (shrink)