This article explores aggravated and exemplary damages in terms of their structure. It argues that the awards are distinguishable and once they have been appropriately analysed it can be seen that aggravated damages have a secure foundation in the private law and are importantly different from other compensatory awards. The article then argues that many of the reasons given in favour of exemplary damages are not consistent with the structure of that award. The article concludes by insisting that exemplary damages (...) should be abolished as they are in serious tension with the nature of civil liability. (shrink)

English and Australian judges have, over the past few decades, severely questioned the juridical distinctiveness and utility of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The popular assertion in this country has been that the rule is really only a sub-species of the law of private nuisance. By contrast, the Australian judiciary has abandoned the rule altogether, preferring to expand the law of negligence to capture the rule's former territory. This article seeks to defend the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. In (...) particular it asserts that, by reference to their historical origins, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and the law of private nuisance can be seen to be quite different creatures. It also argues that there is strong case for the rule's continued vitality, and that it would be a grave mistake to abandon it in favour of a yet more expansive law of negligence. (shrink)

This book collects John Gardner's celebrated essays on the theory of private law, alongside two new essays. Together they range across the central puzzles in understanding the significance of outcomes, the role of justice in private law, strict liability, the reasonable person standard, and the role of public policy in tort law.

This article elaborates upon and defends the distinction between “primary duty” claims and “primary liability” claims in private law introduced in a previous article. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the distinction to the debates over fault and strict liability and “duty skepticism” and to the relationship between primary and remedial rights. I argue that the tendency to assume that all claims in private law arise from a breach of duty is a source of error and confusion. As a (...) prelude to the discussion, I set out an analysis of a claim or remedial right in private law as a Hohfeldian power correlated with a remedial liability. I also consider whether primary-liability claims can be formulated in terms of the legal relations found in Wesley Hohfeld's scheme, and I make some general comments about Hohfeldian analysis. (shrink)

The English Court of Appeal is currently faced with three analytically distinct approaches to the question of when one party owes another a duty of care in respect of her economic interests, all of which bear the authority of the House of Lords. Unable to choose between them, it has recently adopted a fourth approach combining which combines them, in the apparent belief that the combination will eradicate any individual deficiencies. Against the background of a recent case, the author argues (...) that this is a holding strategy at best and methodologically deficient. He also challenges the continuing lip-service paid by courts to models of liability based upon ‘assumptions of responsibility,’ examining and criticising the causes of their persistence in the law in the face of widespread academic criticism. Instead, the author argues, the House of Lords should now clearly endorse a single reasoning strategy to economic loss cases based on the three-stage approach in Caparo Industries v Dickman. Properly understood, this approach offers the best prospect of facilitating consistent and transparent decision-making in the longer term. (shrink)