In order to explain the possibility of causal interaction between the mind and the body, Descartes claims that they are substantially united. It is argued that descartes is unsuccessful in reconciling this union with the radical dualism which is fundamental to his philosophy. Recent claims that the union of mind and body poses no problem for descartes are shown to be untenable.

_Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.

Ce livre n'est pas un expose de la metaphysique cartesienne, mais s'attache a la pensee qui l'anime et qui cherche en elle son expression. Ce mot expression introduit un premier postulat: une philosophie n'a de sens que par reference a une certaine vision du monde dont precisement elle veut etre l'expression. A l'origine il y a un esprit qui regarde l'univers, l'homme, Dieu et qui s'etonne de les voir comme on ne les a encore jamais vus: c'est cette vision neuve (...) qu'il veut exprimer dans un texte qui est, a la fois, pensee coherente et parole communicable. Qui dit expression dit donc volonte de communication. La vision du monde - c'est le second postulat - n'est en aucune facon une sorte d'essence intemporelle et elle ne peut etre separee de son environnement historique. Ainsi tout texte a deux contextes: l'ensemble ordonne d'idees duquel il tient son sens et un certain dialogue qu'il doit rendre propice a la transmission de ce sens, les interlocuteurs n'appartenant pas tous au meme milieu culturel, comme on dit aujourd'hui. (shrink)

This book argues that science and metaphysics are closely and inseparably interwoven in the work of Descartes, such that the metaphysics cannot be understood without the science and vice versa. In order to make his case, Thomas Vinci offers a careful philosophical reconstruction of central parts of Descartes' metaphysics and of his theory of perception, each considered in relation to Descartes' epistemology. Many authors of late have written on the relation between Descartes' metaphysics and his physics, especially insofar as the (...) former was intended to justify the latter. Vinci's work does not focus on this relation. It takes as a broad interpretive principle that Descartes wanted to justify a certain picture of matter with his metaphysics, but it focuses its own efforts on the way in which metaphysics and science meet in Descartes' theory of sense-perception. Vinci aims to show that Descartes gave an important positive role to sense-perception in his epistemology, and also that he used his reflections on sense-perception to frame his criticism of previous theories of the sensory qualities of objects. (shrink)

To be able to believe that a dog with a broken paw is not really in pain when it whimpers is a quite extraordinary achievement even for a philosopher. Yet according to the standard interpretaion, this is just what Descartes did believe. He held, we are informed, the ‘monstrous’ thesis that ‘animals are without feeling or awareness of any kind’. The Standard view has been reiterated in a recent collection on animal rights, which casts Descartes as the villain of the (...) piece for his alleged view that animals merely behave ‘ as if they feel pain when they are, say, kicked or stabbed’. The basis for this widely accepted interpretation is Descartes' famous doctrine of ‘animal machine’ ; a doctrine that one critic condemns as ‘a grim fortaste of a mechanically minded age’ which ‘brutally violates the old kindly fellowship of living things’. (shrink)