In his De la recherche de la vérité (The Search after Truth) of 1674-75, Nicolas Malebranche makes a number of apparently contradictory remarks about women and their capacity for pure intellectual thought. On the one hand, he seems to espouse a negative biological determinism about women’s minds, and on the other, he suggests that women have the free capacity to attain truth and happiness, regardless of their physiology. In the early eighteenth-century, four English women thinkers – Anne Docwra (...) (c. 1624-1710), Mary Astell (1666-1731), Damaris Masham (1659-1708), and Mary Chudleigh (1656-1710) – engaged with Malebranche’s ideas. Their writings reveal how we might dispel the apparent contradictions in Malebranche’s thinking about women, and reaffirm the liberating potential of Cartesian philosophy for women in the early modern period. (shrink)

Nicolas Malebranche holds that we see all things in the physical world by means of ideas in God (the doctrine of "vision in God"). In some writings he seems to posit ideas of particular bodies in God, but when pressed by critics he insists that there is only one general idea of extension, which he calls “intelligible extension.” But how can this general and “pure” idea represent particular sensible objects? I develop systematic solutions to this and two other (...) putative difficulties with Malebranche’s theory of sensory cognition by appealing to the notion of “seeing as” and to his doctrine that ideas in God have causal powers to affect the mind. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is exegesis. I explicate Nicolas Malebranche's (1674, 1678, 1688, 1714) concept of intelligible extension. I begin by detailing how the concept matured throughout Malebranche's work, and the new functions it took on within his metaphysical system. I then examine Gustav Bergmann's “axiomatic” interpretation, as well as the criticism of it offered by Daise Radner. I argue that Radner's criticism of the interpretation is only partly successful; some of her objections can be met; (...) others cannot. I then develop a novel interpretation of the concept, given insights from this dispute. I call it the “programmatic interpretation.” I argue that this interpretation coheres well with Malebranche's famous Vision in God thesis, as well as many of his other commitments. I conclude by considering a certain pertinent objection to my proposal, summarizing the dialectic, and forcefully restating my case. (shrink)

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) holds that the senses, imagination, and passions aim at survival and the satisfaction of the body’s needs, rather than truth or the good of the mind. Each of these faculties makes a distinctive and, indeed, an indispensable contribution to the preservation of life. Commentators have largely focused on how the senses keep us alive. By comparison, the imagination and passions have been neglected. In this paper, I reconstruct Malebranche’s account of how the imagination contributes (...) to the preservation of the body by compensating for the limitations of the senses. First, the imagination represents non-actual states of affairs, such as probable or possible future states. Second, the imagination forges new and often helpful associations based on past experiences. Third, the imagination (mis)represents that objects will cause pleasure and pain, thereby imbuing them with emotional significance they would otherwise lack. Together, these features flesh out Malebranche’s view that the imagination is necessary for the preservation of life. (shrink)

Do the senses represent causation? Many commentators read Nicolas Malebranche as anticipating David Hume’s negative answer to this question. I disagree with this assessment. When a yellow billiard ball strikes a red billiard ball, Malebranche holds that we see the yellow ball as causing the red ball to move. Given Malebranche’s occasionalism, he insists that the visual experience of causal interaction is illusory. Nevertheless, Malebranche holds that the senses represent finite things as causally efficacious. This (...) experience of creaturely causality explains why Aristotelian philosophers and others struggle to recognize occasionalism’s truth. (shrink)

Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an (...) extreme -- and ultimately unworkable -- attempt to solve this riddle. Most commentators claim that Malebranche defends an adverbial theory of sensation, according to which a sensation is merely a way in which an act of sensing happens. The adverbial reading is wrong, or so I argue. Once we arrive at a more accurate reading, we shall see that his position is much more strange than is currently thought. Nevertheless, Malebranche’s view is similar to the adverbial theory in one respect, albeit it at a very high level of generality. His view thus inherits two of the main problems that afflict adverbial theories. Although Malebranche fails to solve them, his ingenious attempts to do so are instructive. (shrink)

The famous Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) espoused the occasionalist doctrine that ‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes’ (LO, 448, original italics). One of Malebranche’s well-known arguments for occasionalism, known as, the ‘no necessary connection’ argument (or, NNC ) stems from the principle that ‘a (...) true cause… is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect’ (LO, 450). The outline of this paper is as follows. I explicitly layout NNC and articulate some of its prima facie strengths (§1). I then critically discuss, what I take to be, the two main arguments against NNC of the Lee-Pyle interpretation (§2). The main conclusion from (§2) is that Malebranche did not abandon NNC in his later works given textual evidence from the Dialogues, contrary to the Lee-Pyle interpretation. In (§3) I discuss in what ways Suárez, Leibniz, Régis and Spinoza all accepted the main premise of NNC. Then, I rebut Steven Nadler’s influential and unchallenged criticism that Malebranche conflated causal and logical necessity, and provide a more accurate interpretation of Malebranche that only commits him to a partial reduction of causal to logical necessity (§4). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.1 (2005) 55-81 [Access article in PDF] Self-Knowledge in Descartes and Malebranche Lawrence Nolan John Whipple 1. Introduction Descartes's notorious claim that mind is better known than body has been the target of repeated criticisms, but none appears more challenging than that of his intellectual heir Nicolas Malebranche.1 Whereas other critics—especially twentieth-century philosophers eager to use Descartes as their whipping (...) boy—have often been uncharitable, Malebranche accepts many of the fundamental Cartesian doctrines, including mind-body dualism. But he argues that Descartes's position on knowledge of the mind is internally inconsistent. Malebranche agrees with Descartes that the existence of the mind is better known than that of body, but he vehemently denies that the nature of the mind is better known. This denial is based on his view that we lack a clear idea of the mind.2 [End Page 55]Malebranche's polemic has attracted much attention in recent scholarship.3 The growing consensus among commentators is that Malebranche develops a devastating internal critique of Descartes's theory of the mind. For example, Nicholas Jolley writes: "In his case for his negative thesis [concerning knowledge of the mind] Malebranche mounted a powerful, even annihilating, critique of Descartes. This critique embodies the remarkable insight that there is a serious muddle at the heart of Descartes's whole theory of knowledge."4 In a book-length defense of Malebranche's critique, Tad Schmaltz also emphasizes its internal character: "the interpretation here of Malebranche's theory presents it as fundamentally Cartesian, and thereby serves to reinforce his own view that he has provided an authoritative interpretation of the account of mind in the writings of Descartes and other Cartesians."5 Schmaltz also asserts: "Malebranche took his negative thesis concerning our knowledge of the soul to involve not so much a rejection of Cartesianism as an internal correction of it."6We think such remarks misstate the case. Indeed, we argue in this paper that Malebranche's polemic fails as an internal critique of Descartes's theory of the mind. Although we do not here aspire to defend Descartes's strong thesis—that mind is better known than body—we do think he can consistently maintain that we have a clear and distinct idea of the mind, and thus that our knowledge of the mind's nature is at least on a par with our knowledge of corporeal nature.7 While Malebranche's rhetoric would encourage us to think that the debate between him and his predecessor is being fought on common or neutral ground, the fact is that Malebranche often appeals to assumptions and aspects of his own theory of "Vision in God" that Descartes would reject. Once more, he interprets Descartes's theory of knowledge in ways that are misguided and sometimes even uncharitable. If Malebranche's critique succeeds at all, it succeeds only against a straw man—Malebranche's Descartes and not the historical figure.Ours is not the first effort to defend Descartes against this particular attack. When Malebranche first published his critique in Book Three of his first great work, The Search After Truth (1674),8 Descartes had been dead for over two decades, [End Page 56] but he was ably defended by the famous Cartesian Antoine Arnauld in On True and False Ideas (1683). In the ensuing debate Arnauld was clearly the superior dialectician, but while winning several tactical points, he appears not to fully appreciate the crux of Malebranche's argument, or at least that is the view of Jolley and Schmaltz.9 We have a somewhat higher opinion of Arnauld's side of the debate. Granted, some of his defenses are facile and can be easily dismissed; others however are quite compelling when properly developed. In at least one instance, we attempt to provide that development. At the same time we think it is a mistake to treat Arnauld as Descartes's surrogate or as if he had issued the final salvo from the camp of the orthodox Cartesians. Arnauld was a... (shrink)

This paper explores the details of Malebranche‘s philosophy of mind, paying particular attention to the mind-body relationship and the roles of the imagination and the passions. I demonstrate that Malebranche has available an alternative to his deontological ethical system: the alternative I expose is based around his account of the embodied aspects of the mind and the sensations experienced in perception. I briefly argue that Hume, a philosopher already indebted to Malebranche for much inspiration, read Malebranche (...) in the positive way that I here describe him. Malebranche should therefore be acknowledged as a serious influence on Enlightenment philosophy of sensibility. (shrink)

In the early modern period, contempt emerged as a persistent theme in moral philosophy. Most of the moral philosophers of the period shared two basic commitments in their thinking about contempt. First, they argued that we understand the value of others in the morally appropriate way when we understand them from the perspective of the morally relevant community. And second, they argued that we are naturally inclined to judge others as contemptible, and that we must therefore interrupt that natural movement (...) of sense-bestowal in order to value others in the morally appropriate way. In this paper I examine in detail the arguments of Nicolas Malebranche and Immanuel Kant concerning the wrongness of contempt, emphasizing the ways in which they depend on conceptions of community and of the interruption of moral sense-bestowal. After showing how each of these arguments fails to comprehend the nature and the wrongness of contempt, I argue that we can find the resources for a more adequate account in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, and specifically in his reflections on ontology and on the meaning of community. (shrink)

This volume takes cue from the idea that the thought of no philosopher can be understood without considering it as the result of a constant, lively dialogue with other thinkers, both in its internal evolution as well as in its reception, re-use, and assumption as a starting point in addressing past and present philosophical problems. In doing so, it focuses on a feature that is crucially emerging in the historiography of early modern philosophy and science, namely the complexity in the (...) production of knowledge. The book explores the applicability of this approach to a long-considered armchair philosopher, namely René Descartes, who is now more and more understood as a full-blown scientist, networker, and intellectual éminence grise rather than as the mere philosopher of the cogito, as well as the originator of different ‘Cartesianisms’ which encompassed many ideas and approaches for long captured by dichotomic historiographical categories as rationalism and empiricism, or speculative and experimental philosophy. The essays gathered in the volume aim to address the ways in which Descartes’s philosophy evolved and was progressively understood by scientists, philosophers, and intellectuals from different contexts and eras, either by considering direct interlocutors of Descartes such as Isaac Beeckman and Elisabeth of Bohemia, early modern thinkers who developed upon his ideas and on particular topics as Nicolas Malebranche or Thomas Willis, those who adapted his overall methodology in developing new systems of knowledge as Johannes Clauberg and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and contemporary thinkers from continental and analytic traditions like Emanuele Severino and Peter Strawson. (shrink)

In his Christian and Metaphysical Meditations (1683) Malebranche develops a reflection in which the self discovers in its interiority that the interlocutor able to answer some of its questions is the divine Word. Through references to the Holy Scriptures and to Augustine, Malebranche constructs a meditative itinerary that differs from the one proposed by Descartes, as it moves from the lumière naturelle in the Cartesian sense to the lumière of the Word. In the light of these historical-theoretical data, (...) we propose a reconstruction of the role played by interiority and meditation in certain texts by Malebranche, highlighting the moments in which he appropriated the Cartesian heritage and those in which he distanced himself from Descartes’ philosophical paradigm. (shrink)

In his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals David Hume said that a group of earlier modern philosophers, beginning with Malebranche, held that morality was founded on relations. In this paper I follow up on that suggestion by investigating pre-Humean views in moral philosophy according to which morality is founded on relations. I do that by looking at the work of Nicolas Malebranche, John Locke, and Samuel Clarke. Each of them talked prominently about relations in their accounts (...) of basic aspects of morality. Beyond that, each of them turns out to have held both metaphysical and epistemological views that might be described as founding morality on relations. Despite the definite differences between the three philosophers’ approaches, Hume does seem to have noticed a genuine connection here—even though he himself tended to ignore significant versions of this approach when criticizing it. (shrink)

In early modern times it was not uncommon for thinkers to tease out from the nature of God various doctrines of substantial physical and metaphysical import. This approach was particularly fruitful in the so-called beast-machine controversy, which erupted following Descartes’ claim that animals are automata, that is, pure machines, without a spiritual, incorporeal soul. Over the course of this controversy, thinkers on both sides attempted to draw out important truths about the status of animals simply from the notion or attributes (...) of God. Automatists – led by Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Dilly – developed six such arguments, appealing to divine justice, providence, economy, glory (twice) and wisdom, while opponents to animal automatism developed two arguments, appealing to divine wisdom and goodness. In this article I shall examine the substance of all eight of these arguments, along with their origins, patronage, and variations, and the objections they elicited from opponents, with the aim of determining their suitability for use in contemporary debates about animal sentience and consciousness, and hence their relevance for contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

Gabriel Bonnot de Mably takes up the republican commonplace that the desire for esteem is what could motivate the fulfilment of duties of civic virtue. This commonplace, however, has become problematic through the discussion of the problem of human corruption in philosophers such as Blaise Pascal and Nicolas Malebranche. In this article, I will show that Mably takes this problem seriously. However, his critique of Malebranche’s solution to this problem and his critique of the economic reinterpretation of (...) Malebranche’s concept of natural order in the work of Le Mercier de la Rivière motivate his own republican defense of the moral value of the desire for esteem. What makes this defense plausible is his argument that distorted esteem derives from imagination that is distorted, not only as a result of natural factors, but in many cases rather as a result of misguided politics. If some cases of distorted esteem derive from misguided politics, Mably argues, then they can be modified by republican constitution building that modifies the imagination of citizens. (shrink)

Henri Lelevel’s La philosophie moderne par demandes et réponses is a very interesting as well as pretty neglected attempt to disseminate the new philosophy among a larger audience, including the non specialists. Either the style of presentation or the oversimplification of the topics discussed is clearly intended to reach people interested to a smattering of philosophy. More than the comparisons between the traditional and the new philosophy and the compendia, this work vouches for the great interest toward the new philosophy. (...) In this particular case the model is the philosophy of Malebranche, whose interpretation of Descartes thought is preferred by Lelevel, worried by the excessive twist given toward empiricism in P.-S. Régis rendering of Cartesian philosophical system. Lelevel’s logic is directed to eliminate the confusion between sense data and knowledge, echoing also Malebranche’s notion of éténdue idéale, one of the major contribution to the reconsideration of Descartes’ thought. This paper aims to sketch the mains topics discussed in the four sections of Lelevel’s work, with some cross-references to Malebranche’s writings. (shrink)

RENÉ DESCARTES: UMA BIOGRAFIA -/- RENÉ DESCARTES: A BIOGRAPHY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - CAP-UFPE, IFPE-BJ e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected]. WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399. -/- -/- Nascido em 1596 em Haia, nas fronteiras de Touraine e Poitou, em uma família nobre, René Descartes vem ao mundo ao mesmo ano em que Johannes Kepler (1671-1630), em seu primeiro trabalho publicado (Mysterium cosmographicum), prova a superioridade da astronomia moderna (a de Nicolau Copérnico (1473-1543)) da astronomia antiga (a de Ptolomeu (90-168 (...) d.C.)). Ao mesmo tempo, Galileu Galilei (1564-1642), que detém a cadeira de matemática da Universidade de Pádua, funda o método experimental. As descobertas de Galileu tiveram forte impacto sobre o Colégio Real de La Fleche, realizado pelos jesuítas e onde Descartes recebeu, a partir de 1606, uma forte educação. Ele menciona, no Discurso do Método, seu “desejo extremo” em aprender, seguido, no final de seus estudos, de uma grande decepção: decepção com a filosofia ensinada, cujas controvérsias perpétuas revelam um caráter questionável, e que não pode fornecer um alicerce, em seu estado atual, para outras ciências. Também é proferido um desapontamento, mas esse desapontamento é inverso e diz respeito às matemática, capaz de fornecer esse fundamento que a filosofia não confere, mediante sua certeza e evidências, mas sobre o qual ainda não construímos nada. -/- -/- Numa Europa marcada pelo choque do tradicionalismo católico e do mercantilismo protestante, o lento declínio do poder espanhol e a luta dos Países Baixos pela sua independência, Descartes escolheu, primeiramente, após a graduação, a carreira militar. Engajado no exército do Príncipe Maurício de Nassau, ele é retirado da ociosidade da vida da guarnição pelo encontro, em 1618, de um jovem cientista holandês, Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637), que se tornou seu amigo íntimo por algum tempo. Conhecedor de todas as pesquisas científicas do momento e partidário da nova concepção “mecanicista” da natureza, Beeckman compartilhou com Descartes um entusiasmo que foi acompanhado, segundamente, da ambição de realizar a ciência universal por si mesma, mediante um método único: na noite de 10 de novembro de 1619, ele concebe em três “sonhos”, “os alicerces de uma ciência admirável”. -/- Nos anos seguintes a essa iluminação decisiva, Descartes viajou por toda a Europa, estimando, como Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), que a demonstração de boas maneiras e costumes diferentes podem gerar muitos preconceitos. Toda sua vida, além disso, esteve vagando, isto é, foi marcada por múltiplas mudanças de residências, e a recusa de estabelecer um vínculo muito de perto com alguém. Foi na Holanda que ele, finalmente, buscará a tranquilidade que não encontrara na França ainda abalada pelas guerras religiosas, antes de ser assim pelas convulsões da Fronda. Todavia, mesmo na Holanda, ele não pôde evitar os ataques de calvinistas e polemicas teológicas que o repugnaram, como evidenciado em suas discussões com a Universidade de Utrecht entre 1643 à 1645 e a Universidade de Leiden em 1647. -/- -/- Além de sua amizade com Beeckman, outro encontro teve uma influência indubitavelmente decisiva sobre o destino de Descartes: o encontro com o cardeal de Bérulle. Fundador da congregação do Oratório (ao qual pertencem Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) e Jean-Baptiste Massillon (1663-1742)), o cardeal de Bérulle enxerga na nova física mecanicista, um meio de lutar contra o naturalismo resultante do Renascimento e seu paganismo latente: em uma longa entrevista com Descartes, no outono de 1647, ele fez dessa última uma obrigação de consciência para se dedicar, nesse sentido, à filosofia. -/- Em 1628, Descartes começa a escrever as Regras para a direção do espírito, um tratado inacabado e que não foi publicado durante a vida do autor. Em 1631, desenvolvera a geometria analítica que combina curvas geométricas com equações algébricas. Em 1633 escreveu O Tratado do Homem e preparava-se para publicar O Tratado do Mundo quando a notícia da condenação de Galileu Galilei pelo Santo Ofício (a Inquisição) o deixou receoso e decide, por prudência, não publicar o seu Tratado no qual a tese do movimento da Terra ao redor do Sol é apoiada. Alguns anos depois, foi divulgado em público cultivada de algumas de suas descobertas científicas: além da geometria, a dioptria (a teoria da refração da luz) e meteoros (teoria dos fenômenos atmosféricos luminosos). Esses três tratados aparecem no apêndice do Discurso do Método, e como “ensaios” desse método, em 1637. No século XIX, Victor Cousin (1792-1867) publicou pela primeira vez o Discurso sozinho, sem os ensaios. -/- Então vem a principal obra de Descartes no ramo da metafísica: as seis Meditações, aumentadas pelas objeções dos mais famosos filósofos da época (incluindo Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) e Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)), e as respostas a essas objeções, apareceram em 1641. Ansioso para expor sua filosofia para que pudesse ser ensinada, ele também a caracteriza em forma de manual com os Princípios da Filosofia de 1644. -/- Além dos trabalhos publicados, foi por meio das cartas trocadas com personalidades do mundo erudito que Descartes encontrou a oportunidade de esclarecer vários pontos de sua filosofia. Seus principais correspondentes foram o Prade Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), o Padre Denis Mesland (1615-1672), Pierre Chanut (1601-1662), Claude Clerselier (1614-1684), Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) e Henry More (1614-1687). A partir de 1643, Descartes sustentou, com a Princesa Isabel da Boêmia (1596-1662), uma correspondência dedicada essencialmente a questões morais, que lhe permitiu a formulação de suas ideias nesse campo: esse esforço conduziu, em 1649, ao tratado das Paixões da alma. -/- Nesse mesmo ano, 1649, a Rainha Cristina da Suécia (1626-1689) o convida para ir a Estocolmo, que ele aceitou após muita hesitação. Recebido com todas as honras, mas forçado a um modo de vida bastantemente distinto daquele que era acostumado, e submetido a um clima do qual não se adequou, ele sucumbiu a pneumonia em fevereiro de 1650. -/- Descartes deixou-nos uma espécie de autobiografia intelectual na primeira parte do Discurso do Método: em seus anos de treinamento, seus entusiasmos e suas decepções. O discurso é, também, o primeiro livro para quem busca compreender o projeto filosófico cartesiano desde sua gênese até sua realização. Existem expostos, o método claro (na segunda parte), mas também a moral (terceira parte), a metafísica (quarta parte) e finalmente a física (quinta e sexta partes). (shrink)

A critical discussion of J.B. Shank, 'Before Voltaire: the French Origins of "Newtonian" Mechanics,' University of Chicago Press, 2018.

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as ``physically real" and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

În această lucrare analizez posibilitatea călătoriei în timp pe baza mai multor lucrări de specialitate, printre care cele ale lui Nicholas J.J. Smith ("Time Travel", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”), William Grey (”Troubles with Time Travel”), Ulrich Meyer (”Explaining causal loops”), Simon Keller și Michael Nelson (”Presentists should believe in time-travel”), Frank Arntzenius și Tim Maudlin ("Time Travel and Modern Physics") și David Lewis (“The Paradoxes of Time Travel”). Lucrarea începe cu o Introducere în care fac o scurtă prezentare a (...) călătoriei în timp, și continuă cu o Istoria conceptului de călătorie în timp, prezentarea principalelor Aspecte fizice ale călătoriei în timp, inclusiv călătoria în timp în trecut în relativitatea generală și în fizica cuantică și călătoria în timp în viitor, apoi o prezentare a Paradoxul bunicului care este abordat în aproape toate lucrările de specialitate, urmat de o secțiune dedicată Filosofiei călătoriei în timp, și o secțiune în care analizez Buclele cauzale pentru călătoria în timp. Finalizez lucrarea cu Concluzii, în care expun opiniile personale privind călătoria în timp, și Bibliografia pe care se bazează lucrarea. (shrink)

In this article we argue that the social value of health research should be conceptualized as a function of both the expected benefits of the research and the priority that the beneficiaries deserve. People deserve greater priority the worse off they are. This conception of social value can be applied for at least two important purposes: in health research priority setting when research funders, policy-makers, or researchers decide between alternative research projects; and in evaluating the ethics of proposed research proposals (...) when research ethics committees assess whether the social value of the research is sufficient to justify the risks and burdens to research participants and others. In assessing how far a proposed research project will advance the interests of people who are more disadvantaged, research priority setters and RECs should examine the diseases that the research targets and the type of research. Just as certain diseases impose a greater burden on people who are more disadvantaged, so certain types of intervention and forms of research are more likely to benefit people who are more disadvantaged. We outline which populations are likely to be representative of the global worst off and identify what types of health research, and which disease categories, are priorities for these populations. (shrink)

Despre necesitatea şi utilitatea dezvoltării unei filosofii specifice tehnologiei blockchain, accentuând pe aspectele ontologice. După o Introducere în care evidenţiez principalele direcţii filosofice pentru această tehnologie emergentă, în Tehnologia blockchain explicitez modul de funcţionare al blockchain, punând în discuţie direcţiile ontologice de dezvoltare în Proiectarea şi Modelarea acestei tehnologii. Următoarea secţiune este dedicată principalei aplicaţii a tehnologiei blockchain, Bitcoin, cu implicaţiile sociale ale acestei criptovalute. Urmează o secţiune de Filosofie în care identific tehnologia blockchain cu conceptul de heterotopie dezvoltat de (...) Michel Foucault şi o interpretez în lumina tehnologiei notaţionale dezvoltată de Nelson Goodman ca sistem notaţional. În secţiunea Ontologii dezvolt două direcţii de dezvoltare considerate de mine ca importante: Ontologia narativă, bazată pe ideea de ordine şi structură a istoriei transmise prin naraţia istoriei a lui Paul Ricoeur, şi un sistem ontologic bazat pe Ontologiile de intreprindere, bazat pe conceptele şi modelele de intreprindere specifice webului semantic, şi pe care eu îl consider cel mai bine dezvoltat şi cel care va deveni, probabil, sistemul ontologic formal, cel puţin în ceea ce priveşte aspectele economice şi juridice ale tehnologiei blockchain. În Concluzii vorbesc despre direcţiile viitoare de dezvoltare a filosofiei tehnologiei blockchain în general ca o teorie explicativă şi robustă din punct de vedere fenomenologic, consistentă şi care să permită testabilitatea, şi a ontologiilor în special, argumentând pentru necesitatea unei adopţii globale a unui sistem ontologic pentru a dezvolta soluţii transversale şi a rentabiliza tehnologia. -/- Cuvinte cheie: filosofie, blockchain, ontologie, bitcoin, proiectare, modele -/- CUPRINS -/- Abstract Introducere Tehnologia blockchain - - - Proiectare - - - Modele Bitcoin Filosofia Ontologii - - - Ontologii narative - - - Ontologii de intreprindere Concluzii Note Bibliografie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25492.35204. (shrink)

This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...) we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals. (shrink)

The picture of moral development defended by followers of Aristotle takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue. I argue that this picture is inadequate and must be supplemented by imaginative techniques. One can, and sometimes must, cultivate virtue without actually performing the associated actions. Drawing on strands in Buddhist philosophy, I (...) explain several methods of moral development that rely on imagination and visualization rather than overt action. These techniques are essential in cases where cultivating virtue the way one practices the harp is impossible. In particular, I focus on single-event virtues, first-time virtuous acts, and morally dangerous situations. (shrink)

Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering upon animals is wrong. Many fewer people, including among ethicists, agree that painlessly killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most commonly cited reason is that death (without pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way that matters morally, or not as significantly as it does for persons, who are self-conscious, make long-term plans and have preferences about their own future. Animals, at least those that are not persons, lack a morally (...) significant interest in continuing to live. At the same time, some argue that existence itself can be good, insofar as one’s life is worth living. For animals, a good life can offset a quick, if early, death. So, it seems to follow that breeding happy animals that will be (prematurely) killed can be a good thing overall. Insofar as slaughter and sale makes it economically sustainable to raise new ones, who would otherwise not exist, raising and killing animals for food who will have lives worth living is good overall. It benefits them as well as consumers, and makes the world better by adding to the sum of happiness. The process of raising and killing animals with positive welfare produces a sequence of replacement that maintains or increases overall welfare, all else being equal (assuming in particular no overall negative impact on the welfare of other parties). Call this the Replaceability Argument (RA) and the ensuing controversy the Replaceability Problem (RP). This is a problem at the crossroads of the ethics of killing, agricultural ethics, procreation ethics, and population ethics. (shrink)

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to “speak” of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary (...) to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms. (shrink)

We aim to do two things in this article. On the positive end, our goal is to explain how some seemingly incompatible aspects of belief live together, by presenting distinct mechanistic explanations of each of them: in particular we want to show how belief can be discerning, credulous, rational, and irrational. After clarifying our positive view, we take aim at some competitor views in the second half of the paper, particularly offering critiques of epistemic vigilance and social marketplace accounts of (...) belief. We conclude by inviting proponents to provide an architecture for belief that can be tested against existing models. (shrink)

The claim that the observation of a violation of a Bell inequality leads to an alleged alternative between nonlocality and non-realism is annoying because of the vagueness of the second term.

Peer commentary on: Blumenthal-Barby, J. S. (2016). Biases and heuristics in decision making and their impact on autonomy. The American Journal of Bioethics, 16(5), 5-15.

World food production is facing exorbitant challenges like climate change, use of resources, population growth, and dietary changes. These, in turn, raise major ethical and political questions, such as how to uphold the right to adequate nutrition, or the right to enact a gastronomic culture and to preserve the conditions to do so. Proposals for utopic solutions vary from vertical farming and lab meat to diets filled with the most fanciful insects and seaweeds. Common to all proposals is a polarized (...) understanding of food and diets, famously captured by Warren Belasco in the contraposition between technological fixes and anthropological fixes. According to the first, technology will deliver clean, just, pleasurable, affordable food; future generations will not need to adjust much of their dietary cultures. According to the second, future generations should dramatically change their dietary habits (what they eat and how they eat it) to achieve a sustainable diet. The two fixes found remarkably distinct perspectives over dietary politics and the ethics of food production and consumption. In this paper we argue that such polarized thinking rests on a misrepresentation of the ontological status of food, which in turn affects the underlying ethical and political issues. Food is a socially constructed object that draws in specific ways on habits, norms, traditions, geographical, and climatic conditions. Although this thesis seems somewhat obvious, its consequences on the ethical and political perspectives on the future of food have not been derived properly. After introducing the issue at stake (¤1), we point out the polarities that characterize food utopias (¤2) and their ontological faults (¤3). We hence suggest that a socio-ontological analysis of food can better deliver the principles for a foundation of food utopias (¤4). (shrink)

Is suffering really bad? The late Derek Parfit argued that we all have reasons to want to avoid future agony and that suffering is in itself bad both for the one who suffers and impersonally. Nietzsche denied that suffering was intrinsically bad and that its value could even be impersonal. This paper has two aims. It argues against what I call ‘Realism about the Value of Suffering’ by drawing from a broadly Nietzschean debunking of our evaluative attitudes, showing that a (...) recently influential response to the debunking challenge (the appeal to phenomenal introspection) fails. It also argues that a Nietzschean approach is well suited to support the challenge and is bolstered by the empirical literature. As strangers to ourselves, we cannot know whether suffering is really intrinsically bad for us. (shrink)

Despre analogia existentă între aspectele epistemologice şi metodologice ale activităţii serviciilor de informaţii şi unele discipline ştiinţifice, pledând pentru o abordare mai ştiinţifică a procesului de culegere şi analiză de informaţii din cadrul ciclului de informaţii. Afirm că în prezent aspectele teoretice, ontologice şi epistemologice, în activitatea multor servicii de informaţii, sunt subestimate, determinând înţelegere incompletă a fenomenelor actuale şi creând confuzie în colaborarea inter-instituţională. După o scurtă Introducere, care include o istorie a evoluţiei conceptului de serviciu de informaţii după (...) al doilea război mondial, în Activitatea de informaţii definesc obiectivele şi organizarea serviciilor de informaţii, modelul de bază al acestor organizaţii (ciclul informaţional), şi aspectele relevante ale culegerii de informaţii şi analizei de informaţii. În secţiunea Ontologia evidenţiez aspectele ontologice şi entităţile care ameninţă şi sunt ameninţate. Secţiunea Epistemologie include aspecte specifice activităţii de informaţii, cu analiza principalului model (Singer) folosit în mod tradiţional, şi expun o posibilă abordare epistemologică prin prisma conceptului de cunoaştere tacită dezvoltat de omul de ştiinţă Michael Polanyi. În secţiunea Metodologii prezint diverse teorii metodologice cu accent pe tehnicile analitice structurale, şi câteva analogii, cu ştiinţa, arheologia, afacerile şi medicina. Lucrarea se încheie cu Concluziile privind posibilitatea unei abordări mai ştiinţifice a metodelor de culegere şi analiză a informaţiilor din cadrul serviciilor de informaţii. -/- Cuvinte cheie: servicii de informaţii, agenţii de informaţii, informaţii, intelligence -/- CUPRINS -/- Abstract 1. Introducere 1.1. Istorie 2. Activitatea de informaţii 2.1. Organizaţii 2.2. Ciclul informaţional 2.3. Colectarea informaţiilor 2.4. Analiza informaţiilor 2.5. Contrainformatii 2.6. Comunităţi epistemice 3. Ontologia 4. Epistemologia 4.1. Cunoaşterea tacită (Polanyi) 5. Metodologii 6. Analogii cu alte discipline 6.1. Stiinta 6.2. Arheologia 6.3. Afaceri 6.4. Medicina 7. Concluzii Bibliografie -/- ISBN: 978-606-033-160-5 , DOI: 10.58679/TW56764. (shrink)

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...) and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our under- standing of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. (shrink)

We present in this paper a novel ontological theory of events whose central tenet is the Aristotelian distinction between the object that changes and the actual subject of change, which is what we call an individual quality. While in the Kimian tradition events are individuated by a triple ⟨ o, P, t ⟩, where o is an object, P a property, and t an interval of time, for us the simplest events are qualitative changes, individuated by a triple ⟨ o, (...) q, t ⟩, where q is an individual quality inhering in o or in one of its parts. Detaching the individuation of events from the property they exemplify results in a fine-grained theory that keeps metaphysics and semantics clearly separate, and lies between the multiplicative and the unitarian approaches. We discuss then the way language refers to events, observing that, in most cases, event descriptions refer to complex, cognitively relevant clusters of co-occurring qualitative changes, which exhibit a synchronic structure depending on the way they are described. Contra Bennett, who famously argued that the semantics of event names ultimately depends on “local context and unprincipled intuitions”, we show how the lexicon provides systematic principles for individuating such clusters and classifying them into kinds. Finally, we address some open challenges in the semantics of locative and manner modifiers. (shrink)

This paper addresses issues in comparing nonhuman animals and severely disabled human beings in terms of their morally relevant characteristics. Through a discussion of the works of Jeff McMahan, Eva Feder Kittay and Martha Nussbaum, the paper offers a defense of the importance and possibility of extending care and compassion to nonhumans without collapsing relevant species differences.

It’s natural to think of acts of solidarity as being public acts that aim at good outcomes, particularly at social change. I argue that not all acts of solidarity fit this mold - acts of what I call ‘private solidarity’ are not public and do not aim at producing social change. After describing paradigmatic cases of private solidarity, I defend an account of why such acts are themselves morally virtuous and what role they can have in moral development.

Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ is often used by philosophers as a synonym for ‘metaphysics’ (literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term which was used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. The term ‘ontology’ (or ontologia) was itself coined in 1613, independently, by two philosophers, Rudolf Göckel (...) (Goclenius), in his Lexicon philosophicum and Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus), in his Theatrum philosophicum. The first occurrence in English recorded by the OED appears in Bailey’s dictionary of 1721, which defines ontology as ‘an Account of being in the Abstract’. (shrink)

In this article, I show that the semantics one adopts for mass terms constrains the metaphysical claims one can make about mixtures. I first expose why mixtures challenge a singularist approach based on mereological sums. After discussing an alternative, non-singularist approach, I take chemistry into account and explain how it changes our perspective on these issues.

In a number of papers, Kit Fine introduced a theory of embodiment which distinguishes between rigid and variable embodiments, and has been successfully applied to clarify the ontological nature of entities whose parts may or may not vary in time. In particular, he has applied this theory to describe a process such as the erosion of a cliff, which would be a variable embodiment whose manifestations are the different states of erosion of the cliff. We find this theory very powerful, (...) and especially appropriate to capture the intuition that the same process may go on at different times. However, its formal principles have been subject to some criticisms, mainly concerning the mereological structure of a variable embodiment. Moreover, since the notion of variable embodiment is very general, simply saying that processes are variable embodiments is not enough to understand their ontological nature. To address these concerns, in this paper we proceed in two phases: first, we propose a revised version of Fine’s original theory adapted to the case of processes, which adopts a classical mereology instead of Fine’s hylomorphic mereology, and a temporalized constitution relation in place of Fine’s function of variable embodiment; second, we go deeper into the ontological nature of processes by revisiting the notions of homogeneity, intentionality, and telicity discussed in the literature, and propose an account based on ontological principles and not on semantic properties of predicates. This allows us to organize processes into a novel taxonomy based exclusively on their unity and individuation principles. (shrink)

This article first defines the absolute discourse, then discusses its possibility in theology, as well as the relationships between language, thought, and reality as they derive from the spirituality and life of the Eastern Church. Theology must face several problems—including the paradox of transcendence, the violence of metaphysics, onto-theology, and the duplicity of language itself—, but the Revelation of the Absolute itself legitimizes the theological discourse. By using both affirmations and negations, theology reveals an iconic structure of discourse that opens (...) itself towards life and spirituality. The conclusion is that, in the absolute discourse of theology, words, even ineffable ones, are insufficient without life. (shrink)

Virușii coabitează de cca. 300 milioane de ani cu oamenii. Uneori, virușii pot infecta oamenii pe scară largă. Dar, cum a fost posibilă actuala pandemie? Încălzirea globală determină fenomene meteorologice extreme care au dus la o creștere a bolilor infecțioase. Noul climat poate susține vectori epidemiologici pentru perioade mai lungi de timp, creând condiții mai favorabile replicării și apariția de noi vectori. În cazul bolilor infecțioase emergente, se consideră că există o graniță peste care s-a sărit deja. Virușii au, în (...) mod normal, o zonă nativă („rezervorul” lor), din care nu ar trebui să fie împinși afară. Se creează astfel o intimitate periculoasă, cu „puncte fierbinți” care includ locații precum piețele, care devin adevărate focare de epidemii. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16634.11202. (shrink)

Termodinamica se ocupă cu studiul energiei, a conversiilor sale între diferite forme, cum ar fi căldura, și capacitatea energiei de a produce lucru mecanic. Ea este strâns legată de mecanica statistică, din care pot fi derivate multe relații termodinamice. Se poate argumenta că termodinamica a fost greșit denumită astfel întrucât aceasta nu se referă de fapt la rate de schimbare ca atare și, prin urmare, ar fi fost probabil mai corect ca domeniul să se denumească termostatica. Termodinamica se referă la (...) posibilitatea de declanșare a anumitor reacții chimice, și nu cât de repede au loc acestea. (shrink)

Starting from the typical case of utilitarianism, I distinguish three ways a moral theory may be deemed (over-)demanding: practical, epistemic, and cognitive. I focus on the latter, whose specific nature has been overlooked. Taking animal ethics as a case study, I argue that knowledge of human cognition is critical to spelling out moral theories (including their implications) that are accessible and acceptable to the greatest number of agents. In a nutshell: knowing more about our cognitive apparatus with a view to (...) play better with it. This meta-theoretical suggestion, however, differs from a classical objection drawn from the intuition that a given theory demands too much. -/- //// A partir du cas typique de l’utilitarisme, je distingue trois façons dont une théorie morale pourrait être jugée (trop) exigeante : pratique, épistémique et cognitive. La spécificité de cette dernière – qui fait l’objet de cet article – a été négligée. Je soutiens, en prenant l’exemple de l’éthique animale, que la connaissance de la cognition humaine est essentielle à la formulation de théories morales (et de leurs implications) qui soient accessibles à, et acceptables par, le plus grand nombre d’agents possible. En d’autres termes : comment mieux connaître notre machine cognitive pour mieux jouer avec elle. Cette recommandation méta-théorique se distingue cependant d’une objection classique tirée de l’intuition selon laquelle une théorie exigerait trop de nous. (shrink)

Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanization can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of “pervasive captivity” against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, (...) as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanized environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals. (shrink)

Revista Cunoașterea Științifică este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile științei și filosofiei, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL Știință sau pseudoștiință?, de Nicolae Sfetcu -/- ȘTIINȚE NATURALE Problems with String Theory in Quantum Gravity, de Nicolae Sfetcu -/- ȘTIINȚE SOCIALE The Adventures of Pinocchio – Education, de Nicolae Sfetcu Conceptele de putere și emergență, de Alexandru Cristian Câteva opinii privind etnogeneza românilor (1), de Dan D. Farcaș Sancțiunile internaționale, măsură suprastatală de coerciție, de Oana Denisa (...) Pătrașcu Persoanele adulte fără adăpost și importanța serviciilor sociale în procesul de reintegrare în comunitate și societate, de Bianca-Daniela Parepeanu Puncte de vedere asupra proiectului de democratizare a Orientului Mijlociu Extins, de Tiberiu Tănase -/- ȘTIINȚE FORMALE Măsurarea formei populației pentru înțelegerea tendințelor demografice, de Nicolae Sfetcu -/- FILOSOFIE Philosophy of Emotional Intelligence, de Nicolae Sfetcu -/- ISSN 2821-8086 ISSN-L 2821-8086, DOI: 10.58679/CS25335. (shrink)

Le renseignement est traditionnellement caractéristique aux organisations gouvernementales impliquées dans les questions de sécurité nationale. Mais les entreprises privées innovantes adaptent de plus en plus le modèle des services de renseignement au monde des affaires pour aider à planifier leurs propres stratégies. Le processus de transformation des informations brutes en informations traitées exploitables est presque identique pour les organisations gouvernementales ainsi que pour les entreprises, ces dernières développant le système de collecte et d'analyse des informations en utilisant leurs propres méthodologies. (...) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12444.21125 . (shrink)