Switch to: Citations

References in:

Acting on Probabilistic Knowledge

Res Philosophica 97 (1):109-117 (2020)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   530 citations  
  • Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.
    This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout the paper, I discuss racial profiling as a case study, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1266 citations  
  • Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   212 citations  
  • The psychological representation of modality.Jonathan Phillips & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):65-94.
    A series of recent studies have explored the impact of people's judgments regarding physical law, morality, and probability. Surprisingly, such studies indicate that these three apparently unrelated types of judgments often have precisely the same impact. We argue that these findings provide evidence for a more general hypothesis about the kind of cognition people use to think about possibilities. Specifically, we suggest that this aspect of people's cognition is best understood using an idea developed within work in the formal semantics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Sarah Moss: Probabilistic Knowledge. [REVIEW]Daniel Greco - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (4):230-235.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   673 citations  
  • Response to Lehrer.Edward Craig - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):655-665.
    Professor Lehrer’s coherence theory makes play with the metaphor of a key-stone arch. The metaphor is graphic, but it may cause card-carrying foundationalists to give a little private smile. After all, no key-stone in the history of architecture ever kept even a single brick up unless the walls were already standing firmly on something solid. So there you have a reason, if you needed one, for not letting the metaphor affect your preferences as to which style of epistemology to accept—not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Consequentialize This.Campbell Brown - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):749-771.
    To 'consequentialise' is to take a putatively non-consequentialist moral theory and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialised. If this were so, then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content. As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequentialist commitment to 'maximising the good', I formulate a precise definition of consequentialism and demonstrate that, given this definition, several sorts of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations