Moral Status asks what creates moral obligations toward entities. Warren’s thesis is that attempts to ground moral status on a single criterion have been unsuccessful, as they inevitably lead to Procrustean measures to fit diverse values into a single mold. She proposes instead a “multi-criterial’ approach that promises to accommodate these values. In so doing, she expands and generalizes on a strategy she uses quite successfully in her 1990 article “The Moral Significance of Birth” to show why a personhood approach (...) to abortion need not imply the moral permissibility of infanticide. (shrink)

The report of the President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity, addresses the central ethical, political, and policy issue in human embryonic stem cell research: the moral status of extracorporeal human embryos. The Council members were in sharp disagreement on this issue and essentially failed to adequately engage and respectfully acknowledge each others' deepest moral concerns, despite their stated commitment to do so. This essay provides a detailed critique of the two extreme views on the Council (i.e., embryos (...) have full moral status or they have none at all) and then gives theoretical grounding for our judgment about the intermediate moral status of embryos. It also supplies an account of how to address profound moral disagreements in the public arena, especially by way of constructing a middle ground that deliberately pays sincere respect to the views of those with whom it has deep disagreements. (shrink)

Bypassing the question of when "human" life begins, the author seeks to determine the moral status of the fetus directly by means of a rational theory of rights. He argues that all agents with an operative rational and moral capacity are entitled to full equal rights, while the rights of those lacking these capacities are conferred by rational, moral agents. After reviewing the general considerations that would lead rational agents to confer rights, the author concludes that these agents would probably (...) not choose to restrict their liberty of abortion by conferring substantial rights on the fetus. (shrink)