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  1. Why Sentience Should be the Only Basis of Moral Status.Matthew Wray Perry - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-23.
    It is fairly commonplace to think that the capacity for sentience need not be the only basis of moral status. Pluralists contend that moral status is grounded in several other valuable capacities as well as, or instead of, sentience, such as agency, empathy, or sociality. However, this contention contrasts with a standard assumption in animal ethics: that sentience should be the only basis of moral status. This article vindicates that assumption. Whilst classical utilitarians have defended a similar claim about sentience (...)
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  • Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    Can nonhuman animals and artificial intelligence (AI) entities be attributed moral agency? The general assumption in the philosophical literature is that moral agency applies exclusively to humans since they alone possess free will or capacities required for deliberate reflection. Consequently, only humans have been taken to be eligible for ascriptions of moral responsibility in terms of, for instance, blame or praise, moral criticism, or attributions of vice and virtue. Animals and machines may cause harm, but they cannot be appropriately ascribed (...)
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  • Better to be a Pig Dissatisfied than a Plant Satisfied.Ethan C. Terrill & Walter Veit - 2024 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 37 (4):1-17.
    In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and (...)
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  • Dignity Beyond the Human: A Deontic Account of the Moral Status of Animals.Matthew Wray Perry - 2023 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    Dignity is traditionally thought to apply to almost all and almost only humans. However, I argue that an account of a distinctly human dignity cannot achieve a coherent and non-arbitrary justification; either it must exclude some humans or include some nonhumans. This conclusion is not as worrying as might be first thought. Rather than attempting to vindicate human dignity, dignity should extend beyond the human, to include a range of nonhuman animals. Not only can we develop a widely inclusive account (...)
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  • Anthropological Crisis or Crisis in Moral Status: a Philosophy of Technology Approach to the Moral Consideration of Artificial Intelligence.Joan Llorca Albareda - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-26.
    The inquiry into the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to prolific theoretical discussions. A new entity that does not share the material substrate of human beings begins to show signs of a number of properties that are nuclear to the understanding of moral agency. It makes us wonder whether the properties we associate with moral status need to be revised or whether the new artificial entities deserve to enter within the circle of moral consideration. This raises the (...)
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  • On the Idea of Degrees of Moral Status.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
    A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some of the complexities that arise when (...)
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  • Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold.David Wendler - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    To provide a theoretical basis for the common view that moral status comes in degrees, many philosophers endorse ‘two-factor’ accounts of the foundations of moral status. These accounts postulate one or more properties which endow individuals with moral status, and one or more other properties which increase the moral status of those who possess them. Critical assessment of two-factor accounts has focused on their implications, especially for humans who lack the properties thought to increase individuals’ moral status. Unfortunately, this approach (...)
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  • Will intelligent machines become moral patients?Parisa Moosavi - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):95-116.
    This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue that intelligent machines are (...)
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  • Thinking Inside the Bag: Patient Selection, Framing the Ethical Discourse, and the Importance of Terminology in Artificial Womb Technology.Mark R. Mercurio & Kelly M. Werner - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 23 (5):79-82.
    In 2017, Partridge et al. published remarkable experimental results concerning the use of a new artificial womb technology (AWT) with lambs, developed at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, called...
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  • Abortion.Jonathan Lewis & Søren Holm - 2017 - In Mortimer Sellers & Stephan Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer. pp. 1-8.
    Abortion remains a highly controversial issue in many countries and subject to intense public debate. The aim of this chapter is to summarize the most prominent assumptions and arguments concerning the moral and legal dimensions of abortion on which this debate rests. Where the moral justifiability of abortion is concerned, this chapter focuses on arguments relating to the moral status of the fetus or embryo, the notion of personhood, the biological development of the embryo or fetus, and the moral relevance (...)
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  • Artificial Consciousness Is Morally Irrelevant.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (2):72-74.
    It is widely agreed that possession of consciousness contributes to an entity’s moral status, even if it is not necessary for moral status (Levy and Savulescu 2009). An entity is considered to have...
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  • Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans.Luke Roelofs - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):301-323.
    If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to ‘philosophical Vulcans’. I defend a middle position, Motivational Sentientism, on which what matters is motivating consciousness: (...)
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  • Moral Patiency Partially Grounds Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - manuscript
    This paper argues that, although moral agency and moral patiency are distinct concepts, we have pro tanto normative reasons to ascribe some moral agency to all moral patients. Assuming a practice-focused approach, moral agents are beings that participate in moral responsibility practices. When someone is a participant, we are warranted to take a participant stance toward them. Beings who lack moral agency are instead accounted for by an objective stance. As such, they are assumed to be exempted from moral responsibility (...)
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  • Your Mother Should Know: Pregnancy, the Ethics of Abortion and Knowledge through Acquaintance of Moral Value.Fiona Woollard - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):471-492.
    An important strand in the debate on abortion focuses on the moral status of fetuses. Knowledge of the moral value of fetuses is needed to assess fetuses’ moral status. As Errol Lord argues, acquaintance plays a key role in moral and aesthetic knowledge. Many pregnant persons have acquaintance with their fetus that provides privileged access to knowledge about that fetus’ moral value. This knowledge is (a) very difficult to acquire without being pregnant and (b) relevant for assessing the moral status (...)
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  • Mary Anne Warren and the Boundaries of the Moral Community.Timothy Furlan - 2022 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 31 (2):230-246.
    In her important and well-known discussion “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Mary Anne Warren regrets that “it is not possible to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman’s right to obtain an abortion without showing that the fetus is not a human being, in the morally relevant sense.” Unlike some more cautious philosophers, Warren thinks that we can definitively demonstrate that the fetus is not a person. In this paper, Warren’s argument is critically examined with a focus (...)
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  • Donation, Control and the Ownership of Conscious Things.Søren Holm & Jonathan Lewis - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 13 (2):106-108.
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  • Exploring Non-Anthropocentric Paradigms.Francesco Allegri - 2019 - Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism 7:7-11.
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  • Etica relației dintre copii, părinți și stat.Daniela Cutas - 2021 - In Alexandru Volacu, Daniela Cutas & Adrian Miroiu (eds.), Alegeri morale. Teme actuale de etică aplicată. Polirom.
    Care este statutul moral al copiilor? Ce înseamnă egalitatea morală dintre copii şi adulți? Care sunt constrângerile pe care le impune acceptarea acestei egalități în ceea ce priveşte felul în care pot fi tratați copiii în familie sau în societate ? Cine are ce fel de responsabilitate pentru copii ? În capitolul de față voi discuta astfel de întrebări. Voi analiza relația dintre copii, părinți şi stat, în dimensiunea ei practică (felul în care ne raportăm la copii), din punct de (...)
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  • Embryo experimentation: is there a case for moving beyond the ‘14-day rule’.Grant Castelyn - 2020 - Monash Bioethics Review 38 (2):181-196.
    Recent scientific advances have indicated that it may be technically feasible to sustain human embryos in vitro beyond 14 days. Research beyond this stage is currently restricted by a guideline known as the 14-day rule. Since the advances in embryo culturing there have been calls to extend the current limit. Much of the current debate concerning an extension has regarded the 14-day rule as a political compromise and has, therefore, focused on policy concerns rather than assessing the philosophical foundations of (...)
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  • Artificial moral and legal personhood.John-Stewart Gordon - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-15.
    This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the European Parliament’s resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics and its recommendation that robots be granted legal status and electronic personhood. The resolution is discussed against the background of the so-called Robotics Open Letter, which (...)
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  • Especismo.Ricardo Miguel - 2020 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como uma forma de discriminação moral com base na espécie. Em grande medida, a discussão contemporânea sobre a importância moral dos animais surgiu e desenvolveu-se em torno da crítica e da defesa do especismo. Este artigo oferece uma visão da discussão filosófica contemporânea sobre o especismo. Após uma breve introdução, apresenta-se uma definição de especismo e caracterizam-se vários tipos de especismo, sendo o Antropocentrismo o mais (...)
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  • Populism on the periphery of democracy: moralism and recognition theory.Charlene McKibben - 2023 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (6):897-917.
    Moralism is an often-cited feature of populist politics; yet, as a concept, it remains under-theorised in current literature. This paper posits that to understand the threat that populism poses to democracy, it is necessary to develop this key feature of populism. Essential to discerning what moralism is is the difference between moralism, or moralistic blame, and moral criticism. While moral criticism is a restrained and thoughtful method of holding persons accountable for their actions, moralism amounts to a distinctly punitive form (...)
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  • On the moral status of social robots: considering the consciousness criterion.Kestutis Mosakas - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (2):429-443.
    While philosophers have been debating for decades on whether different entities—including severely disabled human beings, embryos, animals, objects of nature, and even works of art—can legitimately be considered as having moral status, this question has gained a new dimension in the wake of artificial intelligence (AI). One of the more imminent concerns in the context of AI is that of the moral rights and status of social robots, such as robotic caregivers and artificial companions, that are built to interact with (...)
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  • A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi & Christian Munthe - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):195-218.
    This paper proposes a methodological redirection of the philosophical debate on artificial moral agency in view of increasingly pressing practical needs due to technological development. This “normative approach” suggests abandoning theoretical discussions about what conditions may hold for moral agency and to what extent these may be met by artificial entities such as AI systems and robots. Instead, the debate should focus on how and to what extent such entities should be included in human practices normally assuming moral agency and (...)
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  • Considering medical assistance in dying for minors: the complexities of children’s voices.Harprit Kaur Singh, Mary Ellen Macdonald & Franco A. Carnevale - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (6):399-404.
    Medical assistance in dying (MAID) legislation in Canada followed much deliberation after the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling inCarterv.Canada. Included in this deliberation was the Special Joint Committee on Physician Assisted Dying’s recommendation to extend MAID legislation beyond the inclusion of adults to mature minors. Children's agency is a construct advanced within childhood studies literature which entails eliciting children’s voices in order to recognise children as active participants in constructing their own childhoods. Using this framework, we consider the possible extension (...)
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  • (1 other version)Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals.Stan Husi - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):375-401.
    Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any particular choice regarding the basis of equality. To show this, I (...)
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  • Joining forces: the need to combine science and ethics to address problems of validity and translation in neuropsychiatry research using animal models.Franck L. B. Meijboom, Elzbieta Kostrzewa & Cathalijn H. C. Leenaars - 2020 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 15 (1):1-11.
    BackgroundCurrent policies regulating the use of animals for scientific purposes are based on balancing between potential gain of knowledge and suffering of animals used in experimentation. The balancing process is complicated, on the one hand by plurality of views on our duties towards animals, and on the other hand by more recent discussions on uncertainty in the probability of reaching the final aim of the research and problems of translational failure.MethodsThe study combines ethical analysis based on a literature review with (...)
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  • Three Errors in the Substance View's Defense.Rob Lovering - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):25-58.
    According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the “substance view,” all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in (...)
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  • African Communitarianism and Difference.Thaddeus Metz - 2020 - In Elvis Imafidon (ed.), Handbook on African Philosophy of Difference. Springer. pp. 31-51.
    There has been the recurrent suspicion that community, harmony, cohesion, and similar relational goods as understood in the African ethical tradition threaten to occlude difference. Often, it has been Western defenders of liberty who have raised the concern that these characteristically sub-Saharan values fail to account adequately for individuality, although some contemporary African thinkers have expressed the same concern. In this chapter, I provide a certain understanding of the sub-Saharan value of communal relationship and demonstrate that it entails a substantial (...)
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  • (1 other version)Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals.Stan Husi - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):375-401.
    Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any particular choice regarding the basis of equality. To show this, I (...)
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  • Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals.Stephen Puryear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):250-269.
    I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to suppose that at least many animals can (...)
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  • The Moral Status of Beings who are not Persons: A Casuistic Argument.Jon Wetlesen - 1999 - Environmental Values 8 (3):287-323.
    This paper addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them? It argues for a biocentric answer which ascribes inherent moral status value to all individual living organisms. This position must be defended against an anthropocentric position. The argument from marginal cases propounded by Tom Regan and Peter Singer for this purpose is criticised as defective, and a different argument is proposed. The biocentric position developed here is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Implications of Recent Developments in Ireland for the Status of the Embryo.Sheelagh Mcguinness & Sorcha Uí Chonnachtaigh - 2011 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20 (3):396-408.
    One of the most significant developments in the area of reproductive health in Ireland is theRoche v. Roche[2009] case. The case concerned a woman who wished to implant cryopreserved embryos made with a former partner, against the partner’s wishes. Of particular interest are questions about the status of the embryo: in Ireland the life of “the unborn” is constitutionally protected. Therefore the courts inRochehad to decide whether embryos were “unborn” within the meaning of the Irish Constitution.
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  • The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2).Rob Lovering - 2012 - Bioethics 28 (7):378-86.
    In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) (...)
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  • Adventures in Moral Consistency: How to Develop an Abortion Ethic through an Animal Rights Framework.Cheryl E. Abbate - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):145-164.
    In recent discussions, it has been argued that a theory of animal rights is at odds with a liberal abortion policy. In response, Francione (1995) argues that the principles used in the animal rights discourse do not have implications for the abortion debate. I challenge Francione’s conclusion by illustrating that his own framework of animal rights, supplemented by a relational account of moral obligation, can address the moral issue of abortion. I first demonstrate that Francione’s animal rights position, which grounds (...)
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  • Review: Klaus Petrus: Tierrechtsbewegung. [REVIEW]Florian L. Wüstholz - 2013 - Tierethik 7:134-137.
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  • Clarifying the Concept of Cruelty: What Makes Cruelty to Animals Cruel.Julia Tanner - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (5):818-835.
    The topic of cruelty features regularly in discussions concerning animals’ moral status. Further, condemnation of cruelty to animals is virtually unanimous. As Regan points out, ‘[i]t would be difficult to find anyone who is in favour of cruelty.’ What is to count as cruelty is therefore important. My aim here is to gain a clearer understanding of one aspect of our moral landscape: cruelty to animals. I will start by analyzing the concept of cruelty in section II. In section III (...)
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  • (1 other version)Zulässigkeit später Schwangerschaftsabbrüche und Behandlungspflicht von zu früh und behindert geborenen Kindern – ein ethischer Widerspruch?Sigrid Graumann - 2011 - Ethik in der Medizin 23 (2):123-134.
    ZusammenfassungDie Zulässigkeit später Schwangerschaftsabbrüche nach Pränataldiagnostik wirft die Frage auf, ob die deutsche Rechtspraxis nicht widersprüchlich ist, die einerseits Ärzte dazu verpflichtet, zu früh und behindert geborene Kind zu behandeln, andererseits bei einer vorgeburtlich diagnostizierten Behinderung des Kindes aber den Abbruch einer Schwangerschaft bis zur Geburt zulässt. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, ob die Unterschiede, die im gesetzlichen Schutz des Lebens einerseits von ungeborenen und neugeborenen Kindern und anderseits von behinderten und nichtbehinderten Föten gemacht werden, aus ethischer Sicht verteidigt (...)
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  • Abtreibung, Verstümmelung und Umweltethik: Lektionen aus drei Gedankenexperimenten.Y. M. Barilan - 2003 - Ethik in der Medizin 15 (4):282-294.
    In dieser Arbeit werden drei Gedankenexperimente geprüft, die im Diskurs zur Moralität der Abtreibung vorgebracht wurden: der Geiger von Judith J. Thomson und zwei Erwiderungen darauf von Kenneth Himma und Christopher H. Conn. Sie sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass sie von Rechten sprechen, eine besondere Betonung auf Verkörperung legen und an die moralische Intuition appellieren. Ich behaupte, dass nur menschliche Individuen Menschenrechte haben können und dass Individuation nicht auf der Verletzung der moralischen Rechte anderer basieren kann. Deshalb kann der Fetus weder (...)
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  • Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3):209-221.
    Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration (...)
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  • La place du normatif en morale.Bernard Baertschi - 2001 - Philosophiques 28 (1):69-86.
    On a reproché au modèle perceptuel de la connaissance morale d'être inadéquat en ce qu'il serait incapable d'expliquer le signe distinctif et fondamental de l'éthique, à savoir son caractère normatif. Je tente de montrer que la critique n'est pas pertinente, car le normatif n'a en réalité qu'une place dérivée en morale : l'éthique est d'abord une question de valeurs, entités dont il est tout à fait plausible de dire que nous les percevons. Pour justifier la place dérivée du normatif, je (...)
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  • Helen Frowe’s “Practical Account of Self-Defence”: A Critique.Uwe Steinhoff - 2013 - Public Reason 5 (1):87-96.
    Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, (...)
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  • Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals.Julia Tanner - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
    It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.
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  • Bioethics, Cultural Differences and the Problem of Moral Disagreements in End-Of-Life Care: A Terror Management Theory.M. -J. Johnstone - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (2):181-200.
    Next SectionCultural differences in end-of-life care and the moral disagreements these sometimes give rise to have been well documented. Even so, cultural considerations relevant to end-of-life care remain poorly understood, poorly guided, and poorly resourced in health care domains. Although there has been a strong emphasis in recent years on making policy commitments to patient-centred care and respecting patient choices, persons whose minority cultural worldviews do not fit with the worldviews supported by the conventional principles of western bioethics face a (...)
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  • On Political Legitimacy, Reasonableness, and Perfectionism.Thomas M. Besch - 2013 - Public Reason 5 (1):58-74.
    The paper advances a non-orthodox reading of political liberalism’s view of political legitimacy, the view of public political justification that comes with it, and the idea of the reasonable at the heart of these views. Political liberalism entails that full discursive standing should be accorded only to people who are reasonable in a substantive sense. As the paper argues, this renders political liberalism dogmatic and exclusivist at the level of arguments for or against normative theories of justice. Against that background, (...)
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  • Undignified bioethics.Alasdair Cochrane - 2009 - Bioethics 24 (5):234-241.
    The concept of dignity is pervasive in bioethics. However, some bioethicists have argued that it is useless on three grounds: that it is indeterminate; that it is reactionary; and that it is redundant. In response, a number of defences of dignity have recently emerged. All of these defences claim that when dignity is suitably clarified, it can be of great use in helping us tackle bioethical controversies. This paper rejects such defences of dignity. It outlines the four most plausible conceptions (...)
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  • Marginal Humans, The Argument From Kinds, And The Similarity Argument.Julia Tanner - 2006 - Facta Universitatis, Series: Linguistics and Literature 5 (1):47-63.
    In this paper I will examine two responses to the argument from marginal cases; the argument from kinds and the similarity argument. I will argue that these arguments are insufficient to show that all humans have moral status but no animals do. This does not prove that animals have moral status but it does shift the burden of proof onto those who want to maintain that all humans are morally considerable, but no animals are.
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  • The burden of self-consciousness.Bernard Baertschi - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):33 – 34.
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  • Human-animal chimeras: Human dignity, moral status, and species prejudice.David Degrazia - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):309–329.
    The creation of chimeras by introducing human stem cells into nonhu- man animals has provoked intense concerns. Addressing objections that appeal to human dignity, I focus in this essay on stem cell research intended to generate human neurons in Great Apes and rodents. After considering samples of dignity- based objections from the literature, I examine the underlying assumption that nonhuman animals have lower moral status than personsFwith particular attention to what it means to speak of higher and lower moral statusFbefore (...)
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  • The Moral Status of Social Robots: A Pragmatic Approach.Paul Showler - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (2):1-22.
    Debates about the moral status of social robots (SRs) currently face a second-order, or metatheoretical impasse. On the one hand, moral individualists argue that the moral status of SRs depends on their possession of morally relevant properties. On the other hand, moral relationalists deny that we ought to attribute moral status on the basis of the properties that SRs instantiate, opting instead for other modes of reflection and critique. This paper develops and defends a pragmatic approach which aims to reconcile (...)
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