- Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.details
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A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):87-104.details
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(1 other version)The Gupta-Belnap systems ${\rm S}^\#$ and ${\rm S}^*$ are not axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.details
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The liar paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.details
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Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.details
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The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.details
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Two types of deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.details
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Reaching Transparent Truth.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):841-866.details
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Universal Logic.Ross Brady - 2006 - CSLI Publications.details
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Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness and revision sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.details
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Truth and paradox: solving the riddles.Tim Maudlin - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Boolean negation and all that.Graham Priest - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (2):201 - 215.details
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Semantical paradox.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.details
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Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles.Tim Maudlin - 2004 - Studia Logica 85 (2):277-281.details
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Spandrels of truth.Jc Beall - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):284-286.details
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Paradoxes, self-reference and truth in the 20th century.Andrea Cantini - 2009 - In Dov Gabbay (ed.), The Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. pp. 5--875.details
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The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth.Leon Horsten - 2011 - MIT Press.details
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Ultimate truth vis- à- vis stable truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.details
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Property theory and the revision theory of definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):212-246.details
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Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth.Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.details
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(1 other version)Pointers to Truth.Haim Gaifman - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (5):223.details
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(1 other version)The Guptα-Belnαp Systems S and S* are not Axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.details
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Hopes fade for saving truth. [REVIEW]Graham Priest - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):109-140.details
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(1 other version)Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions: Parameters, Complexity and Games.Philip Welch, Kai–Uwe Kühnberger, Benedikt Löwe & Michael Möllerfeld - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (1):79-98.details
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Four valued semantics and the liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.details
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(3 other versions)A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell. pp. 282–387.details
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What are we to accept, and what are we to reject, while saving truth from paradox? [REVIEW]Greg Restall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):433 - 443.details
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Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.details
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Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):915-932.details
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XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1.Anil Gupta - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1):227-246.details
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Definition and revision: A response to McGee and Martin.Anil Gupta - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:419-443.details
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The semantic paradoxes: Some second thoughts.Charles Chihara - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):223 - 229.details
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The Complexity of Revision, Revised.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.details
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The Complexity of Revision, revised.Aldo Antonelli - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.details
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Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too.Greg Restall - 2005 - In Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Intensional aspects of semantical self-reference.Brian Skyrms - 1984 - In Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.), Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 119--31.details
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