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  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  • Luhmann, N. Social Systems. [REVIEW]N. Luhmann, John Bednarz & Dirk Baecker - 1998 - Human Studies 21 (2):227-234.
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  • Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias Research?: An Inquiry into the “Funding Effect” Hypothesis.Sheldon Krimsky - 2012 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 38 (4):566-587.
    In the mid-1980s, social scientists compared outcome measures of related drug studies, some funded by private companies and others by nonprofit organizations or government agencies. The concept of a “funding effect” was coined when it was discovered that study outcomes could be statistically correlated with funding sources, largely in drug safety and efficacy studies. Also identified in tobacco research and chemical toxicity studies, the “funding effect” is often attributed, implicitly or explicitly, to research bias. This article discusses the meaning of (...)
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  • Why Most Published Research Findings Are False.John P. A. Ioannidis - 2005 - PLoS Med 2 (8):e124.
    Published research findings are sometimes refuted by subsequent evidence, says Ioannidis, with ensuing confusion and disappointment.
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  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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