Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.

For the past two decades, 'complexity' has informed a range of work across the social sciences. There are diverse schools of complexity thinking, and authors have used these ideas in a multiplicity of ways, from health inequalities to the organization of large scale firms. Some understand complexity as emergence from the rule-based interactions of simple agents and explore it through agent-based modelling. Others argue against such 'restricted complexity' and for the development of case-based narratives deploying a much wider set of (...) approaches and techniques. Major social theorists have been reinterpreted through a complexity lens and the whole methodological programme of the social sciences has been recast in complexity terms. In four parts, this book seeks to establish 'the state of the art' of complexity-informed social science as it stands now, examining: the key issues in complexity theory the implications of complexity theory for social theory the methodology and methods of complexity theory complexity within disciplines and fields. It also points ways forward towards a complexity-informed social science for the twenty-first century, investigating the argument for a post-disciplinary, 'open' social science. Byrne and Callaghan consider how this might be developed as a programme of teaching and research within social science. This book will be particularly relevant for, and interesting to, students and scholars of social research methods, social theory, business and organization studies, health, education, urban studies and development studies. (shrink)

Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used m complexity science After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other weak objectivist approaches to emergence, the paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates at with cellular automata Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved m weak emergence.

Following C. S. Peirce, abduction is often interpreted as a first phase of inquiry where a hypothesis is formulated requiring testing. I maintain, however, that a natural scientific ideal of testing is not the most suitable model for studies on human practices. Practical experimentation follows a different kind of a logic, and Peirce’s formulations need to be developed further. I interpret abduction in relation to the Deweyan idea of a working hypothesis, and the method of ascending from the abstract to (...) the concrete. Practical abduction is about enriching the working hypothesis instead of “testing” it in a strict sense. In studies on human practices abduction continues throughout the research process. (shrink)