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How not to state T-sentences

Analysis 66 (4):276-280 (2006)

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  1. What Truth Depends on.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
    What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of (...)
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  • Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion Principles and Finite Axiomatizability.Richard Montague - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):600-601.
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  • Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague.Richard Montague - 1974 - New Haven,: Yale University Press.
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  • Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schema.Vann McGee - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3):235 - 241.
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  • (1 other version)Model Theory.C. C. Chang & H. Jerome Keisler - 1992 - Studia Logica 51 (1):154-155.
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  • (1 other version)Model Theory.Michael Makkai, C. C. Chang & H. J. Keisler - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):1096.
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  • (2 other versions)Model Theory.Gebhard Fuhrken - 1976 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (3):697-699.
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  • No future.Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (3):259-265.
    The difficulties with formalizing the intensional notions necessity, knowability and omniscience, and rational belief are well-known. If these notions are formalized as predicates applying to (codes of) sentences, then from apparently weak and uncontroversial logical principles governing these notions, outright contradictions can be derived. Tense logic is one of the best understood and most extensively developed branches of intensional logic. In tense logic, the temporal notions future and past are formalized as sentential operators rather than as predicates. The question therefore (...)
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  • An Axiomatic Investigation of Provability as a Primitive Predicate.Leon Horsten - 2002 - In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth. New York: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 203-220.
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  • Principles of truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Hänsel-Hohenhausen.
    On the one hand, the concept of truth is a major research subject in analytic philosophy. On the other hand, mathematical logicians have developed sophisticated logical theories of truth and the paradoxes. Recent developments in logical theories of the semantical paradoxes are highly relevant for philosophical research on the notion of truth. And conversely, philosophical guidance is necessary for the development of logical theories of truth and the paradoxes. From this perspective, this volume intends to reflect and promote deeper interaction (...)
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  • Modalized Disquotationalism.Volker Halbach - 2002 - In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth. New York: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 75-102.
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