Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter (...) its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ‘general logic’ built in this framework. (shrink)

In his monograph On Numbers and Games, J. H. Conway introduced a real-closed field containing the reals and the ordinals as well as a great many less familiar numbers including $-\omega, \,\omega/2, \,1/\omega, \sqrt{\omega}$ and $\omega-\pi$ to name only a few. Indeed, this particular real-closed field, which Conway calls No, is so remarkably inclusive that, subject to the proviso that numbers—construed here as members of ordered fields—be individually definable in terms of sets of NBG, it may be said to contain (...) “All Numbers Great and Small.” In this respect, No bears much the same relation to ordered fields that the system ℝ of real numbers bears to Archimedean ordered fields. In Part I of the present paper, we suggest that whereas $\mathbb{R}$should merely be regarded as constituting an arithmetic continuum, No may be regarded as a sort of absolute arithmetic continuum, and in Part II we draw attention to the unifying framework No provides not only for the reals and the ordinals but also for an array of non-Archimedean ordered number systems that have arisen in connection with the theories of non-Archimedean ordered algebraic and geometric systems, the theory of the rate of growth of real functions and nonstandard analysis. In addition to its inclusive structure as an ordered field, the system No of surreal numbers has a rich algebraico-tree-theoretic structure—a simplicity hierarchical structure—that emerges from the recursive clauses in terms of which it is defined. In the development of No outlined in the present paper, in which the surreals emerge vis-à-vis a generalization of the von Neumann ordinal construction, the simplicity hierarchical features of No are brought to the fore and play central roles in the aforementioned unification of systems of numbers great and small and in some of the more revealing characterizations of No as an absolute continuum. (shrink)

Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they are both represented by credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity.” Following Skyrms 1980 and Lewis 1980, they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals.” This essay argues that this popular (...) view is the result of two mistakes. The first mistake, which this essay calls the “numerical fallacy,” is to assume that a distinction that isn't represented by different numbers isn't represented at all in a mathematical representation. In this case, the essay claims that although the real numbers do not make all relevant distinctions, the full mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful for generating certain mathematical models, they will not appear in a faithful mathematical representation of credences of ordinary propositions. (shrink)

We show that there is a restriction, or modification of the finite-variable fragments of First Order Logic in which a weak form of Craig's Interpolation Theorem holds but a strong form of this theorem does not hold. Translating these results into Algebraic Logic we obtain a finitely axiomatizable subvariety of finite dimensional Representable Cylindric Algebras that has the Strong Amalgamation Property but does not have the Superamalgamation Property. This settles a conjecture of Pigozzi [12].

Alberto Casullo ("Necessity, Certainty, and the A Priori", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, 1988) argues that arithmetical propositions could be disconfirmed by appeal to an invented scenario, wherein our standard counting procedures indicate that 2 + 2 != 4. Our best response to such a scenario would be, Casullo suggests, to accept the results of the counting procedures, and give up standard arithmetic. While Casullo's scenario avoids arguments against previous "disconfirming" scenarios, it founders on the assumption, common to scenario and (...) response, that arithmetic might be independent of standard counting procedures. Here I show, by attention to tallying as the simplest form of counting, that this assumption is incoherent: given standard counting procedures, then (on pain of irrationality) arithmetical theory follows. (shrink)

Some highly saturated models of Peano Arithmetic are constructed in this paper, which consists of two independent sections. In § 1 we answer a question raised in [10] by constructing some highly saturated, rather classless models of PA. A question raised in [7], [3], ]4] is answered in §2, where highly saturated, nonstandard universes having no bad cuts are constructed.Highly saturated, rather classless models of Peano Arithmetic were constructed in [10]. The main result proved there is the following theorem. If (...) λ is a regular cardinal andis aλ-saturated model of PA such that ∣M∣ >λ, thenhas an elementary extensionof the same cardinality which is alsoλ-saturated and which, in addition, is rather classless. The construction in [10] produced a modelfor which cf() =λ+. We asked in Question 5.1 of [10] what other cofinalities could such a modelhave. This question is answered here in Theorem 1.1 of §1 by showing that any cofinality not immediately excluded is possible. Its proof does not depend on the theorem from [10]; in fact, the proof presented here gives a proof of that theorem which is much simpler and shorter than the one in [10].Recursively saturated, rather classless κ-like models of PA were constructed in [9]. In the case of singular κ such models were constructed whenever cf(κ) > ℵ0; no additional set-theoretic hypothesis was needed. (shrink)

A shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of process enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity, and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two foundational forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This process model of representation, called interactivism, compels changes (...) in many related domains. The discussion ends with brief attention to three domains in which changes are induced by the representational model: perception, learning, and language. (shrink)

Ambiguities in natural language can multiply so fast that no person or machine can be expected to process a text of even moderate length by enumerating all possible disambiguations. A sentence containing $n$ scope bearing elements which are freely permutable will have $n!$ readings, if there are no other, say lexical or syntactic, sources of ambiguity. A series of $m$ such sentences would lead to $(n!)^m$ possibilities. All in all the growth of possibilities will be so fast that generating readings (...) first and testing their acceptability afterwards will not be feasible. -/- This insight has led a series of researchers to adopt a level of representation at which ambiguities remain unresolved. The idea here is not to generate and test many possible interpretations but to first generate one `underspecified' representation which in a sense represents all its complete specifications and then use whatever information is available to further specify the result. -/- One central hypothesis in the paper will be that the relation between an underspecified representation and its full representations is not so much the relation between one structure and a set of other structures but is in fact the relation between a description (a set of logical sentences) and its models. (shrink)

This is a survey article on algebraic logic. It gives a historical background leading up to a modern perspective. Central problems in algebraic logic (like the representation problem) are discussed in connection to other branches of logic, like modal logic, proof theory, model-theoretic forcing, finite combinatorics, and Gödel’s incompleteness results. We focus on cylindric algebras. Relation algebras and polyadic algebras are mostly covered only insofar as they relate to cylindric algebras, and even there we have not told the whole story. (...) We relate the algebraic notion of neat embeddings (a notion special to cylindric algebras) to the metalogical ones of provability, interpolation and omitting types in variants of first logic. Another novelty that occurs here is relating the algebraic notion of atom-canonicity for a class of boolean algebras with operators to the metalogical one of omitting types for the corresponding logic. A hitherto unpublished application of algebraic logic to omitting types of first order logic is given. Proofs are included when they serve to illustrate certain concepts. Several open problems are posed. We have tried as much as possible to avoid exploring territory already explored in the survey articles of Monk [93] and Németi [97] in the subject. (shrink)

M. H. A. Newman (1928) criticized Russell's structuralist philosophy of science. Demopoulos and Friedman have discussed Newman's critique, showing its relevance to the structuralist positions held by Schlick and Carnap, and to Putnam's argument against "metaphysical realism". I discuss Richard Braithwaite's (1940) appeal to Newman in a critique of Arthur Eddington. Braithwaite believed Newman had shown that "structure depends upon content". Eddington, in his reply, misunderstood the generality of Newman's argument.

We consider arbitrary stratified languages. We study structures which satisfy the same stratified sentences and we obtain an extension of Keisler's Isomorphism Theorem to this situation. Then we consider operations which are definable by a stratified formula and modify the `type' of their argument by one; we prove that for such an operation F the sentence c = F(c) and the scheme $\varphi(c) \leftrightarrow \varphi(F(c))$ , where φ(x) varies among all the stratified formulas with no variable other than x free, (...) imply the same stratified {c}-sentences. (shrink)

In the early eighties, answering a question of A. Macintyre, J. H. Schmerl ([13]) proved that every countable recursively saturated structure, equipped with a function β encoding the finite functions, is the β-closure of an infinite indiscernible sequence. This result implies that every countably saturated structure, in a countable but not necessarily recursive language, is an Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski model, by which we mean that the structure expands, in a countable language, to the Skolem hull of an infinite indiscernible sequence (in the (...) new language). More recently, D. Lascar ([5]) showed that the saturated model of cardinality ℵ 1 of an ω-stable theory is also an Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski model. These results naturally raise the following problem: which (countable) complete theories have an uncountably saturated Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski model. We study a generalization of this question. Namely, we call ACI-model a structure which can be expanded, in a countable language L', to the algebraic closure (in L') of an infinite indiscernible sequence (in L'). And we try to characterize the λ-saturated structures which are ACI-models. The main results are the following. First it is enough to restrict ourselves to ℵ 1 -saturated structures: if T has an ℵ 1 -saturated ACI-model then, for every infinite λ, T has a λ-saturated ACI-model. We obtain a complete answer in the case of stable theories: if T is stable then the three following properties are equivalent: (a) T is ω-stable, (b) T has a ℵ 1 saturated ACI-model, (c) every saturated model of T is an Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski model. The unstable case is more complicated, however we show that if T has an ℵ 1 -saturated ACI-model then T doesn't have the independence property. (shrink)

Assume $\langle \aleph_0, \aleph_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \lambda, \lambda^+ \rangle$ . Assume M is a model of a first order theory T of cardinality at most λ+ in a language L(T) of cardinality $\leq \lambda$ . Let N be a model with the same language. Let Δ be a set of first order formulas in L(T) and let D be a regular filter on λ. Then M is $\Delta-embeddable$ into the reduced power $N^\lambda/D$ , provided that every $\Delta-existential$ formula true (...) in M is true also in N. We obtain the following corollary: for M as above and D a regular ultrafilter over $\lambda, M^\lambda/D$ is $\lambda^{++}-universal$ . Our second result is as follows: For $i < \mu$ let Mi and Ni be elementarily equivalent models of a language which has cardinality $\leq \lambda$ . Suppose D is a regular filter on λ and $\langle \aleph_0, \aleph_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \lambda, \lambda^+ \rangle$ holds. We show that then the second player has a winning strategy in the $Ehrenfeucht-Fra\ddot{i}ss\acute{e}$ game of length λ+ on $\prod_i M_i/D$ and $\prod_i N_i/D$ . This yields the following corollary: Assume GCH and λ regular (or just $\langle \aleph_0, \aleph_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \lambda, \lambda^+ \rangle$ and 2λ = λ+). For L, Mi and Ni be as above, if D is a regular filter on λ, then $\prod_i M_i/D \cong \prod_i N_i/D$. (shrink)

We construct a decidable first-order theory T such that the theory of its finite models is undecidable. Moreover, T will be equationally axiomatizable and of finite type.

We consider the problem of finding and classifying representations in algebraic logic. This is approached by letting two players build a representation using a game. Homogeneous and universal representations are characterized according to the outcome of certain games. The Lyndon conditions defining representable relation algebras (for the finite case) and a similar schema for cylindric algebras are derived. Finite relation algebras with homogeneous representations are characterized by first order formulas. Equivalence games are defined, and are used to establish whether an (...) algebra is ω-categorical. We have a simple proof that the perfect extension of a representable relation algebra is completely representable. An important open problem from algebraic logic is addressed by devising another two-player game, and using it to derive equational axiomatisations for the classes of all representable relation algebras and representable cylindric algebras. Other instances of this approach are looked at, and include the step by step method. (shrink)

We consider some modal languages with a modal operator $D$ whose semantics is based on the relation of inequality. Basic logical properties such as definability, expressive power and completeness are studied. Also, some connections with a number of other recent proposals to extend the standard modal language are pointed at.

For a complete theory of Boolean algebras T, let MT denote the class of countable models of T. For B1, B2 ∈ MT, let B1 ≤ B2 mean that B1 is elementarily embeddable in B2. Theorem 1. For every complete theory of Boolean algebras T, if T ≠ Tω, then $\langle M_T, \leq\rangle$ is well-quasi-ordered. ■ We define Tω. For a Boolean algebra B, let I(B) be the ideal of all elements of the form a + s such that $B\upharpoonright (...) a$ is an atomic Boolean algebra and $B\upharpoonright s$ is an atomless Boolean algebra. The Tarski derivative of B is defined as follows: B(0) = B and B(n + 1) = B(n)/I(B(n)). Define Tω to be the theory of all Boolean algebras such that for every n ∈ ω, B(n) ≠ {0}. By Tarski [1949], Tω is complete. Recall that $\langle A, \leq\rangle$ is a partial well-quasi-ordering, if it is a partial quasi-ordering and for every $\{a_i\mid i \in \omega\} \subseteq A$ , there are $i < j < \omega$ such that ai ≤ aj. Theorem 2. $\langle M_{T_\omega}, \leq\rangle$ contains a subset M such that the partial orderings $\langle M, \leq \upharpoonright M \rangle$ and $\langle\mathscr{P}(\omega), \subseteq\rangle$ are isomorphic. ■ Let M'0 denote the class of all countable Boolean algebras. For B1, B2 ∈ M'0, let B1 ≤' B2 mean that B1 is embeddable in B2. Remark. $\langle M'_0, \leq'\rangle$ is well-quasi-ordered. ■ This follows from Laver's theorem [1971] that the class of countable linear orderings with the embeddability relation is well-quasi-ordered and the fact that every countable Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a Boolean algebra of a linear ordering. (shrink)

We investigate in an algebraic setting the question of which logical languages can express the properties integral, permutational, and rigid for algebras of relations.

To compute is to execute an algorithm. More precisely, to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture. The key issue is to delimit the phrase of a certain kind. I call this the problem of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard models of computation. The successful drawing of this distinction guards Turing's 1936 analysis of computation against (...) a difficulty that has persistently been raised against it, and undercuts various objections that have been made to the computational theory of mind. (shrink)

A final version of this paper is in press as: Bickhard, M. H.. The Dynamic Emergence of Representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, P. Slezak Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Praeger.

Boolean-valued models for first-order languages generalize two-valued models, in that the value range is allowed to be any complete Boolean algebra instead of just the Boolean algebra 2. Boolean-valued models are interesting in multiple aspects: philosophical, logical, and mathematical. The primary goal of this paper is to extend a number of critical model-theoretic notions and to generalize a number of important model-theoretic results based on these notions to Boolean-valued models. For instance, we will investigate (first-order) Boolean valuations, which are natural (...) generalizations of (first-order) theories, and prove that Boolean-valued models are sound and complete with respect to Boolean valuations. With the help of Boolean valuations, we will also discuss the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems on Boolean-valued models. (shrink)

The Ehrenfeucht–Fraïsse game for a logic usually provides an intuitive characterizarion of its expressive power while in abstract model theory, logics are compared by their expressive powers. In this paper, I explore this connection in details by proving a general Lindström theorem for logics which have certain types of Ehrenfeucht–Fraïsse games. The results generalize and uniform some known results and may be applied to get new Lindström theorems for logics.

The question “what is an interpretation?” is often intertwined with the perhaps even harder question “what is a scientific theory?”. Given this proximity, we try to clarify the first question to acquire some ground for the latter. The quarrel between the syntactic and semantic conceptions of scientific theories occupied a large part of the scenario of the philosophy of science in the 20th century. For many authors, one of the two currents needed to be victorious. We endorse that such debate, (...) at least in the terms commonly expressed, can be misleading. We argue that the traditional notion of “interpretation” within the syntax/semantic debate is not the same as that of the debate concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics. As much as the term is the same, the term “interpretation” as employed in quantum mechanics has its meaning beyond (pure) logic. Our main focus here lies on the formal aspects of the solutions to the measurement problem. There are many versions of quantum theory, many of them incompatible with each other. In order to encompass a wider variety of approaches to quantum theory, we propose a different one with an emphasis on pure formalism. This perspective has the intent of elucidating the role of each so-called “interpretation” of quantum mechanics, as well as the precise origin of the need to interpret it. (shrink)

We prove that the two-variable fragment of first-order logic has the weak Beth definability property. This makes the two-variable fragment a natural logic separating the weak and the strong Beth properties since it does not have the strong Beth definability property.

According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show that this is not the case in general. More precisely, (...) we consider two methods of computing how probable must each of a series of propositions be in order to rationally believe their conjunction under the Lockean thesis. The price one has to pay for the proposed solutions to the paradox is what we call “quasi-dogmatism”: the view that a rational agent should believe only those propositions which are “nearly certain” in a suitably defined sense. (shrink)

The concept of emergence is commonly invoked in modern physics but rarely defined. Building on recent influential work by Jeremy Butterfield, I provide precise definitions of emergence concepts as they pertain to properties represented in models, applying them to some basic examples from space-time and thermostatistical physics. The chief formal innovation I employ, similarity structure, consists in a structured set of similarity relations among those models under analysis—and their properties—and is a generalization of topological structure. Although motivated from physics, this (...) similarity-structure-based account of emergence applies to any science that represents its possibilia with models. (shrink)

This article consists in two parts that are complementary and autonomous at the same time. -/- In the first one, we develop some surprising consequences of the introduction of a new constant called Lambda in order to represent the object ``nothing" or ``void" into a standard set theory. On a conceptual level, it allows to see sets in a new light and to give a legitimacy to the empty set. On a technical level, it leads to a relative resolution of (...) the anomaly of the intersection of a family free of sets. -/- In the second part, we show the interest of introducing an operator of potentiality into a standard set theory. Among other results, this operator allows to prove the existence of a hierarchy of empty sets and to propose a solution to the puzzle of "ubiquity" of the empty set. -/- Both theories are presented with equi-consistency results (model and interpretation). -/- Here is a declaration of intent : in each case, the starting point is a conceptual questionning; the technical tools come in a second time\\[0.4cm] \textbf{Keywords:} nothing, void, empty set, null-class, zero-order logic with quantifiers, potential, effective, empty set, ubiquity, hierarchy, equality, equality by the bottom, identity, identification. (shrink)

We study a modal system $\overline{T}$, that extends the classical modal system T and whose language is provided with modal operators $M_{n}$ to be interpreted, in the usual kripkean semantics, as "there are more than n accessible worlds such that...". We find reasonable axioms for $\overline{T}$ and we prove for it completeness, compactness and decidability theorems.

Relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability of modal quantificational formulae in which “= ” is the sole predicate is undecidable; but if we restrict attention to satisfiability in structures with the expanding domain property, satisfiability relative to the familiar frames (K, K4, T, S4, B, S5) is decidable. Furthermore, relative to any reasonable frame, satisfiability for modal quantificational formulae with a single monadic predicate is undecidable ; this improves the result of Kripke concerning formulae with two monadic predicates.