The doctrinal part of this study focuses on the early fourteenth-century debate concerning whether human beings are to love God more than themselves. The main protagonist in the debate is Durand of St. Pourçain, who argues that we are to love God more than ourselves, and not only by a charitable love but also by a natural kind of friendship. Durand, who is best known in the secondary literature as an opponent of Thomas Aquinas, holds himself in this case close (...) to Aquinas’s doctrine. Even some harsh critics of Durand and defenders of St. Thomas, like John of Naples and Peter of Palude, do not differ from Durand in their general view, merely criticizing some of Durand’s arguments and little details in his position rather than offering an alternative position. Indeed, all the participants in this debate argue against James of Viterbo, who claims in his Quodl. II, q. 20 that we have to assume a greater natural friendship towards ourselves than towards God. In the historical-philological part of this study, Book III, d. 29, q. 2 of Durand’s Sentences Commentary in its first redaction is reconstructed on the basis of Peter of Palude’s text, which accurately transmits Durand’s treatment of the topic. (shrink)

We are affected by the world: when I place my hand next to the fire, it becomes hot, and when I plunge it into the bucket of ice water, it becomes cold. What goes for physical changes also goes for at least some mental changes: when Felix the Cat leaps upon my lap, my lap not only becomes warm, but I also feel this warmth, and when he purrs, I hear his purr. It seems obvious, in other words, that perception (...) (at least, and at least under ordinary conditions) is a matter of being affected by the agency of perceptible objects. Call this doctrine affectionism. Durand of St.-Pourçain rejects affectionism. The paper has three parts. In the first part, I sketch, briefly, what motivates Durand to reject affectionism. In the second part, I will take up the affectionist doctrine as defended by Durand's older contemporary at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines, who holds that the object of all our mental acts (not just perceptions, but also thoughts and desires) is the efficient cause of those acts, or, in other words, all mental acts (not just perception) come about owing to the affection of the relevant mental faculty by the agency of the object. As it turns out, Godfrey develops a celebrated argument against the thesis that the object is not the efficient cause but a mere sine qua non cause. Hence his position offers a challenge to Durand's position, a challenge, I argue in the third part, Durand meets. (shrink)