Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Recent developments in Particle Physics and Cosmology lead one naturally to the existence of many universes. Although direct confirmation of other universes is difficult, it is not impossible. This paper is an attempt at a new theory for multiple universes. Time started long before the big bang that started our universe. In fact our universe is just one of many that exist in a larger area of space. So the big bang that began our universe is not the beginning of (...) time, but it was just the start of our universe. The idea of t = 0, goes back long before the creation of our universe. Time has been around for an infinite period. Time is not just continuing in our universe, but time is continuing in the area of space where our universe began. Our universe is not as old as time, in the larger area of space that was our universe’s origin, time is older than we can understand. The limit of time is infinite, time started zillions, and zillions of years ago. Many others universes are much older than our universe. This larger area of space contains many other universes. The number of universes is infinite, so some universes are far older than our universe. These ultimate areas of space were our universe started, is still creating new universes. Many big bangs have occurred in the past, and many big bangs will occur in the future. Big bangs are not something that happens just once or twice. Many different universes exist; in this larger area of space we can call the ‘Total universe’. In the ‘Total Universe’ energy is not conserved, and entropy tends to remain constant. (shrink)

Third World Approaches to International Law scholarship provides a trenchant critique of the contemporary international law regime, using concrete historical and cultural evidence to demonstrate that the central doctrines of international law are highly Eurocentric and, therefore, not representative of the values and beliefs of a large portion of the world's population. Nevertheless, there is almost no recognition of TWAIL's intellectual contribution in mainstream international law scholarship. It is only in rare cases that mainstream scholars make the effort to directly (...) respond to Twailian critiques. And in these rare cases, TWAIL is positioned as just another "radically critical" post-modern approach to international law. The marginalization of TWAIL scholarship is frustratingly counterproductive, as recent developments in the international order offer unparalleled challenges for populations in the South. Further, Southern perspectives are conspicuously absent from the mainstream international law discourse. TWAIL seeks to represent marginalized world-views and incorporate them into this discourse. My project is to reinterpret the insights of TWAIL so as to make them more palatable to mainstream scholars with modernist theoretical commitments. I will argue that many TWAIL scholars should be understood to subscribe to the same methodological commitments as "naturalized epistemologists" because they are interested in the causes of belief-claims, prioritizing an etiological examination of international law doctrine and scholarship over substantive analytical critique. More specifically, TWAIL promotes a suspicious stance towards belief-claims that have problematic, hidden, and/or misrepresented foundations. I will conclude that TWAIL's critique of international law is most reminiscent of a "hermeneutics of suspicion," which is the interpretive approach famously embraced by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Such an approach, while undeniably critical, falls squarely within the modernist philosophical tradition. According to TWAIL, practitioners and scholars of international law should engage in self-reflection and critically examine the epistemological foundations of their beliefs and doctrinal claims. If such practitioners and scholars agree that international law should be based on intellectual and moral commitments that reflect its global subject matter and not just its European history, then there is significant space for the insights of TWAIL in mainstream scholarship. (shrink)