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  1. Must evidence underdetermine theory.John D. Norton - 2003 - The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice:17--44.
    According to the underdetermination thesis, all evidence necessarily underdetermines any scientific theory. Thus it is often argued that our agreement on the content of mature scientific theories must be due to social and other factors. Drawing on a long standing tradition of criticism, I shall argue that the underdetermination thesis is little more than speculation based on an impoverished account of induction. A more careful look at accounts of induction does not support an assured underdetermination or the holism usually associated (...)
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  • The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
    The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.
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  • On the seriousness of mistakes.Isaac Levi - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.
    Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is (...)
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  • Must the scientist make value judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
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  • Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
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  • Values in Science.Heather E. Douglas - 2014 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 609-630.
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  • Science in a Democratic Society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101:95-112.
    Claims that science should be more democratic than it is frequently arouse opposition. In this essay, I distinguish my own views about the democratization of science from the more ambitious theses defended by Paul Feyerabend. I argue that it is unlikely that the complexity of some scientific debates will allow for resolution according to the methodological principles of any formal confirmation theory, suggesting instead that major revolutions rest on conflicts of values. Yet these conflicts should not be dismissed as irresoluble.
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  • Bias and values in scientific research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.
    When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all extra-scientific influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically (...)
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  • Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy.Helen E. Longino - 1996 - In Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. pp. 39--58.
    Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge. I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria drawn from a pool of (...)
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  • The Community of Science®.James R. Brown - 2008 - In Martin Carrier, Don Howard & Janet A. Kourany (eds.), The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited. University of Pittsburgh Press.
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  • Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
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  • Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
    This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.
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  • Science and Human Values.Carl G. Hempel - 1965 - In Carl Gustav Hempel (ed.), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free Press. pp. 81-96.
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  • Science in a democratic society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.
    Claims that science should be more democratic than it is frequently arouse opposition. In this essay, I distinguish my own views about the democratization of science from the more ambitious theses defended by Paul Feyerabend. I argue that it is unlikely that the complexity of some scientific debates will allow for resolution according to the methodological principles of any formal confirmation theory, suggesting instead that major revolutions rest on conflicts of values. Yet these conflicts should not be dismissed as irresoluble.
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  • (1 other version)Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
    APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...)
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  • Higgs Discovery and the Look Elsewhere Effect.Richard Dawid - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):76-96.
    The discovery of the Higgs particle required a signal of 5σ significance. The rigid application of that condition is a convention that disregards more specific aspects of the given experiment. In particular, it does not account for the characteristics of the look elsewhere effect in the individual experimental context. The paper relates this aspect of data analysis to the question as to what extent theoretical reasoning should be admitted to play a role in the assessment of the significance of empirical (...)
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  • Rejecting the Ideal of Value-Free Science.Heather Douglas - 2007 - In Harold Kincaid, John Dupre & Alison Wylie (eds.), Value-Free Science: Ideals and Illusions? New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 120--141.
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  • Philosophy of Science: A Unified Approach.Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - New York: Routledge.
    Philosophy of Science: A Unified Approach combines a general introduction to philosophy of science with an integrated survey of all its important subfields. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this excellent overview is guided methodologically by "a unified approach" to philosophy of science: behind the diversity of scientific fields one can recognize a methodological unity of the sciences. This unity is worked out in this book, revealing all the while important differences between subject areas. Structurally, this comprehensive book offers a two-part (...)
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  • Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.
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  • (1 other version)Statistics, pragmatics, induction.C. West Churchman - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (3):249-268.
    1. Deductive and Inductive Inference. Within the traditional treatments of scientific method, e.g., in and, it was customary to divide scientific inference into two parts: deductive and inductive. Deductive inference was taken to mean the activity of deducing theorems from postulates and definitions, whereas inductive inference represented the activity of constructing a general statement from a set of particular “facts.” Deductive inference was relegated to the mathematical sciences, and inductive inference to the empirical sciences. As a consequence, the whole of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Mind 62 (245):86-99.
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  • Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice: the case of high energy physics.Kent W. Staley - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).
    Amidst long-running debates within the field, high energy physics has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be understood as pragmatic, in the sense that statistical methods (...)
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  • Messianic vs Myopic Realism.Isaac Levi - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:617-636.
    Two views of the role of truth as an aim of inquiry are contrasted: The Peirce-Popper or messianic view of approach to the truth as an ultimate aim of inquiry and the myopic view according to which a concern to avoid error is a proximate aim common to many otherwise diverse inquiries. The messianic conception is held to be responsible for the tendency to conflate fallibilism with corrigibilism and for the consequent problems faced by Peirceans and Popperians alike in squaring (...)
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  • (1 other version)Statistics, Pragmatics, Induction.C. West Churchman - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):59-59.
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