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  1. (1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
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  • From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
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  • Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.
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  • What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
    The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, (...)
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  • Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.
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  • (1 other version)The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 520--533.
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  • Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  • (2 other versions)What is justified belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 178.
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  • Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
    According to a simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification, a belief is justified if and only if the process leading to that belief is reliable. The idea behind this theory is simple and attractive. There are a variety of mental or cognitive processes that result in beliefs. Some of these processes are reliable—they generally yield true beliefs—and the beliefs they produce are justified. Other processes are unreliable and the beliefs they produce are unjustified. So, for example, reliable (...)
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  • Having evidence.Richard Feldman - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 83--104.
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  • Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  • Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 33-40.
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  • Iceberg Epistemology.David Henderson & Terrence Horgan - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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  • Transglobal reliabilism.David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
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  • Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
    We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way.
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  • Particularist semantic normativity.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61.
    We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.
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  • Morphological content.Matjaz Potrc - 1999 - Acta Analytica 144:133-149.
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  • Reliability and Justification.Stewart Cohen - 1985 - The Monist 68:149-158.
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology: A review of Alvin I. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Gerald W. Glaser - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
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