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  1. Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists?Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):383-403.
    This target article is concerned with the implications of the surprisingly different experimental practices in economics and in areas of psychology relevant to both economists and psychologists, such as behavioral decision making. We consider four features of experimentation in economics, namely, script enactment, repeated trials, performance-based monetary payments, and the proscription against deception, and compare them to experimental practices in psychology, primarily in the area of behavioral decision making. Whereas economists bring a precisely defined “script” to experiments for participants to (...)
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  • Deception in experiments: Revisiting the arguments in its defense.Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann - 2008 - Ethics and Behavior 18 (1):59 – 92.
    In psychology, deception is commonly used to increase experimental control. Yet, its use has provoked concerns that it raises participants' suspicions, prompts second-guessing of experimenters' true intentions, and ultimately distorts behavior and endangers the control it is meant to achieve. Over time, these concerns regarding the methodological costs of the use of deception have been subjected to empirical analysis. We review the evidence stemming from these studies.
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  • A Definition of Deceiving.James Edwin Mahon - 2007 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):181-194.
    In this article I consider six definitions of deceiving (that is, other-deceiving, as opposed to self-deceiving) from Lily-Marlene Russow, Sissela Bok, OED/Webster's dictionary, Leonard Linsky, Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, and Gary Fuller, and reject them all, in favor of a modified version of a rejected definition (Fuller). I also defend this definition from a possible objection from Annette Barnes. According to this new definition, deceiving is necessarily intentional, requires that the deceived person acquires or continues to have a false (...)
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