Utilitarianism tells us that actions are morally right and good if and to the extent that they add to human happiness or diminish human unhappiness. And—or, perhaps, therefore—it also tells us that the best action a person can perform is that which of all the possible actions open to him is the one which makes the greatest positive difference to human happiness. Moreover, as everyone will also remember, utilitarianism further tries to tell us, perhaps intending it as a corollary of (...) that first, main claim, that the motive for an action has nothing to do with its moral rightness or goodness. But even if, as utilitarians, we accepted the dubious corollary, it would not follow, as many have thought, that utilitarians have no moral interest in motives. For unless, absurdly, a utilitarian believed either that there was never more than a fortuitous connection between on the one hand what we intended to do and on the other what we did and the consequences of what we did, or that, if there were such connections, we could not know of them, he must believe, as a moralist, that the best motive a person can have for performing an action is likely to be the desire to produce the happiest result. Indeed, utilitarians ought to be morally committed, it would seem, to trying to find out as much as they can about the consequences of our actions, e.g. what connections exist, if any, between how we raise children and what sort of adults they grow up to be. (shrink)

By virtue of their professional ethics as healers and because of their specialized technical knowledge and clinical experience in assessing and reacting to real and potential emergencies, physicians have an obligation to offer an unsolicited medical opinion when the following conditions are met: (1) physicians assess a high probability of potentially serious disease in a stranger because of information presented to them, either in the form of a communication or physical signs; (2) physicians judge this information to be latent (not (...) readily interpretable as potentially dangerous by the stranger) and likely to remain latent prior to the onset of symptoms; (3) the physicians possess the medical knowledge appropriate to the professional interpretation of this information. Although not a morally risk-free endeavor (invasion of privacy and the potential creation of a ‘sick role’ whether or not the diagnosis is correct), offering an unsolicited medical opinion under the above conditions can prevent suffering and save lives in unsuspecting strangers. Keywords: bystander, professional duty, patient-physician relationship, privacy, altruism * I would like to dedicate this essay to my father, Martyn C. Ratzan, M.D., who taught me never to listen to whispers too close to the window. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The british Medical Association wants to criminalise all boxing. This article examines the logic of the arguments it uses and finds them wanting. The move from medical evidence about the risk of brain damage to the conclusion that boxing should be banned is not warranted. The BMA's arguments are a combination of inconsistent paternalism and legal moralism. Consistent application of the principles implicit in the BMA's arguments would lead to absurd consequences and to severe limitations being put on individual freedom.

The issue of mandatory cycle helmets is highly contentious. The aim of this paper is not to argue for or against legislation but to suggest criteria on which the debate should focus. This is done by attempting to answer the question: 'What criteria must be met before cycle helmet wearing is enforced?' Consideration is given to principles, precedents and consequences and four criteria are suggested. The criteria are to do with effectiveness, personal liberty, public acceptability and the promotion of the (...) public health benefits of cycling. (shrink)