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Actually knowing

Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):453-469 (1998)

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  1. On the possibility of philosophical knowledge.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.
    The paper elaborates upon various points and arguments in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1993), in which the author defends the autonomy of philosophy from the empirical sciences. It provides, for example, an extended defense of the modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence, including a new argument against evolutionary explanations of the reliability of intuitions. It also contains a fuller discussion of how to neutralize the threat of scientific essentialism to the autonomy of (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  • The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
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  • (1 other version)An alleged defect in Gettier counter-examples.Richard Feldman - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
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  • Knowledge, context, and social standards.Stewart Cohen - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):3 - 26.
    This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...)
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