- Modal Knowledge for Expressivists.Peter Hawke - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (4):1109-1143.details
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Knowledge, the concept know, and the word know: considerations from polysemy and pragmatics.Rachel Dudley & Christopher Vogel - 2023 - Synthese 203 (1):1-46.details
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(1 other version)Non-deductive justification in mathematics.A. C. Paseau - 2023 - Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice.details
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The Epistemological Subject(s) of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2024 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-27.details
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Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.details
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A novel Process Reliabilist response to the Swamping Problem.Sanford Goldberg - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):465-473.details
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.details
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A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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On the Possibility of Gettier Cases for Modal Knowledge.Alexandru Dragomir - 2022 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 66 (2):315-326.details
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Evolutionary anamnesis.James Toomey - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1–20.details
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Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2022 - Argumentation 36 (4):493-510.details
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Trust and Trustworthiness.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):377-394.details
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Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
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The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
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The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):592-608.details
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Acting and believing on the basis of reasons.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12797.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):39-54.details
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Prospects for evidentialism.Bob Beddor - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.details
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No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.details
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Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy.Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):814-840.details
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A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291.details
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Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.details
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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The Analysis of Knowledge.Brian C. Barnett - 2021 - In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community. pp. Chapter 1.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.Thomas Hurka - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):589-608.details
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Introduction to the special issue ‘knowledge and justification: new perspectives’.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1473-1480.details
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Definite Descriptions in Argument: Gettier’s Ten-Coins Example.Yussif Yakubu - 2020 - Argumentation 34 (2):261-274.details
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Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference.Andrea Onofri - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (2):1-45.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.John Turri - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134.details
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Safety, domination, and differential support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.details
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Resolving the Gettier Problem in the Smith Case: The Donnellan Linguistic Approach.Joseph Martin M. Jose & Mabaquiao Jr - 2018 - Kritike 12 (2):108-125.details
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The Gettier Problem.Ian M. Church - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge. pp. 261-271.details
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The lack of structure of knowledge.Arthur Viana Lopes - 2018 - Aufklärung 5 (2):21-38.details
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Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously.Peter P. Slezak - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):529-555.details
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Lucky Achievement: Virtue Epistemology on the Value of Knowledge.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):303-311.details
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The Problem of Truth in the Classical Analysis of Knowledge.Filip Vittorio Rossi - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):41-49.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.details
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A dilemma for the knowledge despite falsehood strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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Gettier Across Cultures.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui & Takaaki Hashimoto - 2015 - Noûs:645-664.details
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How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.details
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Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.details
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