What makes a living system a living system? What kind of biological phenomenon is the phenomenon of cognition? These two questions have been frequently considered, but, in this volume, the authors consider them as concrete biological questions. Their analysis is bold and provocative, for the authors have constructed a systematic theoretical biology which attempts to define living systems not as objects of observation and description, nor even as interacting systems, but as self-contained unities whose only reference is to themselves. The (...) consequence of their investigations and of their living systems as self-making, self-referring autonomous unities, is that they discovered that the two questions have a common answer: living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. The result of their investigations is a completely new perspective of biological (human) phenomena. During the investigations, it was found that a complete linguistic description pertaining to the ‘organization of the living’ was lacking and, in fact, was hampering the reporting of results. Hence, the authors have coined the word ‘autopoiesis’ to replace the expression ‘circular organization’. Autopoiesis conveys, by itself, the central feature of the organization of the living, which is autonomy. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the functional roles symbols play in biological organisms, scientific models and adaptive learning devices, analyzing the process of how symbols acquire new functions. The semiotic categories of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics are used to examine the functioning of symbols in organisms, models, and devices. The dissertation explores how we would go about designing self-organizing devices which adaptively construct their own relationships to the physical world . It bears on the frame/feature-generation problem in artificial intelligence, the problem of (...) machine creativity in philosophy, the measurement problem in physics, the problem of generating new observables in science, and the problem of emergent functions in evolutionary biology. Much of the perspective comes out of the work of theoretical biologists Howard Pattee and Robert Rosen. ;An analytical framework is developed for distinguishing between computation, measurement, control, and nonsymbolic functionalities. A taxonomy of adaptive cybernetic devices is proposed in which nonadaptive devices are distinguished from computationally adaptive ones and semantically adaptive ones . Evolutionary devices adaptively construct their own sensors and effectors contingent upon their performance, and are thus qualitatively different from devices now in use. Evolutionary devices are analogous to the biological evolution of new sense and effector organs. Relative capacities and limitations of the device types are outlined. ;Three contemporary conceptions of emergence are distinguished: computational emergence, thermodynamic emergence, and emergence-relative-to-a-model. Levels of adaptivity are connected to types of emergence. ;Throughout, purely computational, logic-driven strategies for generating new functions are criticized as being incapable of generating new primitives. It is argued that computers have completely nonemergent behavior because of their completely specified, digital, symbolic nature, while biological organisms are capable of emergent behavior because they also include analog, nonsymbolic processes. An evolutionary robotics research program is suggested as an alternative to purely computational approaches. (shrink)