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A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists

In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dancak (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015. College Publications. pp. 87-105 (2016)

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  1. Reason in philosophy: animating ideas.Robert Brandom - 2009 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    This is a paradigmatic work of contemporary philosophy.
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  • Between saying and doing: towards an analytic pragmatism.Robert Brandom - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Extending the project of analysis -- Elaborating abilities : the expressive role of logic -- Artificial intelligence and analytic pragmatism -- Modality and normativity : from Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars -- Incompatibility, modal semantics, and intrinsic logic -- Intentionality as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation -- Afterword : philosophical analysis and analytic philosophy.
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  • Tonk, Plonk and Plink.Nuel Belnap - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):130-134.
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  • The province of logic.William Kneale - 1956 - Mind 66 (262):258.
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  • Subject Index.Robert B. Brandom - 2009 - In Robert Brandom (ed.), Reason in philosophy: animating ideas. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 229-237.
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  • (1 other version)Non-monotonic logic.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term "non-monotonic logic" covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference , i.e., that kind of inference of everyday life in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Such inferences are called "non-monotonic" because the set of conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base does not increase (in fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. This is (...)
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  • The nature of nonmonotonic reasoning.Charles G. Morgan - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (3):321-360.
    Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic. But in the standard formal systems usually studied by logicians, if a conclusion follows from a set of premises, that same conclusion still follows no matter how the premise set is augmented; that is, the consequence relations of standard logics (...)
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