Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)The subtraction argument(s).Alexander Paseau - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):145–156.
    The subtraction argument aims to show that there is an empty world, in the sense of a possible world with no concrete objects. The argument has been endorsed by several philosophers. I show that there are currently two versions of the argument around, and that only one of them is valid. I then sketch the main problem for the valid version of the argument.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • (1 other version)There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159-166.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • (1 other version)Metaphysical nihilism defended: reply to Lowe and Paseau.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):172-180.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • (1 other version)There might be nothing.T. Baldwin - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):231-238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Why the subtraction argument does not add up.A. Paseau - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):73-75.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) has refined an argument due to Thomas Baldwin (1996), which claims to prove nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, and which apparently does so without reliance on any heavy-duty metaphysics of modality. This note will show that on either reading of its key premiss, the subtraction argument Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes is invalid. [A sequel to this paper, 'The Subtraction Argument(s)', was published in Dialectica in 2006.].
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Metaphysical nihilism and the subtraction argument.E. J. Lowe - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):62-73.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations