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  1. Concepts of supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
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  • From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
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  • (1 other version)Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  • Supervenience and microphysics.Terence Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):29-43.
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  • (1 other version)Defining ‘Intrinsic’.David Lewis & Rae Langton - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 17-30.
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  • Global supervenience and identity across times and worlds.Theodore Sider - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):913-937.
    The existence and importance of supervenience principles for identity across times and worlds have been noted, but insufficient attention has been paid to their precise nature. Such attention is repaid with philosophical dividends. The issues in the formulation of the supervenience principles are two. The first involves the relevant variety of supervenience: that variety is global, but there are in fact two versions of global supervenience that must be distinguished. The second involves the subject matter: the names “identity over time” (...)
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  • (1 other version)Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.) - 1992 - New York: Walter de Gruyter.
    No detailed description available for "Emergence or Reduction?".
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  • (1 other version)In defense of global supervenience.R. Cranston Paull & Theodore R. Sider - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):833-53.
    Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties. But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on the physical, and in general that global supervenience is too weak to be an (...)
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  • How to define intrinsic properties.Robert Francescotti - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
    An intrinsic property, according to one important account, is a property that is had by all of one's duplicates. Instead, one might choose to characterize intrinsic properties as those that can be had in the absence of all distinct individuals. After reviewing the problems with these earlier accounts, the author presents a less problematic analysis. The goal is to clarify the rough idea that an intrinsic property is a special sort of non-relational property; having the property does not consist in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Varieties of supervenience.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.
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  • (1 other version)Varieties of supervenience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--59.
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  • Global supervenience and dependence.Karen Bennett - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.
    Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.
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  • (1 other version)Intrinsic properties defined.Peter Vallentyne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2): 209-219.
    Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing’s having it (at a time) depends only on what that thing is like (at that time), and not on what any wholly distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like. A property is extrinsic just in case it is non-intrinsic. Redness and squareness are intrinsic properties. Being next to a red object is extrinsic.
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  • Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities and Anti-Individualism.Oron Shagrir - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-196.
    Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not (...)
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  • (1 other version)Supervenience, vagueness, and determination.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:209-30.
    The paper is divided into two parts, each with subsections. In the first part, I shall discuss some matters that have been extensively examined by Kim, namely what the basic types of supervenience are and how they are pairwise logically related; in the course of this discussion, I shall distinguish a weak from a strong notion of global supervenience. In the second part, I shall examine supervenience in a context in which Kim has not: I shall attempt to solve a (...)
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  • Supervenience and Object-Dependant Properties.Thomas Hofweber - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.
    I argue that the semantic thesis of direct reference and the meta- physical thesis of the supervenience of the non-physical on the physical cannot both be true. The argument first develops a necessary condition for supervenience, a so-called conditional locality requirement, which is then shown to be incompatible with some physical object having object dependent properties, which in turn is required for the thesis of direct reference to be true. We apply this argument to formulate a new argument against the (...)
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