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Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism

In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-144 (2012)

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  1. IX—Wittgenstein and Physicalism.James Hopkins - 1975 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):121-146.
    Wittgenstein's private language argument refutes the Cartesian conception of the mind and thereby clears the way for a physicalistic understanding of phenomenology.
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  • Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin McGinn & James Hopkins - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):195-236.
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  • Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.
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  • Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
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  • Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  • Patterns of Interpretation: Speech, Action, and Dream.Jim Hopkins - 1999 - In L. Marcus (ed.), Cultural Documents: The Interpretation of Dream. Manchester University Press.
    Freud's account of dreams can be understood via interpretive patterns that span language and action, enabling an extension of common sense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  • Propositional Attitudes.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-523.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  • Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.
    Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person perspective -- must (...)
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  • Consciousness and Space.Colin McGinn - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Imprint Academic. pp. 220-230.
    Consciousness lacks extension and other spatial properties. But how can this be, if it arises from matter in space? The paper argues that this conundrum can only be solved by recognizing that our current conception of space is fundamentally inadequate. However, no other conception is available to us.
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  • Evolution, Consciousness, and the Internality of Mind.Jim Hopkins - 2000 - In P. Carruthers & A. Chamberlen (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 276.
    Understanding the notion of innerness that we ascribe to mental items is central to understanding the problem of consciousness, and we can do so in evolutionary and physical terms.
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  • Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (3):337-352.
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  • Consciousness and Space.C. Mcginn - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):220-230.
    Consciousness lacks extension and other spatial properties. But how can this be, if it arises from matter in space? The paper argues that this conundrum can only be solved by recognizing that our current conception of space is fundamentally inadequate. However, no other conception is available to us.
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  • Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem.Thomas Nagel - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11:69-86.
    Las intuiciones basadas en la perspectivade la primera persona fácilmente nospueden inducir a error sobre lo que es yno es concebible. Este punto usualmentese presenta como apoyo de posicionesreduccionistas comunes sobre el problemamente-cuerpo, pero considero que se puedeseparar de tal perspectiva. Me pareceque la fuerte apariencia de contingenciaen la relación entre el funcionamiento delorganismo físico y la mente consciente–una apariencia que depende directa oindirectamente de la perspectiva de laprimera persona– tiene que ser una ilusión.Enotraspalabras,creoquehayunaconexiónnecesariaenambasdireccionesentre lo físico y lo mental, pero (...)
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  • Psychoanalysis, Metaphor, and the Concept of Mind.Jim Hopkins - 2000 - In M. Levine (ed.), The Analytic Freud. Routledge. pp. 11--35.
    In order to understand both consciousness and the Freudian unconscious we need to understand the notion of innerness that we apply to the mind. We can partly do so via the use of the theory of conceptual metaphor, and this casts light on a number of related topics.
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  • The Problem of Consciousness and the Innerness of the Mind.Jim Hopkins - 2007 - In M. M. McCabe & M. Textor (eds.), Perspectives on Perception.
    The problem of consciousness is taken to concern items which are internal to the mind, and phenomenal, subjective, and private. Understanding the notion of innerness in this enables us to understand the rest in physical terms.
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  • Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Radical Interpretation.Jim Hopkins - 1999 - In F. Hahn (ed.), The Library of Living Philosophers: Donald Davidson. Open Court.
    Davidson's account of interpretation is closely related to that offered by Wittgenstein in his remarks on following a rule.
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  • Psychosemantics, or, Where Do Truth Conditions Come From?Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
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