kant’s critique of pure reason undertakes a systematic investigation of the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori so as to determine whether this kind of cognition is possible in the case of traditional metaphysics.1 While much scholarly attention has been devoted to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments as well as to that between the a priori and the a posteriori, less attention has been devoted to understanding exactly what cognition is for Kant. In particular, it is often insufficiently (...) clear what kind of mental state cognition is, what the exact nature of the conditions on cognition is, and how they are satisfied in the case of human beings. To bring greater clarity to... (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that Kant’s complex argument against materialism involves not only his generic commitment to the existence of non-spatio-temporal and thus non-material things in themselves, but also considerations pertaining to reason and the subject of our thoughts. Specifically, I argue that because Kant conceives of reason in such a way that it demands a commitment to the existence of the unconditioned so that we can account for whatever conditioned objects we encounter in experience, our thoughts, which are (...) also conditioned, require something unconditioned that, because it is unconditioned, cannot be material. In this way, Kant’s attitude towards materialism is based not only on abstract features of his metaphysics and epistemology, but also on specific features that were under serious discussion in the early modern period. (shrink)

Kants Kritik der transzendenten Metaphysik in der transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft war durchschlagend und findet auch in der Philosophie der Gegenwart breite Zustimmung. Weniger Zustimmung und Verständnis findet die systematische Konzeption der transzendentalen Dialektik, die Lehre vom Bezug der Vernunft auf das Unbedingte als notwendigem, unvermeidlichem Schein. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht diese Konzeption. Sie stellt die in der Forschung weitgehend ungeklärten Fragen (a) nach der Notwendigkeit des Scheins und dem logischen Status der Schlüsse der Vernunft auf das (...) Unbedingte, insbesondere nach der logischen Struktur der Antinomien, (b) nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen den Lehrstücken der Dialektik (von den Ideen der Vernunft als Begriffen vom Unbedingten, von den dialektischen Schlüssen, vom angemessenen Gebrauch der Ideen), (c) nach dem systematischen Verhältnis von Analytik und Dialektik als den beiden Teilen der transzendentalen Logik und nach der Funktion der Dialektik im architektonischen Zusammenhang der Kritik. Es ist die These der Studie, dass die Dialektik die Grundlage der kritischen Philosophie darstellt und dass ihre negative und ihre positive Lehre von der Vernunft unzertrennlich zusammenhängen. (shrink)

Kant conceived of 'critique' as a kind of winnowing exercise, with the aim of separating the wheat of good metaphysics from the chaff of bad. He used a less familiar metaphor to make this point, namely, that of 'the fiery test of critique'-not a medieval ordeal of trial by fire, but rather a metallurgical assay, or cupellation, a procedure in which ore samples are tested for their precious-metal content. When seen in this light, critique has a positive, investigatory side: it (...) seeks not merely to eliminate bad, 'dogmatic' metaphysics but also to uncover what of philosophical value might be contained in traditional speculative metaphysics. In this comprehensive study of the Transcendental Dialectic in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Proops argues that Kant uncovered two nuggets of value: the indirect proof of Transcendental Idealism afforded by the resolution of the Antinomies, and a defence of theoretically grounded 'doctrinal beliefs' in a wise and great originator, on the one hand, and in an afterlife, on the other. This examination of critique engages with Kant's views on a number of central problems in philosophy and meta-philosophy: the explanation of the enduring human impulse towards metaphysics, the correct philosophical method, the limits of self-knowledge, the possibility of human freedom, the resolution of metaphysical paradox, the justification of faith, the nature of scepticism, and the role of 'as if' reasoning in natural science. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

In this article, I claim that the Antinomy of pure reason emerges as the result of synthetic activities that require succession. In this regard, I show that cosmological conflicts involve different kinds of representations: cosmological ideas, purely conceptual representations of the unconditioned and the product of non-temporal synthetic activities; and putative complete series of spatiotemporal conditions, which require temporal synthetic activities. As I show, purely conceptual representations cannot produce cosmological conflicts: The Antinomy requires the interaction of reason, understanding, and sensibility. (...) I also discuss the maxim and principle of pure reason, how they lead to the unconditioned, and how the cosmological syllogism produces the Antinomy. (shrink)

This paper examines whether Kant’s Critical philosophy offers resources for a conception of empirical psychology as a theoretical science in its own right, rather than as a part of applied moral philosophy or of pragmatic anthropology. In contrast to current interpretations, this paper argues that Kant’s conception of inner experience provides relevant resources for the theoretical foundation of scientific psychology, in particular with respect to its subject matter and its methodological presuppositions. Central to this interpretation is the regulative idea of (...) the soul, which supplies principles of systematicity at different levels. Firstly, the idea defines the way in which we must reflect on mental beings, i.e., those beings that fall in the domain of psychology. Secondly, it provides a principle for the unification of a systematic body of psychological laws. In consequence, by approaching the object of psychology from the perspective of the self-conscious subject, who––in virtue of being capable of inner experience––first constitutes a psychological reality, Kant’s theory offers an attractive alternative to reductionist conceptions of psychology. (shrink)

Kant speaks repeatedly about the relations between ends or aims and scientific research, but the topic has mostly been ignored. What is the role of ends, especially (though not exclusively) practical ones, in his views on science? I will show that while Kant leaves ample space for recognizing a function of ends both in the definition and the pursuit of inquiry, and in the further practical application of scientific cognition, he does not claim that science is simply an instrument for (...) achieving practical ends. I explain his complex conception, pointing out that Kant argues (1) that the sciences require ends for their very definition, (2) that ends come in fundamentally different kinds, (3) that the relation between science and ends requires the rational determination and hierarchization of all our ends, with “wisdom” as the highest, and (4) that this determination and hierarchization – which ought to be done by metaphysics – has itself to be carried out in a “scientific way”. I show further that (5) Kant gives sui generis weight to the epistemic aims and standards of science and to the autonomy of science from our practical lives. This places his position between separatism and anti-separatism with regard to the relation between science and our ends or values. (shrink)

In § 59 von Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft steht relativ unvermittelt und oft überlesen der Halbsatz:,,so ist all unsere Erkenntnis von Gott bloß symbolisch." Die philosophiegeschichtlich ausgerichtete Studie versucht die Bedeutung dieser Aussage mittels einer kommentarischen Interpretation des ersten Teils von § 59 und weiterer für diese Aussage relevanter Texte zu verstehen. Sie erschließt auf diese Weise zunächst Kants Symbolbegriff, dessen prinzipielle Bedeutung für Kants Erkenntnistheorie und den Zusammenhang von Symbol und Analogie im Denken Kants. Die Studie legt ihren Schwerpunkt (...) dann auf die Untersuchung der Bedeutung des Symbol- und Analogiebegriffs für die Rede von einer Erkenntnis Gottes und für Kants Interpretation bestimmter christlicher Glaubensüberzeugungen. Durch diese Begriffe markiert Kant nicht nur seine Verhältnisbestimmung von menschlicher Erkenntnis zur Transzendenz Gottes. Beide Begriffe spielen eine zentrale Rolle für ein Verständnis seiner philosophischen Theologie als praktisch-hermeneutisch. Das Buch leistet somit einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis von Kants Religionsphilosophie und philosophischer Theologie. (shrink)

In this essay I analyse Kant’s view on the regulative role of reason, and in particular on what he describes as the ‘indispensably necessary’ role of ideas qua foci imaginarii in the Appendix. I review two influential readings of what has become known as the ‘transcendental illusion’ and I offer a novel reading that builds on some of the insights of these earlier readings. I argue that ideas of reason act as imaginary standpoints, which are indispensably necessary for scientific knowledge (...) by making inter-conversational agreement possible. Thus, I characterise scientific knowledge as a distinctive kind of perspectival knowledge. This novel reading can illuminate the role of reason in complementing the faculty of understanding and sheds light on the apparent dichotomy between the first and the second part of the Appendix. More to the point, this novel reading takes us right to the heart of what scientific knowledge is, according to Kant, and how it differs from bogus knowledge and opinion. (shrink)

Wolff’s relation to Leibniz and Kant’s relation to both are notoriously vexed questions. First, this paper argues that Wolff’s most serious departure from Leibniz consists in his (so far overlooked) rejection of the latter’s infinitism. Second, it contends that the controversies that surrounded Wolff’s early acceptance of infinite causal regress and prompted his conversion to finitism played a prominent role in shaping the theses of Kant’s Antinomies. Whereas Leibniz and the early Wolff considered infinite regress to provide support for the (...) contingency of the world and the existence of God, Wolff’s enemies condemned it as Spinozistic. After Wolff, the claim that an infinite chain of causes is impossible became the standard view among both Wolffian and anti-Wolffian metaphysicians. (shrink)