In this paper I consider, in connection with dementia, two views of the person. One view of the person is derived from Locke and Parfit. This tends to regard the person solely in terms of psychological states and his/her connections. The second view of the person is derived from a variety of thinkers. I have called it the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. This view, I suggest, more readily squares with the reality of clinical experience. It regards the person as (...) embedded in a history and culture. The human person is also an embodied agent. I contend that this view encourages a more appropriate approach towards the ethical issues that arise in dementia and towards people with dementia. (shrink)

In Dutch healthcare policy patients are seen as informed, autonomous experts and active decision makers with control over their illness and care. Healthcare professionals are expected to operate as providers of information. The purpose of this article is to argue that the consumerist approach of the patient–professional relationship is not a productive way to envision the patient–professional relationship. We argue that an interpretive/deliberative model is a more productive way to envision this relationship, especially in the care for people with a (...) chronic illness. This is illustrated with a case study. It concerns a study of the experiences of a Multiple Sclerosis (MS) patient and healthcare professionals involved in her care. The presented stories show that the participants did not act in line with the roles and responsibilities embodied in the consumerism rhetoric in Dutch healthcare policy. Expectations of patients and healthcare professionals are better met when care is redefined as mutual endeavour in which the caring abilities of healthcare professionals and the vulnerability of chronically ill patients are taken into account. (shrink)