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  1. Is Quine a Verificationist?Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):399-409.
    For example, Cheryl Misak in her book-length examination of verificationism writes that ‘the holist [such as Quine] need not reject verificationism, if it is suitably formulated. Indeed, Quine often describes himself as a verificationist’.[iii] Misak concludes that Quine ‘can be described as a verificationist who thinks that the unit of meaning is large’;[iv] and when comparing Dummett and Quine, Misak states that ‘both can be, and in fact are, verificationists’.[v].
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  • The significance of Quine's indeterminacy thesis.Michael Dummett - 1974 - Synthese 27 (3-4):351 - 397.
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  • The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 47-64.
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  • (1 other version)The nature of natural knowledge.Willard V. Quine - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 1975--67.
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  • (4 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • Carnap and logical truth.Willard van Orman Quine - 1954 - Synthese 12 (4):350--74.
    Kant's question 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' pre- cipitated the Critique of Pure Reason. Question and answer notwith- standing, Mill and others persisted in doubting that such judgments were possible at all. At length some of Kant's own clearest purported.
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  • (1 other version)Facts of the Matter.W. V. Quine - 1978 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):155-169.
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  • (1 other version)Autobiography.G. K. Chesterton - 2000 - The Chesterton Review 26 (1/2):23-27.
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  • The scope and language of science.W. V. Quine - 1954 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (29):1-17.
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  • Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie.Rudolf Carnap - 1929 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 8:77-77.
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  • (1 other version)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.John G. Kemeny - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):281-283.
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  • (4 other versions)Language, Truth and Logic.[author unknown] - 1937 - Erkenntnis 7 (1):123-125.
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