The logic of the commons is applied to the U.S. labor pool. lt is argued that the labor pool is an “active” commons, a commons in whichthe resource as weil as the users of the resource can change voluntarily. For this commons to be tended properly, technical solutions are ineffective and inappropriate; both employer and employee must have trust in the mechanisms that tie them together. Collaborative control is given as a possible framework for making the morality shift necessary to (...) avoid ultimate tragedy. (shrink)

This article surveys arguments for the claim that employees have a right to strong forms of decision-making participation. Itconsiders objections to employee participation based on shareholders' property rights and it claims that those objections are flawed. In particular, it argues the employee participation rights are grounded on the same values as are property rights. The articlesuggests that the conflict between these two competing rights claims is best resolved by limiting the scope of corporate property rightsand by recognizing a strong employee (...) right to co-determine corporate decisions. (shrink)

The paper suggests replacing the shareholder/stakeholder distinction with a “Dual-Investor” model of business: stockowners provide the specific capital for business ventures, while society provides the “opportunity capital.” Thus society is an investor in every business venture. Dual-Investor theory provides a response (based purely on the ethics of investment) to Milton Friedman’s arguments that executives should maximize profit by any legal means, avoids recent criticisms by Kenneth Goodpaster and Thomas McMahon, and suggests that the dichotomy between private and public ownership overlooks (...) several important alternatives. Some consequences of the theory are detailed and a sketch of a theory of property, based on Dual-Investor theory, is appended. (shrink)

The claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to run the corporation in their interests is generally supported by two arguments: that shareholders are owners of a corporation and that they have a contract or agency relation with management. The latter argument is used by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, who rejects a multi-fiduciary, stakeholder approach on the grounds that the shareholder-management relation is “ethically different” because of its fiduciary character. Both of these arguments provide an inadequate basis for the (...) fiduciary duties of officers and directors of corporations. The basis is to be found, rather, in considerations of public policy, a point that was established in the Dodd-Berle exchange of the 1930s. This conclusion also shows the inadequacy of Goodpaster’s solution to the so-called stakeholder paradox, and an alternative solution to the paradox is presented. (shrink)

Downsizing has become a significant public issue that has not yet been significantly studied by business ethicists. It is proposed that reasonable social and psychological contracts bound the moral free space of managers contemplating downsizing; the degree of constraint is also dependent on the organization's resource munificence. A framework for considering the extent of managerial moral free space and implications thereof for managerial practice are offered.

This paper discusses the normative ethical theory of the business firm advanced principally by William E. Evan and R. Edward Freeman. According to their stakeholder theory, the firm should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: indeed, management has a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders to act as their agent. In this paper I seek to clarify the theory by discussing the concept of a stakeholder and by distinguishing stakeholder theory from two varieties of stockholder theory-I call them ‘pure’ and (...) ‘tinged.’ I argue that the distinctive claims of stakeholder theory, as contrasted with tinged stockholder theories, have been inadequately supported by argument. (shrink)

Downsizing has become a significant public issue that has not yet been significantly studied by business ethicists. It is proposed that reasonable social and psychological contracts bound the moral free space of managers contemplating downsizing; the degree of constraint is also dependent on the organization's resource munificence. A framework for considering the extent of managerial moral free space and implications thereof for managerial practice are offered.