Hunger strikes potentially present a serious challenge for attending physicians. Though rare, in certain cases, a conflict can occur between the obligations of beneficence and autonomy. On the one hand, physicians have a duty to preserve life, which entails intervening in a hunger strike before the hunger striker loses his life. On the other hand, physicians’ duty to respect autonomy implies that attending physicians have to respect hunger strikers’ decisions to refuse nutrition. International medical guidelines state that physicians should follow (...) the strikers’ unpressured advance directives. When physicians encounter an unconscious striker, in the absence of reliable advance directives, the guidelines advise physicians to make a decision on the basis of the patient’s values, previously expressed wishes, and best interests. I argue that if there are no advance directives and the striker has already lost his competence, the physician has the responsibility to resuscitate the striker. Once the striker regains his decision-making capacity, he should be asked about his decision. If he is determined to continue fasting and refuses treatment, the physician has a moral obligation to respect this decisions and follow his advance directives. (shrink)

It is widely accepted now that a patient's right to refuse treatment extends to circumstances in which the exercise of that right may lead to the patient's death. However, it is also often effectively assumed, without argument, that this implies a patient's right to request another agent to intervene so as to bring about his or her death, in a way which would render that agent guilty of murder in the absence of such a request. But the right to refuse (...) treatment can, logically, have no such implication, and the mistaken supposition that it does conflates a right to die with a right to be killed. Confusion over this issue is brought out by an examination of conflicting opinion concerning the permissible termination of ventilation for mentally competent patients. A wider lesson may be drawn regarding the need for the ethical assessment of new forms of life-sustaining medical technology. (shrink)

The ability to differentiate between what is just and what is unjust may be considered as the precondition to demand one's own rights. Starting from this point, this research was carried out to describe the level of awareness of patients concerning their rights. The main hypothesis was: the higher the socioeconomic and cultural level of patients, the higher is their awareness of their rights. This research was conducted in one of the state hospitals in Turkey in 1998. It is a (...) descriptive study carried out on 128 inpatients in medical and surgical wards. The data were collected by a questionnaire, which included questions on the rights of patients and gave sample cases. The sample cases were designed by referring to the World Health Organization Declaration on the Promotion of Patients' Rights in Europe. Only 23% of the participants were able to recognize patient rights, while 32% could not; the majority (45%) were undecided in recognizing patient rights. The awareness scores were statistically significantly different for educational level categories (F = 5.84; p<0.001). A continuously declining trend was observed for patient rights awareness scores from the highest educational level to the lowest. This partly proves the hypothesis of the research. However, the awareness scores were not significantly different for the other background variables (p>0.05). Most strikingly, 38% of the patients had no idea about their diagnosis and 63% of those who had undergone surgery did not know why they had had the operation. (shrink)

Patient rights are universal values which we have to adopt. It is not so easy, however, to put such values and principles into effect. As approaches and attitudes differ from individual to individual, from society to society, and from country to country, a uniform application of these values is difficult. If we want to reach a general conclusion about the status of patient rights in the world as whole, we should examine the situation in individual countries. As far as Turkey (...) is concerned, we can say that, although the idea of patient rights is accepted in principle, patient rights have yet to be adequately implemented. (shrink)

Gillon is correct that the four principles provide a sound and useful way of analysing moral dilemmas. As he observes, the approach using these principles does not provide a unique solution to dilemmas. This can be illustrated by alternatives to Gillon’s own analysis of the four case scenarios. In the first scenario, a different set of factual assumptions could yield a different conclusion about what is required by the principle of beneficence. In the second scenario, although Gillon’s conclusion is correct, (...) what is open to question is his claim that what society regards as the child’s best interest determines what really is in the child’s best interest. The third scenario shows how it may be reasonable for the principle of beneficence to take precedence over autonomy in certain circumstances, yet like the first scenario, the ethical conclusion relies on a set of empirical assumptions and predictions of what is likely to occur. The fourth scenario illustrates how one can draw different conclusions based on the importance given to the precautionary principle. (shrink)

Objective: To gain insight into the standards of rationality that physicians use when evaluating patients’ treatment refusals.Design of the study: Qualitative design with indepth interviews.Participants: The study sample included 30 patients with cancer and 16 physicians . All patients had refused a recommended oncological treatment.Results: Patients base their treatment refusals mainly on personal values and/or experience. Physicians mainly emphasise the medical perspective when evaluating patients’ treatment refusals. From a medical perspective, a patient’s treatment refusal based on personal values and experience (...) is generally evaluated as irrational and difficult to accept, especially when it concerns a curative treatment. Physicians have a different attitude towards non-curative treatments and have less difficulty accepting a patient’s refusal of these treatments. Thus, an important factor in the physician’s evaluation of a treatment refusal is whether the treatment refused is curative or non-curative.Conclusion: Physicians mainly use goal oriented and patients mainly value oriented rationality, but in the case of non-curative treatment refusal, physicians give more emphasis to value oriented rationality. A consensus between the value oriented approaches of patient and physician may then emerge, leading to the patient’s decision being understood and accepted by the physician. The physician’s acceptance is crucial to his or her attitude towards the patient. It contributes to the patient’s feeling free to decide, and being understood and respected, and thus to a better physician–patient relationship. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethico-legal problems regarding the right to refuse treatment in Turkey's healthcare system. We discuss these problems in the light of a recent case that was directly reported to us. We first summarise the experience of a chronically dependent patient (as recounted by her daughter) and her family during their efforts to refuse treatment and receive palliative care only. This is followed by a summary of the legal framework governing the limits of the right to refuse treatment (...) in Turkey. With the help of this background information on the legal framework, we re-examine the ethico-legal aspects of the case and explain the underlying reasons for the problems the family and the patient experienced. Finally, we conclude that Turkey's legal framework relating to the right to refuse treatment needs to be clarified and amended in accordance with international conventions and fundamental human rights. (shrink)