Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an "isomorphic model" schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of (...) physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction. (shrink)

The applicability of Nagel's concept of theory reduction, and related concepts of reduction, to the reduction of genetics to molecular biology is examined using the lactose operon in Escherichia coli as an example. Geneticists have produced the complete nucleotide sequence of two of the genes which compose this operon. If any example of reduction in genetics should fit Nagel's analysis, the lactose operon should. Nevertheless, Nagel's formal conditions of theory reduction are inapplicable in this case. Instead, it is argued that (...) genetics has been partially reduced to molecular biology in the sense of token-token reduction. (shrink)

This essay seeks to rehabilitate the distinction between theory and observation in philosophy of science. Historical background to the distinction in the early development of empiricism is highlighted for clues to its later rejection as overly simplistic, and for an indication of its useful purpose in scientific thinking. The post-positivistic objection that all observation is theory-laden is considered, and key arguments against the theory-observation distinction are evaluated and criticized as inconclusive. At most such attempts to undermine the theory-observation distinction show (...) that it may be hopeless to establish the division by treating observation as non-theoretical. As an alternative to these failed efforts, another approach is essayed, according to which theoretical terms are defined as non-observational. A defense of the theory-observation distinction along these lines is developed and illustrated with examples involving Ramsey sentence reductions of theoretical to observational terms as a way of restoring objectivity to science in light of skepticism arising from the claim that all observation is subjectively tainted by prior commitments to theoretical presuppositions. (shrink)