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  1. Alien control: From phenomenology to cognitive neurobiology.Sean Spence - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):163-172.
    People experiencing alien control report that their thoughts, movements, actions, and emotions have been replaced by those of an "other." The latter is commonly a perceived persecutor of the patient. Here I describe the clinical phenomenology of alien control, mechanistic models that have been used to explain it, problems inherent in these models, the brain deficits and functional abnormalities associated with this symptom, and the means by which disordered agency may be examined in this perplexing condition. Our current state of (...)
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  • Rationality and schizophrenic delusion.Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):146-167.
    The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning pro‐cedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, how‐ever, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theory of schizophrenic delusion and propose that some (...)
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  • Schizophrenia, aberrant utterance and delusions of control: The disconnection of speech and thought, and the connection of experience and belief.Brendan Maher - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (1):1-22.
    Uttered language does not necessarily reflect the planned communications of schizophrenia patients, nor do their delusions necessarily reflect basic failures of inferential reasoning. The role of inhibitory failure in the production of speech and the role of primary experiences of discrepancy between intention and action, and between experience–based expectations and perceived realities account for many of the clinical phenomena that have led to the conclusion that these patients have a ‘thought’ disorder, or a ‘disturbed’ mind. The alternatives and the evidence (...)
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  • (1 other version)Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation.Jakob Hohwy - 2004 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion formation may also involve some kind of top-down mechanism. (...)
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  • Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley - 1999 - American Psychologist 54:480-492.
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of Science.Alexander Bird - 2000 - Mind 109 (434):325-327.
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  • Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.
    Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second (...)
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  • Pathologies of belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1-46.
    In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.
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  • Delusions of alien control in the normal brain.S. -J. Blakemore, D. A. Oakley & C. D. Frith - 2003 - Neuropsychologia 41 (8):1058-1067.
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  • (1 other version)Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation.Jakob Hohwy - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion formation may also involve some kind of top-down mechanism. (...)
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  • Reality monitoring: Evidence from confabulation in organic brain disease patients.Marcia K. Johnson - 1991 - In G. P. Prigatono & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.), Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury: Clinical and Theoretical Issues. Oxford University Press. pp. 176--197.
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  • Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
    Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
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  • Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder.Brendan A. Maher - 1974 - Journal of Individual Psychology 30 (1):98-113.
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  • A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a two-stage explanation (...)
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  • Abnormalities in the awareness of action.Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Daniel M. Wolpert & Christopher D. Frith - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):237-242.
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  • Self-generated actions.M. Jeannerod - 2003 - In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary action: brains, minds, and sociality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--64.
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